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ABSTRACT
Seeking Medical Care for

a

Breast Cancer Symptom:

Predicting

Intentions to Engage in Prompt or Delay Behavior

September 1984
Christine Timko, B.A., University of Pennsylvania
M.S., Ph.D, University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Ronnie Janoff-Bulman

This study examined the cognitive structures underlying
women's

intentions to delay or not delay seeking medical care for

cancer symptom.

Middle-aged women completed

a

breast

questionnaire that first

asked them to imagine that they had just discovered
in their breast.

a

a

particular change

Assessed were the variables specified by Ajzen and

Fishbein's Theory of Reasoned Action (i.e., intention, attitude and its

determinants, and subjective norm and its determinants) with respect to
immediately calling the doctor (i.e., prompt behavior) and monitoring
the breast change on one's own (i.e., delay behavior).

Also assessed

were variables external to the theory that were drawn from research on
cancer delay, medical sociology, and cognitive social psychology.

Re-

sults showed that intentions to engage in delay rather than prompt be-

havior were accurately predicted from corresponding attitude and subjective norm measures.

Intentions to delay were positively associated with

having favorable attitudes toward delay and perceived social pressure to
delay; however, the attitudinal factor was
nant of intentions than the social factor.

vi

a

more influential determiUnderlying favorable

attitudes toward delay were beliefs that delay would
be likely to resul
in a variety of positive outcomes,

various negative consequences.

but would be unlikely to result in

Three external variables were found to

directly and indirectly contribute to intentions to delay:

having

little anxiety upon discovering the breast change, making
non-cancer

attributions for the change, and having
for physical symptoms.

a

habit of delaying medical

cai

The bases on which respondents made cancer or

non-cancer attributions for the breast change, and the determinants of
the extent to which respondents perceived themselves as vulnerable
to

getting breast cancer were also explored.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Overview

The research presented here examined the cognitive
structures that

underlie women's intentions to obtain or not obtain medical
care upon
the discovery of a breast cancer symptom.

The methods used to assess

women's cognitive structures in regard to this situation
drew on procedures developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975) to

apply their "theory of reasoned action" to the prediction and
under-

standing of particular behaviors.
action, the performance of

perform that behavior.
factors:

a

According to the theory of reasoned

behavior

is

preceded by the intention to

This intention is in turn

a

function of two

the attitude toward the behavior (i.e., the degree to which

the individual has

a

favorable or unfavorable evaluation of the behav-

ior), and the subjective norm concerning the behavior (i.e., the indi-

vidual's perceived social pressure to perform the behavior).

Attitude

toward the behavior is the result of salient beliefs concerning the

consequences of performing the behavior, termed behavioral beliefs

subjective norm

is

determined by normative bel iefs

;

.

The

that is, by the per-

ceived prescriptions of relevant referent persons or groups.

Ajzen and

Fishbein have demonstrated that close examination of the behavioral and

normative beliefs concerning
er to gain

a

a

particular behavior enables the research-

good understanding of the factors that ultimately determine

people's decisions to perform or not perform that behavior.

1

They have

2

also demonstrated that "external variables,"
such as general attitudes

towards institutions, people, or other
targets, personality traits, or

demographic characteristics, may influence intentions
indirectly by
affecting behavioral or normative beliefs people
hold concerning

a

behavior, or by determining the relative importance
attached to attitudinal and normative considerations.

Thus a demonstration of the impact

of external variables on beliefs underlying

a

given behavior can add to

the understanding of that behavior.
In the study presented here,

given

a

a

sample of middle-aged women was

questionnaire to complete that first asked them to imagine
that

they had just discovered a specific change in their breast.

The vari-

ables specified by Ajzen and Fishbein were then assessed
regarding the

behaviors of immediately presenting the symptom to

delaying presentation of the symptom.

a

physician and of

Additional variables that were

hypothesized to influence these behaviors were also assessed; these
variables were drawn from past research in the areas of delay in obtaining a diagnosis of cancer symptoms, medical sociology, and cognitive

social psychology.

Basically, the sample was divided into those women

who intended to immediately present their breast symptom to
and those who intended to delay presentation.

a

physician

The difference in inten-

tions was then explained by examining patterns of differences in the

other variables measured.
a

The general purpose of the study was to gain

greater understanding of the decision to seek or not seek medical care

for cancer symptoms.

3

Introduction

Presently, very few types of cancer are
considered to be preventable by means of avoiding or eliminating their
causes.

Because primary

prevention of most cancers is not yet possible, the
focus of educational
campaigns concerning cancer has been on early detection
of the disease.

Current evidence suggests that early case detection,
along with adequate
diagnosis and treatment, have value in controlling cancer
and extending

survival, although the value may differ with cancer of various
sites.
In the case of

breast cancer, the American Cancer Society (Note

1)

states that the value of early detection is well documented; the
five

year survival rate for localized breast cancer

is 87%, but if the cancer

has spread by the time of diagnosis and treatment the survival

only 47%.

rate is

Unfortunately, delay in seeking medical attention for cancer

symptoms is

a

severe problem.

The American Cancer Society (Note 1)

estimated that of the 430,000 people who were expected to die of cancer
in

1982, 139,000 (32%) might have lived longer with earlier diagnosis

and prompt treatment.

It is not possible to arrive at a very precise

generalization as to the extent of delay in seeking care for cancer
symptoms, but there is

a

great deal of research that documents the very

considerable delay which commonly occurs (for reviews, see Antonovsky

&

Hartman, 1974; Blackwell, 1963).

Although delay in seeking treatment for symptoms
nized as

a

is well

recog-

major problem in controlling cancer, investigations of the

problem have generally failed to provide

a

theoretical basis from which

4

to explain this behavior.

Due to methodological problems
and equivocal

data, studies of delay are relatively
uninformati ve as to the psychological

processes involved in the decision to obtain
or not obtain medical

care for cancer symptoms.

The present paper first briefly reviews
the

available literature on seeking care for symptoms
of cancer, including
the limitations of this research and the
conclusions it offers.

presents

broader approach to the problem of delay than that
generally

a

taken by researchers in this area.

sented that

is

questions:

(1)

attended to?

is

pre-

Under what conditions are physical symptoms noticed
and

(2)

(3)

Specifically, information

aimed at providing answers to the following
interrelated

Once bodily symptoms are perceived, how are they

interpreted; how does
illness?

It then

a

symptom come to be defined as signifying an

Once symptoms are interpreted as indicative of illness,

what behavioral responses follow from this interpretation?

Theory and

research relevant to these questions have come mainly from medical

sociologists, although psychologists have recently also begun to investigate health-relevant behavior.

After these questions are discussed

the Ajzen and Fishbein model of attitude-behavior relationships is

presented.

Finally, the differing research perspectives are integrated

into the present study of the decision to seek professional medical care
for a physical symptom suggesting breast cancer.
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Studies of Delay in Seeking Diagnosis
of Cancer Symptoms

Methodological Issues

Typically, studies of delay compare two groups
of patients:

those

who sought treatment promptly for cancer symptoms,
and those who delayed
seeking treatment.

Three major methodological problems run
throughout

this body of research.

These problems concern the definition of
delay,

the methods used to determine the extent of delay,
and the fact that the

majority of the studies are retrospective.
The concept of patient delay (as distinguished from
physician
delay) refers to the time elapsing between the recognition
of
and the first presentation to

a

physician.

symptom

a

The most frequently used

definition of delay was initially provided by Pack and Gallo
(1938), and
specifies that delay occurs when the patient waits more than three

months from the onset of symptoms before consulting

a

doctor.

In

studies of factors related to delay, this three month period has been
used to differentiate delaying patients from prompt patients.
The consistent use of Pack and Gallo's definition of delay constitutes the only basis for comparison among studies in this area.

tunately, this definition is problematic.

Unfor-

First of all, as Kutner and

Gordan (1961) have stated, if three months is considered to be

reason-

a

able time in which to seek medical care, this implies that no significant changes in health status occur during that interval; however, no
such guarantees appear warranted.

Secondly, cancer is actually

a

group

of diseases, and the biological nature and rate of growth of different

6

types of neoplasms may vary, as may
the resistance of the host.
fore,

a

There-

certain time period of delay may be
deleterious delay for can cer

of one site, but not delay at all for
cancer of another site (Blackwell,
1963).
In response to the problem of defining
delay, Makover (1963) sug-

gested that delay should ideally be defined
in terms of knowledge of

specific pathogeneses of specific cancers, rather
than using

a

broad,

arbitrary unit of time which does not account for
varying growth rates
and danger periods for different cancers.

The limitations of current

knowledge, however, make such an ideal appear unattainable
in the fore-

seeable future.

Kutner and Gordan (1961) argue that promptness and

delay should both be defined in terms of deviations
from the norm of
medical help seeking for
In

a

particular symptom in

particular sample.

a

this approach, delaying and prompt patients are defined in
relation

to the population from which they are sampled, and in relation
to the

specific symptom they did or did not neglect.
is

If the goal

to compare delayers to nondelayers, Kutner and Gordan

's

of research

method of

empirically defining delay and nondelay, instead of relying on an arbitrary time criterion, seems preferable.

Antonovsky and Hartman (1974) have raised

problem that is present in studies of delay.

a

second methodological

They point out that inves-

tigators rarely state explicitly what question was asked of patients in

order to determine the extent of delay.

It is

likely that the same

individual would provide different answers concerning the extent of
delay, depending on whether s/he was asked about

a

pain episode,

a

7

persistent pain, an unusual physical sensation, or
and so on.

a

physical symptom,

The effects of particular questions on patients'
self-

reports of extent of delay can be determined only
through further research.

Until such research becomes available, investigators
should

provide the specific questions asked of respondents, along
with the
rationale underlying the choice of questions.
A less easily solved methodological problem concerns the
retro-

spective nature of delay research.

Most delay studies are based on the

recollections of patients who have sought diagnosis and treatment for

cancer symptoms.

Although prospective studies of delay would be diffi-

cult to carry out, at the very least an attempt should be made to examine the reliability and validity of respondents'

retrospective accounts.

Findings of Delay Research

Basically, studies of delay ask why people delay seeking care for

cancer symptoms, and compare delaying patients and prompt patients on
variety of characteristics.

rather than explanatory.

a

Delay research has tended to be descriptive

People who do or do not delay are described in

terms of demographic and personality factors; their relationships with

medical practitioners and their attitudes toward the health care system;

their anxiety, knowledge, and previous experience in relation to cancer;
and their habits of medical care seeking.
to specify in any detail

There have been few attempts

the various processes-- the stages and types of

decisions--that enter into the seeking of professional medical care for
cancer symptoms.

8

One of the first approaches taken
in the study of why
people delay
was to compare delayers and nondelayers
on demographic variables
such as
age, gender, occupation, income, and
education.
A consistent finding is

that lower socioeconomic status and lower
educational achievement tend
to be associated with delay.

Age is the third most powerful
variable in

predicting delay behavior, in that delayers tend
to be older.

Beyond

these tendencies, no firm generalizations
can be made regarding the

relationship between demographic variables and delay.

For instance,

Marshall, Gregorio, and Walsh (1982) found that
gender differences in
care seeking among individuals with cancer were
negligible.

These find-

ings were based on assessments of both the
stage of disease at which

patients reported for treatment and the duration of delay
between their

reported first notice of symptoms and the diagnosis.

There is only one

situation in which background characteristics might directly
explain
delay:

when the procurement of medical care necessarily requires finan-

cial outlay, low socioeconomic status would possibly account for
delay

behavior.

In all

other cases, demographic variables can be operative

solely through other variables.

For example, it may be that older

people delay more because they are overrepresented in groups of lower

socioeconomic status.

For reviews of research examining the relation-

ship between general background factors and delay, see Antonovsky and

Hartman (1974); Kasl and Cobb (1966); and Rosenstock and Kirscht (1979).
A second approach taken in the study of delay behavior has been to

compare patients who delayed seeking care for cancer symptoms with
prompt patients on their responses to personality tests and/or

9

psychological or psychiatric interviews.
four major issues:

These investigations focus
on

general emotional health (e.g.,
Cameron & Hinton,

1968; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower
& Lougheed, 1958; Worden
&

Weisman, 1975), intellectual capacity
(e.g., Aitken-Swan

&

Paterson,

1955), hypochondria and body image (e.g.. Fisher,
1967; Gold, 1964;

Hammerschlag, Fisher, DeCosse & Kaplan, 1964;
Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Sugar &
Watkins, 1961), and styles of

coping with fear (e.g., Aitken-Swan & Paterson,
1955; Cobb, Clark,

McGuire

&

Howe, 1954; Hammerschlag et

Lougheed, 1958; Shands

,

al

.

,

1964; Henderson, Wittkower &

Finesinger, Cobb & Abrams, 1951).

There is very

little consistency in the findings regarding these
issues; for

a

review

of this literature, see Antonovsky and Hartman
(1974).

Studies of delay in seeking

a

cancer diagnosis have further exam-

ined the attitudinal and behavioral relationship of
individuals to their

doctors and to the medical care system.

Findings regarding the influ-

ence of patients' perceptions of their relationship with
doctors on medical

help-seeking are equivocal.

Some researchers have suggested that

"good" doctor-patient relationships, or at least having

a

doctor one

considers to be one's family physician, facilitates prompt help-seeking
for cancer symptoms.

The same investigators have reported that delayers

tend to be unable to form satisfactory relationships with doctors, and
to feel

uncomfortable in these relationships (Cobb et al., 1954; Hen-

derson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower
1950).

On the other hand,

&

Lougheed, 1958; King & Leach,

subsequent studies have found no meaningful

differences between delayers and non-delayers in terms of their
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attitudes toward their doctors (Clements
1974).

&

Wakefield, 1972; Greer,

The lack of consistency among studies
as to how attitudes
toward

doctors are measured contributes greatly
to the ambiguity surrounding
this issue.

Investigations of people's relationships to
the health care

system have focused on variables such as the
expense of the health care
facility, travel distance to the facility, and
the type of health insurance coverage carried by respondents.

In several

studies, reasons given

by delayers for why they delayed obtaining
treatment for cancer symptoms

did involve inadequate financial resources and
lack of transportation to
the doctor (Cobb et

al

Lougheed, 1958; Lynch

.

&

,

1954; Gold, 1964; Henderson, Wittkower &

Krush,

1969).

However, no attempts have been

made to determine the extent to which these factors affect
delay.
One of the most prevalent approaches taken in the study of
delay
has been to examine the variables of affective reactions to
cancer,

knowledge about cancer and cancer symptoms, and previous experience with

cancer in oneself, relatives, and friends.

Fear is by far the most

frequently cited reason for delay in obtaining
symptoms.

a

diagnosis of cancer

Delay is attributed not only to fear of cancer itself— of its

diagnosis, treatment, pain, incurability, and stigma— but also to fear
of doctors, physical exams, hospitals, surgery, anesthesia, disfigure-

ment, leaving home, losing one's job, dependency, embarrassment upon

seeking care for

a

trivial symptom, and many other related factors

(Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Burdick & Chanatry, 1954; Cameron
Hinton, 1968; Clements & Wakefield, 1972; Cobb et

al

.

,

&

1954; Gold, 1964;

n
Greer, 1974; Henderson, 1966; Henderson,
Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958;
Lynch & Krush, 1968, 1969; Roberts,
1965).

Researchers investigating coping mechanisms
in patients with can-

cer commonly state that if excessive fear
is aroused by the discovery
of

cancer symptoms, the patient reacts by denying
or avoiding the symptoms
(Bard & Sutherland, 1955; Cameron & Hinton,
1968; Shands et

al

.

,

1951).

These defensive reactions are thought to
function to reduce anxiety, but
also to delay medical care seeking.
to the patient's

In this

view, delay is due largely

unwillingness or inability to experience the distress

aroused by the suspicion of cancer.

Data from studies of delay are

interpreted as supporting this view, in that delayers are
often reported
to have employed the repressive mechanisms of denial,
avoidance, or

fatalism (Aitken-Swan & Paterson, 1955; Cobb et

al

.

,

1954; Eardley,

1974; Greer, 1974; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed,
1958; Lynch & Krush, 1969; Worden & Weisman, 1975).

The absence of fear upon discovering symptoms of cancer is also

believed by some researchers to deter early action in obtaining medical
treatment for those symptoms.

In almost all

studies in which patients

were interviewed about why they had delayed seeking care,

a

high percen-

tage mentioned that they did not consider their symptoms to be serious,

unusual, abnormal, or significant.

appeared to have

a

Prompt patients, on the other hand,

greater awareness that their symptoms were indeed

serious (e.g., Cobb et al., 1954; Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Henderson,
1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; Worden & Weisman, 1975).

Furthermore, studies by Cameron and Hinton (1968) and Sugar and Watkins

.
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(1961) of women with breast cancer symptoms
both suggested that concern

or anxiety is

a

healthy response to the discovery of
cancer symptoms,

since these affective reactions were associated
with early help seeking
in their samples.

Cameron and Hinton found that delayers were
less

likely than nondelayers to have been worried
when they discovered
in their breast.

a

lump

Patients in the Sugar and Watkins study who
sought

care promptly reported feeling anxious about the
possibility of having
an operation; delayers, however, reported feeling
depressed about the

possibility of mastectomy.

In this case,

depression, rather than

anxiety, was thought to promote delay through the avoidance
or denial of
symptoms
In reviewing the literature on the relationship between
anxiety

and delay in procuring medical care for cancer symptoms,
Antonovsky and

Hartman (1974) and Kasl and Cobb (1966) have suggested that although
it
is

not clear how anxiety influences delay, the true relationship may be

curvilinear.

A moderate degree of fear regarding the consequences of

cancer may be conducive to nondelay, whereas both little and great fear
may encourage delay.

The suggestion of a curvilinear relation is said

to follow from Janis'

(1967; Janis & Feshbach, 1953) model of the

extent to which fear arousing communications about the dangers of non-

compliance to

a

particular course of action are effective in persuading

people to adopt the recommended behavior.

In fact, however,

delay

researchers have greatly oversimplified Janis' model in attempting to

provide post-hoc explanations for findings concerning the relationship
between anxiety and delay.

Furthermore, the model Janis actually

13

proposed has been criticized on

a

number of grounds by Leventhal
(1970),

who concluded that its predictions
are largely unsupported by
empirical'
evi dence.

The possession of knowledge relating
to cancer has been viewed
as

particularly important with respect to the
ability to define
deviation as

a

possible symptom of cancer.

order to seek care promptly for

a

a

given

It is often assumed that in

cancer symptom, one must be knowledge-

able enough about cancer to recognize the
meaning of the abnormality.

Part of the confusion surrounding studies of
the relationship between

knowledge and delay arises from the failure of
investigators to explicitly distinguish knowledge about cancer symptoms
in general from knowledge about cancer symptoms in relation to oneself.

An individual may

be familiar with the warning signs of cancer,
and yet not "know" that
his or her own symptom is a symptom of cancer.

These different types of

knowledge may differentially affect delay.
Knowledge of cancer in general

— the

ability to recognize the seven

warning signals of cancer, or having been informed about cancer through
the mass media— is believed by some researchers to be necessary but
not

sufficient to prevent delay in securing care for symptoms.

For example,

since both the delaying and nondelaying groups in the Henderson (1966;
Henderson, Wittkower

&

Lougheed, 1958) and Sugar and Watkins (1961)

studies were familiar with the seven warning signs, the authors con-

cluded that knowledge of cancer symptoms fails to induce some patients
to seek early medical assistance.

Similarly, Hackett, Cassem and Raker

(1973) found that patients who appeared to be fully informed about the

14

signs and symptoms of cancer still
did not respond to their own
symptoms
with appropriate promptness.

Available evidence suggests that many
patients think of cancer
when they first notice symptoms of the
disease, but there is no consistency among studies as to the proportion
who do so.

Several studies in-

dicate that relating one's knowledge about
cancer symptoms in general to
one's own symptoms facilitates speedier help
seeking.

King and Leach

(1950) stated that the aspect in which their delay
patients differed

most from nondelay patients was the interpretation
of first symptoms of
cancer.

Nondelay patients most frequently interpreted their
first symp-

toms as a cancerous or precancerous condition,
or else had no specific

idea as to what the symptoms might mean and "just
realized that some-

thing was wrong."
a

recurrence of

a

Delay patients tended to interpret their symptoms as

previous illness or as a common illness.

Thus, in

those cases in which the possibility of cancer was considered
in relation to one's symptoms, this by itself was

promptly.

In a

a

reason for seeing

a

doctor

similar way, Cameron and Hinton (1968), Eardley (1974),

and Sugar and Watkins (1961) have all suggested that those patients
who

openly acknowledge that their symptoms may indicate cancer usually
report to the physician early.
On the other hand, Aitken-Swan and Paterson (1955) speculated

that, in general, there are two clear-cut groups of delayers:

those who

"know" they might have cancer, and those who are genuinely ignorant of
the possible significance of their symptoms.

In their sample,

average length of delay was higher among the "knowers" than the

the

15

"nonknowers," which suggested to
the authors that the "knowers"
were too
fearful to seek a diagnosis.
The authors concluded that
two distinct
processes of fear and ignorance operate
to cause delay.
Burdick and

Chanatry (1954) also stated that fear
and ignorance are the most
common
reasons for delay in securing care
for cancer symptoms.
Ignorance was
ruled out by Greer (1974) as

a

possible explanation for the finding
that

the majority of delayers in his sample
initially regarded their symptoms
as

"definitely not serious."

Rather, the tendency for delayers
to

defend against stressful life events with
denial was given in explanation for this finding.

How one might go about distinguishing
the

defensive denial of cancer symptoms from
genuine ignorance as to the

meaning of symptoms

is

obviously problematic.

Currently, it is generally accepted that the
relationship between

knowledge about cancer-about cancer symptoms in
general or in relation
to oneself--and delay is not a simple one.

Rather, it appears that

knowledge interacts with affective orientations toward
cancer, resulting
in differential

behavior outcomes.

Goldsen, Gerhardt and Handy (1957)

found, for example, that anxiety about cancer (i.e.,
worrying that one's

symptoms signify cancer) did not increase the tendency to delay,
nor was

knowledge about cancer (i.e., the ability to recognize cancer warning
signals) related to delay.

However, "cancer worrying" and knowledge in

combination did serve to increase delay.

The authors concluded that in-

dividuals who recognize the danger signals of cancer will be most likely
to seek early diagnosis of symptoms if they feel

no general

anxiety
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about cancer.

If people do feel such general

anxiety, knowledge

my

increase the tendency to delay.
King and Leach (1950) distinguished
two types of anxiety in relation to cancer symptoms that differentiated
the nondelayers and delayers
in their study.

Prompt patients expressed great concern
over the effect

of their condition on themselves if
neglected.

In

contrast,

a

typical

reaction among delayers was fear of finding
out the nature of their illness or fear of the effects of surgery
or other treatments.

In other

words, nondelayers tended to feel anxious about
the implications of not
treating their symptoms, while delaying patients
were anxious about the
implications of treatment.

Kutner and Gordan (1961) reported that delay

in seeking care for symptoms of cancer was
least for those patients hav-

ing maximal

knowledge regarding cancer symptoms, but greatest for
those

having minimal knowledge about cancer.

However, the authors also

suggested that in the maximal knowledge group, fear of the
consequences
of delay promoted prompt action, whereas in the minimal knowledge
group,
fear of the possible significance of their symptoms promoted
delayed
action.

These studies concerning the interaction of knowledge and anxiety
in relation to cancer suggest that knowledge of cancer warning signals

or knowledge that one's own symptoms may signify cancer are not the only
types of knowledge that influence taking action to seek care.

one's ability to define

a

given symptom as

a

While

symptom of cancer most

likely does play an important role in help seeking behavior, one's

knowledge and beliefs concerning the risk factors, various treatments.
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survival rates, and so on, for
different types of cancer, are
also likely to be important.
Cobb et al
(1954) examined the relation
between
knowledge and delay, but looked at
patients' knowledge concerning
treatments for cancer and the desirability
of early treatment, in addition
to
their knowledge of cancer symptoms
per se.
It was found that when
.

knowledge was operational i zed this way,
the possession of knowledge
was
a trigger to prompt action.
Similarly, Eardley (1974) reported
that one
of the main factors distinguishing delaying
and prompt patients in her

sample was that delayers were unconvinced
of the value of early medical
attention in contributing to survival from
cancer.

Research on the

relationships among the variables of knowledge
and affective and behavioral

responses to symptoms of cancer would be more
informative if

knowledge were conceptualized more broadly than

as

the simple recogni-

tion of cancer symptoms.

There is

a

lack of consistency in the results of studies
that have

investigated the effect of prior experience with cancer
on delay behavior.

In several

cases, previous contact with cancer, i.e., knowing

a

family member, friend, or acquaintance who had or died
of the disease,
was found to be unrelated to the time elapsed between
the onset of symptoms and the first medical

visit (Abrams & Finesinger, 1953; Cameron &

Hinton, 1968; Greer, 1974; Hackett, Cassem

Weisman, 1975).
however, given as

& Raker,

1973; Worden &

Previous experience with others who died of cancer was,
a

reason for delayed action in the Henderson (1966;

Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958) studies.

Aitken-Swan and Pater-

son (1955) stated that knowing a friend or relative who died of cancer
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increased delay, although knowing
outcome did not decrease delay.

a

cancer victiin with

Cobb et al.

prior cancer history in one's family
was

a

a

successful

(1954) found that having

a

motivational force toward

delay, if the relative's outcome
was poor; if the other's outcome
was

successful, this experience encouraged
prompt behavior.

It would seem

reasonable to include the perception of
the quality of others' outcomes
from cancer as a variable in investigations
of the influence of previo us

experience with the disease on obtaining

a

diagnosis of symptoms.

The final approach to be discussed that
has been taken in studies

of delay involves behavioral dispositions
toward medical care.

This ap-

proach asks if behavior that facilitates the
early detection of cancer
follows the same pattern that characterizes other
medical habits of an

individual.

The literature concerning this question seems
to indicate

that the answer is yes.

King and Leach (1950) stated that the cancer
patients in their

sample responded to symptoms of cancer in very much the
same way they
had managed symptoms of past illnesses.
a

Patients who had previously had

habit of seeing doctors only when in extreme discomfort
or in emergen-

cies delayed in securing care for cancer symptoms.

curred among cancer patients who gave

a

Much less delay oc-

history of consulting physicians

for anything unusual or that they did not understand, regardless of

severity or discomfort.

The authors concluded that delay or nondelay in

seeking care for cancer symptoms depends largely on the nature of reactions to illness that patients have previously established.

Goldsen, Gerhardt, and Handy (1957) suggested that delay

is

Similarly,

much less
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related to the emergence of

a

specific symptom and its
possible implica-

tions than to the cluster
of long standing orientations
to medical
problems that people have built
up during the course of
a lifetime.

Their respondents appeared to
seek

prompt diagnosis of cancer
symptoms

a

to the extent that they would
do so for any major or minor
symptom.

Clements and Wakefield (1972)
also indicated that patients
reporting
promptly for cancer symptoms are
more disposed than delaying
patients to
seek medical care for any symptom
of illness. A greater proportion
of

nondelayers than delayers "had made

a

habit of consulting

a

doctor regu-

larly" in the Henderson, Wittkower
and Lougheed (1958) study, and

Hackett, Cassem and Raker (1973) found

a

high positive correlation

between responses to "do you tend to
put off seeing your doctor" and
"did you put it off this time."
The findings of Cameron and Hinton
(1968) run counter to the re-

sults of studies on habits of medical
care already cited, for in their

sample, those patients who considered
themselves generally slow to

consult

a

doctor did not delay more for cancer symptoms.

There is

limited evidence that delay in seeking care
for cancer symptoms

greater than that for seeking care for general
medical symptoms.

is

Kutner

and Gordan (1961) compared delay in the
presence of the seven danger

signals of cancer to delay when other symptoms
were reported, and found
that a higher frequency of longer delays occurred
in the presence of

cancer symptoms.

Aside from the latter two studies, the bulk of the

evidence would seem to indicate that delay in seeking
possible cancer symptoms reflects

a

a

diagnosis of

general pattern of medical delay.
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Summary

Although

a

great number of studies have
attempted to answer the

question of why people delay obtaining
treatment for symptoms of cancer,
the research yields few definitive
responses to the question.
In terns
of demographic factors, delayers
tend to be of lower socioeconomic
status, to have fewer years of
fonnal education, and to be
older.
be that people's behavioral

It may

reactions to cancer symptoms are
similar to

their behavioral reactions to
previously experienced physical
symptoms,
suggesting that people develop general
habits in relation to medical
help seeking.

There is

a

growing acceptance of the idea that the
rela-

tionship between anxiety regarding
cancer symptoms and delay in seeking
care for symptoms is curvilinear,
but that knowledge of cancer interacts

with anxiety to influence help seeking
behavior.

Evidence concerning

the effects on delay of personality
factors, attitudes toward doctors

and the health care system, and previous
experience with cancer is

inconclusive at this time.

Perceiving, Interpreting, and Responding
to Symptoms

The relative failure of research to provide
answers to the ques-

tion of why people delay seeing

a

doctor about cancer symptoms may stem

from the fact that theoretical frameworks in which
to explore delay have
been absent from studies of the problem.

The descriptive nature of

delay research has not allowed investigators to get at the decision

making processes people go through before they arrive at
the doctor's
office.

Medical sociologists have approached the general issue
of
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people's responses to physical
symptoms through the concept
of illness
behavior (cf. Kasl & Cobb,
1966; Mechanic, 1962a).
According to Kasl
and Cobb (1966), "the basic
problem of illness behavior is:
in the

presence of symptoms, what will the
individual do and why will he
do
it?" (p. 255).

Although people's responses to
symptoms of cancer in

particular have not been

a

central focus of illness behavior
research,

this research does contribute
theoretical bases from which to
examine

help-seeking for cancer symptoms.

Several medical sociologists have

suggested that people make decisions
about physical symptoms through

a

series of stages (cf. Freidson,
1961; McKinlay, 1975; Suchman,
1965).

Although different researchers specify
different stages in regard to
illness behavior, the stages fall into
three broad categories:

the

perception of symptoms, the evaluation of
symptoms, and acting (or not
acting) upon symptoms.

These categories are clearly interrelated
and

overlapping, and this creates some difficulty
in separating the stages
for purposes of discussion.

In the discussion that follows,

theory and

empirical data from the field of medical
sociology that bear on each of

these stages will be examined.

In addition,

social psychological

theories of motivation and cognition will be
examined in light of their

implications for the way people perceive, interpret,
and respond to
physical symptoms.

The Perception of Symptoms

Evidence indicates that physical symptoms of illness are commonly

experienced by most people, although only

a

small proportion of physical
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complaints is brought to

a

doctor's attention (Mechanic,
1972; Penne-

baker & Skelton, 1978; Zola,
1973).

Stoekle, Zola, and Davidson
(1963)

suggested that "so widespread, in
fact, is the prevalence of
both symptoms and signs of disease
that these circumstances
may, in fact, be

regarded as the normal condition
of the population.

The absence of complaints and signs of disease may
be exceptional even for the
'healthy'

members of the population who do
not attend the doctor"

(p.

976).

Robinson (1971) similarly stated
that "the classification of symptoms
and defining of behavior as either
relevant or not relevant for reporting to professional medical
authorities are facts of everyday life
for

most families"

(p.

26).

According to Mechanic (1972), many
symptoms

occur so commonly throughout life that they
become part of ordinary
expectations and so are experienced as normal
variations or are regarded
as

trivial.

People begin to notice bodily sensations
only when they de-

part from more ordinary feelings.

In the following section, an attempt

will be made to outline the conditions
under which physical symptoms are

noticed and attended to.

Factors that influence the perception of

symptoms include demographic characteristics of
the symptom-experiencer
and the symptoms themselves.

Demographic Variables
Researchers in the area of health and illness have suggested
that
several demographic variables affect whether physical
symptoms are no-

ticed or not.

One of these variables is social class.

Koos

(1954), for

example, repeatedly interviewed families concerning their health, and
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found that famines of
lower soc1oeconc„.1c status
showed a .arted indifference to .ost symptoms, in
direct contrast to respondents
of higher
social class.
In a sugary of results
of national surveys on
symptom
reporting and its relation
to demographic variables,
Pennebaker (1982)
stated that socioeconomic class,
as indicated by income
and education,
is inversely related to
number of symptom .^ports.
In addition, racial
differences in symptom reporting
show that blacks report
symptoms to a
higher degree than do whites.
Ethnicity has been found to be
related to
individuals' responses to pain
(Zborowski. 1952). as well as
decisions
concerning when to seek medical aid
(Zola. 1973).
Age and gender are
also believed to influence the
perception of bodily states (Kasl
s Cobb.
1965; Kosa & Robertson, 1975; Mechanic.
1968).

Older individuals report

more symptoms than younger people,
and females experience more
symptoms
than males (cf. Pennebaker,
1982).
Pennebaker suggests that females are
more attentive to their internal
states, and are also more likely
to
seek medical attention based on
their perception of symptoms.
National
surveys summarized by Pennebaker further
show that unmarried persons,

especially formerly married persons,
report more symptoms than those who
are married.
Individuals living with one, two or three
other people report fewer symptoms than those living
alone or with four or more others.
Finally, employed individuals report
a fewer number of symptoms than

people who are not in the labor force.
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The Symptoms

Little empirical data exists
concerning how characteristics
of
symptoms affect the perception
of symptoms.
Pennebaker and Skelton
(1978) have demonstrated that active
involvement in the external environment decreases attenti veness
to one's body, while
reductions in

situational demands permit somatic
states to be monitored.

These

authors have also found that merely
attending to bodily states often
increases the salience of symptoms.
Mechanic (1968) has suggested that

symptoms that are perceptually salient
are more readily perceived.

Thus

the more visible (to oneself and
others) and painful the symptoms,
the
more likely it is that they will be
noticed by the individual experiencing them.
Suchman (1965) has also pointed out that
people tend to

trivialize symptoms that are not painful.

More attention will be given

to greater numbers of symptoms that
appear more frequently and persist

for longer periods of time than to few
symptoms that rarely appear and

last for

of
cal

a

a

short duration.

Freidson (1961) speculated that the
duration

symptom may be more influential in responses
to it than the physieffects.

When

a

symptom does not disappear shortly it becomes

something to which special attention

is

directed.

Finally, symptoms

that were previously ignored by an individual
may be noticed when they

change in character.
Aside from perceptual salience,

perception of symptoms

is

a

second factor affecting the

the extent to which they are incapacitating.

Symptoms that entail physical and social disability by
disrupting work,
family, and other social activities are apt to be
noticed (McKinlay,
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1975; Mechanic, 1968; Zola.
1973).

Such.an (1965) emphasized
that sy.p.

toms are recognized in terms
of their interference with
normal

function-

ing; people disregard symptoms
that are not incapacitating.

Furthermore, Twaddle (1972) has suggested
that the greater the importance

attached to an activity that is
inhibited by

symptom, the more likely

a

it is that the biological change
will be attended to.
In

the case of cancer, symptom
characteristics vary depending on

the site and type of cancer.

No data are available concerning
the

extent to which various cancer symptoms
are more readily noticed than
others because of their perceptual
salience or interference with activities.

However, it is generally assumed that
some cancer warning signals

are more easily detected because they
are more apparent and observable.
For example, the American Cancer
Society (Note 1) indicates that lung

cancer and leukemia are difficult to detect
early, while breast and
uterine cancers are relatively easy to detect.

seeking

a

Some studies of delay in

diagnosis of cancer symptoms have examined
delay in relation

to cancer site, in accordance with the
assumption that cancers of some

sites are more easily observed than cancers of
other sites.

Robbins,

MacDonald and Pack (1953) found that delay was greater
for "superficial"
cancers (i.e., cancers that can be detected by

a

superficial physical

examination) than for "thorough" and "special" cancers (i.e.,
cancers
that can be detected only by knowledge of the patient's
medical history

and/or by specialized physical exams and tests).

On the other hand,

Henderson, Wittkower and Lougheed (1958) found less delay in patients

suffering

a

superficial cancer (i.e., breast cancer) than in those
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suffering an Internal cancer
(I.e., cancer of the
cervix or large
bowel).
Furthennore. Cobb et al.
(1954) stated that classifying
subjects according to whether
their cancers were external
or Internal did
not help to differentiate
delayers from nondelayers.
Goldsen.

Gerhardt
and Handy (1957) asked
respondents If they felt their
cancer sy.pton,s
were noticeable to other
people.
The extent to which
symptoms are

observable to others Involves
Impression management, and
thus this
variable could potentially exert
an Important influence
on the decision
to seek treatment for
physical symptoms.

Contrary to what might be

expected, Goldsen et al. found
that delay was greater for
patients who
had cancer symptoms that were
noticeable to other people than
for those

who believed their symptoms
were not apparent to others.

These studies

of the association between cancer
site and delay do not allow
any conclusions to be drawn as to the conditions
under which cancer symptoms
are perceived.

At best they suggest that there
is no direct relation-

ship between the ease with which
cancer symptoms are detected or ob-

served and promptness in seeking

a

diagnosis.

The Interpretation of Symptoms

Symptoms reflect not only the perception
of

interpretation of that state.

experience of

a

some way.

a

bodily state, but an

Pennebaker and Skelton (1978) view the

symptom as having two components:

one of Interpretation.

stimulation from

a

In this view, an individual

one of sensation and

perceives sensory

bodily site that is then evaluated and encoded
in

The interpretive component serves to explain
and give meaning
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to the symptom, and
also to determine action.

While symptoms are typically regarded as unexpected
and unwelcome deviations
from a subjective
baseline, the way people
evaluate symptoms varies
widely and depends
upon Situational factors.
Symptoms differ greatly in
their clarity as
cues, so that individuals
have considerable latitutde
in their reactions
to many physical signs.
Furthermore, decisions concerning
help seeking
behavior for physical deviations
are based on the individual's
evaluation of symptoms rather than
on the symptoms per se
(Green & Roberts,
Kasl
1974;
& Cobb, 1964; Kirscht, 1974; Rodin,
1978).
Generally, the

determinants of whether or not

a

symptom is evaluated as requiring

a

doctor's attention involve the
characteristics of the symptom, the
nature of the individual's
consultations with other people,
and cognitive processes and biases that
affect causal explanations.
The Symptoms

Many of the same characteristics
of symptoms that influence their
perception also influence their
interpretation.
For example, it was

previously suggested that physical
symptoms are more likely to be perceived and attended to if they are
painful than if they are not.

Penne-

baker and Skelton (1978) point out
that an important difference seems
to
exist between painful and nonpainful
symptoms in terms of their evaluation as well.

have

a

Painful symptoms, by their very definition
as painful,

built-in negative interpretation.

Nonpainful symptoms, however,

often have no clear interpretive component
associated with them, and so
they are susceptible to

a

variety of interpretations depending on their

28

context of occurrence.

In fact,

for painless

s„to.s. the Interpretive
context detemines whether the
physical sensations experienced
are
defined as symptomatic at all.
There is indirect evidence
from cancer delay studies
that suggests
that painful symptoms are
more likely than nonpainful
symptoms to be interpreted as signifying illness
and necessitating medical
care.
Several
studies report that the absence
of pain, bleeding, and
discharge in relation to cancer symptoms was
frequently given by patients
as a reason
for delaying diagnosis (Cameron
& Hinton, 1968; Henderson,
1966; Henderson, Wittkower
& Lougheed, 1958; Gold, 1964; Lynch
& Krush, 1968, 1969).

Lynch and Krush (1968) stated
specifically that pain was believed
to be
an essential prerequisite for
cancer by many patients.
Aitken-Swan and

Paterson (1955) found that patients
thought it safe to delay seeking
help for cancer symptoms that
didn't hurt, and they also found
that pain
was the most frequent reason
subjects gave for ending delay.

(1974), Hackett, Cassem & Raker (1973), and
Shands et

al

.

Eardley

(1951) all

similarly stated that patients in their
samples who delayed for long
periods of time sought medical aid when
pain occurred.

comfort was

a

Physical dis-

significantly more frequent reason for seeing
the doctor

among delayers than nondelayers in King and
Leach's (1950) study; among
delayers,

a

much larger proportion did not think it
necessary to see

physician unless they were in pain.

a

The studies mentioned here actually

concern behavioral responses to painful symptoms
as opposed to evaluative responses.

However, it can be inferred that painful symptoms
are

more readily interpreted as worthy of medical
attention than are
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nonpainful ones.

Contrary findings regarding
people's tendency to more
readily define painful symptoms
as illness come from
Cameron and Hinton
and
(1968)
Morden and Weisman (1975). who
found no relationship between
the presence or absence of pain
and delay in obtaining treataent
for

symptoms of cancer.

While symptoms of greater number,
frequency, and persistence are
assumed to be more easily perceived,
they are also assumed to be more
promptly defined as indicating illness
(Freidson, 1961; Kosa & Robertson, 1975; Mechanic, 1968).

In a similar way, symptoms

that change in

character are not only given special
attention, but are more likely to
be evaluated as significant than
symptoms
that remain unchanged.

Twaddle (1969) interviewed elderly men who
had reported
tion within the past several years.

a

health condi-

Subjects reported that they began

to redefine themselves as not well when
changes in feeling states

appeared; most important to the redefinition
was the appearance of pain
and weakness.

In his

study of polio victims, Davis (1963) found
that

parents were able to interpret their child's
symptoms as relatively

insignificant until certain dramatically incongruous
symptoms were
introduced (e.g., the child fell or was unable to walk).
Studies of delay in the presence of cancer warning
signals indi-

rectly support the contention that any change in symptoms,
other than an

alleviation of the symptoms, often leads to their redefinition.

In her

review of delay research, Roberts (1965) stated that perceptions
of
changes in symptoms of cancer frequently serve as

seeking medical care.

a

trigger to action in

Abrams and Finesinger (1953) found that the most

.
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co™o„ reason for tenninatlon
of delay was
sensation of

a

symptom.

a

change in the character
or

Similarly, the delayers in
Clements and Wake-

field's (1972) sample typically
sought help only when their
first symptoms altered in type or
severity.
Although these studies again
specify
behavioral reactions, they do
indicate that the perception
of a symptom
change often leads the individual
to reevaluate the symptom
as requiring
diagnosis

Studies of illness behavior have
demonstrated that incapacitating
symptoms are likely to be evaluated
as serious in addition
to being
readily perceived.
Suchman (1965) interviewed people
who had recently
experienced a relatively severe illness
episode, and found that the
more
symptoms interfered with individuals'
abilities to carry on their usual

activities, the more the individuals
became concerned about the symptoms
and feared they signified the beginnings
of an illness.
According to
Suchman, the success with which the
"denial of illness" can take place
depends largely on the degree of
incapacitation or pain produced by

symptoms.

Respondents were apt to underemphasi ze
symptoms which were

neither severe nor incapacitating.
families'

Robinson (1971) began his study of

illness behavior with the assumption that
the performance of

major social roles is everyone's first priority.

He suggested that

those people whose illness condition impairs
normal roleplaying will be

treated as ill so that they can be returned

as

quickly as possible to

the position where they can play their full social
repertoire.

In his

study of elderly males. Twaddle (1969) found that subjects
began to

consider themselves ill not only when changes in feeling
states
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occurred, but also when they
became incapable of normal
role perfonnance
because of debilitating symptoms.
Twaddle emphasized that
when the
perfonnance of central activities
is disrupted by
symptoms, the symptoms
are more likely to be viewed
as significant than when
they are nondisruptive.

Delay studies provide virtually
no information as to
whether

treatment is sought more promptly
for incapacitating vs.
nonincapacitating cancer symptoms.
Hackett, Cassem and Raker
(1973) reported that
some subjects gave incapacity as
a reason for first seeing
a doctor
about a cancer warning signal.
The lack of data regarding
incapacitation in relation to delay probably
reflects the fact that few types
of
cancer are accompanied by symptoms
that would be considered disruptive
to activity performance.

Social

Inputs
It is well

accepted that relatives and friends commonly
exert

a

considerable influence on one's decisions
surrounding physical symptoms.
Sociological studies show that the symptomatic
person usually consults
some other people before seeking medical
care, and that how others react
to symptoms does much to determine
whether care is sought at all.

Individuals discuss with significant others the
meaning of symptoms,

what label to apply to symptoms, how severe the
illness episode is, what
form of help seeking behavior is appropriate,
and at what point it

should be undertaken (McKinlay, 1975).

Researchers agree that while

consultations take place at all phases of an illness episode,
social
inputs assume greatest importance at the stage of deciding
whether one
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truly ill and in need of
professional aid.
that the role of social
factors in bringing

a

Mechanic (1968) argued
person to seek medical

attention becomes less important
as symptoms become less
common, less
familiar, and less predictable
in their course.
Although such may be
the case, it is clear that,
to

a

large extent, the definition
and

evaluation of symptoms are social
in nature.
Freidson (1960) suggested that
the process of seeking
medical attention for symptoms involves a
network of consultants, which he
called
"the lay referral structure."
Symptom-experiencers casually explore

possible diagnoses of their symptoms
with others, and this exploration
typically takes the form of referrals
through
ity."

a

"hierarchy of author-

Diagnoses are first shared within the
intimate and informal

confines of the nuclear family, but may
be subsequently shared with

successively more distant, authoritative
laymen until the professional
medical practitioner is reached.

Freidson speculated that the explora-

tion of diagnoses is rarely deliberate;
rather, it takes place in

everyday, casual conversation.
In a study of

subscribers to prepaid medical plans, Freidson

(1961) found that consultation about a symptom often
took place in the

household before the doctor was called.

Consultation with household

members was most likely to occur when the
individual's complaint was
relatively severe.

It appeared that discussion with immediate
family

members directly affected the individual's definition
of the symptom.
If the spouse agreed that the symptom was a sign
of significant illness,

the doctor was more likely to be consulted than
if the spouse disagreed.
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Furthe^ore. in the majority
of instances, lay consultation
did not take
Place outside of the home.

A large variety of
complaints seemed suffi-

ciently self-evident or pressing
to require that the doctor
be contacted
inimediately following the
household consultation. However,
when the
symptom's meaning or effect was
more ambiguous, and household
members
could not decide what to do,
consultation with laymen outside
the home
(e.g., relatives, neighbors,
co-workers) tended to occur.

Suchman (1965) hypothesized that
individuals experiencing symptoms
seek "provisional validation"
from the lay referral structure
in addition to information and advice
about possible diagnoses.

Provisional

validation involves the consent of
one's friends and family to
temporarily suspend one's normal
obligations.
In Suchman's study of
people who
had recently experienced a relatively
severe illness, 74% of the subjects reported discussing their
symptoms with someone else before
seeking medical care.
Most discussions were limited to
one other person,

usually the spouse.

The discussion was apt to occur as
soon as symptoms

first appeared, and the subject actively
sought out the discussant for
his or her opinion.
in provisional

For most respondents, the consultation
did result

validation to seek professional help.

Furthermore, in

almost all cases, the individual followed
the recommendations of the
consultant.

Suchman's findings regarding lay discussions
of symptoms

indicate the positive contribution of such
discussion to the seeking of
treatment.
That people define themselves as ill or not ill
through their

interactions with others was also taken up by Twaddle
(1972).

Twaddle
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proposed that delay of the
decision to contact
IS

a

doctor about symptoms
direct function of the time
taken to have the decision
"legiti-

-ted"

by an authoritative layman.

a

Support for this proposal was
found

in Twaddle-s

(1969) study of elderly males who
had previously suffered

an illness.

Ambiguity surrounding the meaning
of

a

symptom typically

led to an exchange of information
between the subject and his wife,

which in turn usually resulted in
the subject agreeing to see
the doctor.
Only when the husband and wife
disagreed in their evaluation
of
the symptom were other people
(e.g., children, friends)
consulted.

one of these other people suggested
seeing

a

If

doctor, and was considered

by the subject to be authoritative
because of some professional
medical

experience or personal experience with
illness,
consulted.

a

doctor was usually

Otherwise, long delays occurred before
treatment.

Miller (1973) interviewed people who
had symptoms of cancer of the
head or neck regarding their choice of
consultants prior to seeing
doctor, and their promptness in obtaining

a

a

professional diagnosis.

The

majority of respondents discussed their
symptoms with at least one
"medically uninformed" person, usually the
spouse, before considering an
exam from

a

professional.

consulted

a

"medically informed" person.

About

respondents went directly to
from any other source.

In

a

a

quarter of the subjects initially
Approximately one- tenth of the

professional without first seeking advice

most cases, subjects followed the advice of

the person(s) they questioned about possible
medications and treatments

for their symptoms.

There were no significant differences between de-

layers and nondelayers in terms of their utilization of
lay consultants.
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However, those respondents
who refrained from discussing
their symptoms
with others before visiting
the doctor, delayed
significantly longer
than those respondents who did
search out others' opinions.
The subjects who failed to discuss
their symptoms with other
people often
explained that they hadn't wanted
to worry others by informing
them of
the symptoms, but that there
had been considerable
opportunity to share
the information.

Goldsen, Gerhardt, and Handy
(1957) asked people with symptoms
of
cancer of various sites whether
they had discussed their
symptoms with
anyone besides their physician.
Only 17% of a large sample said
that
they had not.

Furthermore, the absence of communication
with others

about one's symptoms was positively
related to delay in obtaining
treatment.

The authors suggested that some
patients'

cuss their physical state was
reflective of

cealing symptoms, in addition to

a

a

reluctance to dis-

general pattern of con-

simple lack of opportunity for

conversing with other people.
Several studies of delay in response to
cancer warning signals

report that the advice and persuasion of
friends and relatives were

frequently given as reasons by patients for
first seeing the doctor
(Abrams & Finesinger, 1953; Aitken-Swan
& Paterson, 1955; Eardley, 1974;

Hackett, Cassem & Raker, 1973; Sugar
however, has taken

a

&

Watkins, 1961).

Only one study,

step towards suggesting that individual differences

exist in people's willingness to accept social
inputs when making decisions about symptoms.

In King and Leach's

(1950) investigation of the

decision to seek treatment for cancer warning signals, it
was found that
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t^e pe.cept,-on o.
relatives. contH..t1ons
ai..e.e.

nonde,ave.s.

.e.een .ela.e.

an.

P™.pt patients pe.celved
thei. relatives

as .avin, sho«n
.ene.a, interest in thei.
need .0. a diagnosis.
0. as .avin, provided
specific help in arranging
care.
,„ contrast, delaying
subjects described the inputs Of
their relatives as a
pressure or ..nagging"
for
care.
These differences between
nondelayers and delayers
were viewed by
the authors as reflecting
variations in patients'
sensitivity to group
pressures to procure .edical
assistance.
So™e patients see.ed
to be
sensuive and responsive to the
mere expression of concern
by others
Whereas so.e appeared to
require extreme pressure
fro. others and acied
only when such pressure
became intolerable.
a

Cognitive Processes
Rodin (1978) points out that
attributional processes are
especially likely to be engaged
in when a person feels
ill.
Most illnesses
produce some degree of confusion,
uncertainty, and fear, and
ambiguity
enhances Individuals' desires
to make causal attributions.
Attributions
for disease represent cognitive
attempts to understand and
explain its
occurrence ( Janoff-Bulman S
Lang-Gunn. in press).
Furthermore, causal

attributions affect people's
health-relevant behavior.

For example.

Rodin speculates that people
may put off seeking proper medical
attention while carrying out a
search for explanation and
causation.

Evidence suggests that upon the
initial perception of symptoms,

people usually explain their
occurrence within
framework.

a

minimally threatening

Mechanic and Volkart (1960) stated
that people have

a

.
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tendency to nomalize symptoms,
and Twaddle (1972) similarly
Indicated
that individuals first try to
cope with symptoms by
Interpreting them
within a framework of normality.
Freidson (1961) demonstrated
that the

perception of

a

physical disorder commonly leads
to a pure.ly personal

and tentative self-diagnosis
that stresses the temporary
character of
the symptom.
In a study of polio victims
and their families, Davis
(1963) found that parents initially applied
an everyday explanatory

notion (e.g.. virus, cold, upset
stomach) to their child's apparent
si

ckness
The disposition to initially interpret
physical symptoms as due

to, at worst, a minor ailment, probably
partially reflects information

people have about their own and others'
illness experiences:
nesses occur more frequently than major
ones.

minor ill-

There is also, however,

a

clear motivational basis for the tendency to
normalize or trivialize
symptoms of illness.

By definition, illness is a negative
event; it is

generally unpredictable, involuntary, and undesirable.
ity of illness stems from the fact that
it is

a

The undesirabil-

major source of pain and

suffering, and that it can disrupt and threaten an
individual's life.
It seems obvious that most people want to
avoid becoming

illness most of the time.

a

victim of

This desire is likely to contribute to the

interpretation of symptoms as either normal or indicative of

a

minor

ai Iment.

Our tendency to attribute physical disorders to minimally threat-

ening causes probably rests not only on our desire to avoid negative
outcomes, but also on our belief that misfortunes happen to other
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people, not ourselves.

We intellectually accept
that bad things occur-

that people get cancer, that
assaults are

co™,

and that individuals

have serious car accidents-and
yet we simultaneously seem to
believe
that -It won't happen to me."
Janoff-Bulman , Madden, and Timko
(Note 2)
found, for example, that college
students estimated the likelihood
of
misfortunes (e.g., crimes, accidents,
natural disaster, cancer, heart
disease) happening to them as
significantly lower than the likelihood
of
the misfortunes happening to
"the average person your age."
Lang-Gunn
(Note

3)

similarly found that relative to their
estimates of "the aver-

age person," college students
underestimated their own chances of

developing various illnesses, including
kidney infection, pneumonia,

gastroenteritis, diabetes, coronary heart disease,
and leukemia.

Weinstein (1980; Weinstein & Lachendro,
1982) had samples of college
students estimate how their own chances of
experiencing both desirable
and undesirable life events differed from
the chances of their class-

mates.

Overall, subjects rated their chances to be
above average for

positive events, and below average for negative
events.
This apparent belief in our relative safety
and security has been

labeled "the illusion of invulnerability" by
Janoff-Bulman (Janoff-

Bulman & Lang-Gunn, in press; Janoff-Bulman, Madden
as

& Timko,

"unrealistic optimism" by Weinstein (1980; Weinstein

1982).

Until

&

Lachendro,

recently, people's unrealistic optimism about the future

was regarded largely as

a

defensive phenomenon— a distortion of reality

motivated to reduce anxiety (e.g., Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles
stock, 1966).

1983), and

In line with

this reasoning. Parsons

& Rosen-

(1951) suggested

.
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that people are motivated
to underestimate the
likelihood of their
becoming ill, especially
seriously in.

Social psychologists
investigating factors that
underlie the perception Of invulnerability
have discovered, however,
that this perception may be based on
processes other than purely
motivational ones.
i„
one of his studies. Weinstein
(1980) found, for Instance,
that the
greater the perceived controllability
of a negative event, the
greater
subjects' tendency to believe
that their own chances were
less than

average of experiencing the
event.

The future occurrence of

a

negative

event was also rated as unlikely
if the subject had

a stereotype of the
particular kind of person to whom
the misfortune was likely
to happen.

Previous personal experience with
a negative outcome increased
the
likelihood that people would believe
their own chances were greater
than
average of suffering the outcome.
In a subsequent study. Weinstein
and

Lachendro (1982) forced subjects to
pay more attention to the risk
factors of their peers that would
Increase or decrease their chances
of
experiencing particular misfortunes.
This manipulation reduced but
did
not eliminate subjects' optimism
regarding the future possibility of

negative events.

Weinstein concluded that unrealistic
optimism arises

partially from egocentric tendencies
that keep people from thinking
carefully about others' risk decreasing
characteristics that are similar
to their own.

The work of Weinstein in particular
suggests that cogni-

tive processes, in addition to motivational
biases, contribute to our

belief In our personal Invulnerability
to illness and other undesirable
occurrences
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Rodin (1978) suggested that
causal attributions for
symptoms can
have negative consequences
for health care when people
assign causes on
the basis of limited or
incorrect evidence.
That is, the misattribution
of the cause of particular
symptoms influences the extent
to which the
symptoms are viewed as worthy of
professional care, which in turn
influences help seeking behavior.
There are many examples from
studies of
delay in responding to cancer
symptoms that demonstrate how
misattribution processes might inhibit
prompt behavior; only a relative
few will
be cited here.

Abrams and Finesinger (1953)
found that most of the can-

cer patients in their sample
considered the disease to be their
fault or
the fault of others.
These attributions, along with the
belief that

cancer

is

a

disease of "unclean origin," caused
patients to feel guilty,

which led to their denial or avoidance
of symptoms, and thus to delay in
seeking treatment.
Lynch and Krush (1968) stated generally
that the

misinterpretation of cancer symptoms frequently
leads to delay.

These

authors provided the specific instance
of patients with cancer of the
penis who delayed obtaining care because
they felt guilty about the sus-

picion that their symptoms were due to
venereal disease.

Several

studies report that delaying patients commonly
attributed their symptoms
to a recurrence of a previous illness,
or to an everyday, insignificant

ailment (Cameron

&

Hinton, 1968; Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Henderson,

1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958; King &
Leach, 1950).

In

particular, Greer found that some breast cancer patients
delayed obtaining

a

diagnosis of

a

benign breast tumors.

breast lump because they had
In Gold's

a

previous history of

study of breast cancer patients, delay

41

resulted for some women from
the belief that their
lump was caused by
a
condition much less serious
than cancer (e.g., an injury
to the breast
recent weight gain, a swollen
muscle).
These and many other findings
from the delay literature
support the notion that incorrect
attributions
of causality for cancer
symptoms may contribute to delay.
Delay may
stem from guilt over the
misattributed cause, or it may rest
on the

minimal threat presented by
the misinterpretation.

Because causal

explanations for physical disorders
appear to influence help seeking
behavior, cognitive processes that
influence people's attributions
for
physical symptoms will now be
discussed.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) investigated
cognitive heuristics

which determine probabilistic
judgments in

a

variety of tasks.

Although
these heuristics are efficient,
they are not always valid, and
so they

can lead to biases that are large,
persistent, and serious in their

implications for decision making.

Here, two cognitive heuristics
people

use to assess the probability of
an uncertain event-availability
and

representativeness-are applied to the situation
must make

a

in which an individual

judgment as to the meaning of physical
symptoms.

When people use the availability heuristic,
they estimate the fre-

quency of

a

class or the probability of an event by
the ease with which

instances or occurrences of the event can be
imagined or remembered.
"For example, one may assess the risk of
heart attack among middle aged

people by recalling such occurrences among one's
acquaintances"
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974,

p.

1127).

Instances of frequent events are

typically easier to recall than instances of less frequent
events, and
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likely occurrences are
usually easier to imagine
than unlikely ones
Thus availability is often
a valid cue for the
assessment of frequency
and probability (Slovic,
Fischhoff & Lichtenstei
n, 1977).
However,
availability is sometimes poorly
correlated with actual frequency
or
probability, and therefore can
lead to systematic errors in
prediction.
Some objects or events may be
more or less difficult to
perceive, to
retrieve from memory, to construct
from imagination, or to
associate
with another event.
Events that are more familiar,
more emotionally
salient, and more recent, are
more easily retrieved from
memory.

Utilization of the availability
heuristic may bias causal analyses, in that the acceptability
of causal candidates is affected
by their
degree of availability (Nisbett
& Ross, 1980).

That is, the relative

salience of particular causal factors,
or the ease of their retrieval
from memory, seems to greatly
influence the explanation process.
Just
as

the relative frequency of highly
available events is overestimated,

so the causal significance of highly
available antecedents is overesti-

mated.
An example of how causal analyses
of physical symptoms may be

biased through use of the availability
heuristic
phenomenon of "medical student's disease."

is

provided by the

Mechanic (1972) points out

that medical students frequently experience
symptoms that they ascribe
to some pathologic process.

Students notice in themselves an innocuous

physiological dysfunction, and attach to this an
incorrect causal attri-

bution "of

a

fearful kind," which is usually modeled after

recently observed,

a

a

clinical anecdote casually overheard, or

patient
a

family
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member who has been ill.

The .edical student's
exposure to specific

knowledge about disease provides

a

new framework for perceiving,
identi-

fying, and giving meaning to
previously neglected bodily feelings,
and
this contributes greatly to
the attribution process,
Mechanic's
view, the availability of
detailed medical information
facilitates the

m

perception of physical symptoms and
their interpretation as significant
of illness.
The well

known example of the medical student
syndrome supports

the view that use of the availability
heuristic does bias people's
causal attributions about physical
symptoms.

This bias has important

implications for medical help seeking to
the extent that misattributions

encourage or inhibit help seeking behavior.

In the case of cancer,

it

appears that people often have readily
available explanations for their

symptoms that do not include cancer as

a

possible cause.

The fact that

causal misattributions for cancer symptoms
are not only common but

frequently contribute to delay in seeking
earlier.

a

diagnosis was pointed out

Delay studies also highlight, however, that
if new information

relevant to cancer becomes available through the
media or interactions
with other people, this information can facilitate
care seeking for previously ignored symptoms because it initiates
symptoms.

a

redefinition of the

Eardley (1974) found, for example, that considerable
delay in

caring for breast cancer symptoms often ended when

a

chance event (e.g.,

reading an article about breast lumps, finding out

a

co-worker recently

had

a

lump diagnosed) altered hypotheses about the cause of the
symptom.

Some patients of Abrams and Fines inger (1953) terminated delay when they
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heard that

friend or relative had died
of cancer or had undergone
surgery as treatment for the
disease.
Findings such as these
indicate that
whether cancer symptoms are
attributed to the possible
presence of cancer depends partly on the
extent to which cues about
cancer are available in the environment.
Use of the availability
heuristic may also
bias people's estimates of
the probability that they will
be afflicted
with a particular illness.
According to the availability
hypothesis, if
a

occurrences of

a

specific illness among one's family,
friends, or

acquaintances are not easily recalled
or imagined, people may underestimate the probability of experiencing
the misfortune.
However, personal

experience with an illness makes it
easier to recall instances of the
misfortune, and so leads to greater
perceived probability through the

mechanism of availability.

The availability hypothesis also
implies

that judgments about the probability
of suffering any illness depend

partly on the extent to which vivid images
of that illness are available

when people think about

it.

Janis and Rodin (1979) showed how the
lack

of vivid imagery associated with disease
might affect preventive health

behavior:
For example, in our daily lives we seldom
encounter persons suffering from severe respiratory diseases
such as emphysema or lung cancer and, consequently, vivid images of those
diseases are not available to our imagination when we hear about the
health consequences
of smoking. We are likely, therefore, to
underestimate the likelihood that those illnesses could befall us and to
ignore the recommended preventive action of cutting down on smoking,
(pp. 494-495)
It seems plausible that when use of the availability
heuristic

leads people to make incorrect judgments as to the probability
of

suffering particular illnesses, these errors would affect not only
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preventive health behavior, but
help-seeking behavior as well,
because
such probability judgments
would influence people's
explanations for
physical symptoms when they
occur.
An individual experiencing
cancer
symptoms may well know that his
or her symptoms are
suggestive of cancer, and that immediate
treatment for cancer symptoms is
highly beneficial.
But if the likelihood of oneself
becoming a cancer victim is

believed to be low because of an
inability to remember or imagine
other
people victimized by the disease,
the individual may decide
that the
symptoms could not be attributable
to cancer after all and do
not
require medical attention.
In the case of cancer, many
victims are

unwilling to admit to others that
they have had the disease because
of
the stigma of cancer and the
possibly realistic expectation
of discrimination.
Thus, while cancer is a major killer,
the fact that its victims
are not vocal may render victimization
by the disease

unavailable event.

a

relatively

Use of the availability heuristic
might facilitate

help-seeking behavior when an illness has
already hit close to home or
when the mass media has made vivid
images of the illness available, for
in these cases the perceived probability
of contracting the illness may

increase.

For example, though awareness of breast
cancer seemed to be

relatively high among women, it was not until
Mrs. Ford's and Mrs.

Rockefeller's well publicized mastectomies that
unprecedented vigilance
among women was shown through their use of
breast cancer clinics and

physicians.

Two public figures with breast cancer probably
made occur-

rences of the disease easy to envision, and women
perceived themselves
as more vulnerable than they otherwise would
have.
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The representativeness
heuristic cones into play
in problems of
categorization.
Categorization requires making
Judgments as to the
probability that an object
belongs in a given class,
or that a certain
process will generate a
particular event.
People make judgments
such as
these by assessing the degree
to which the salient
features of the object or process are similar
to the features presumed
to be characteristic Of the class or event.
When the features are very
similar, as when
an outcome is highly
representative of the process from
which it originates, then the probability
that the process will produce
the event 1s
judged to be high.
Causal explanations are often
influenced by a primitive version
of

the representativeness heuristic
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Nisbett
& Wilson, 1977).
People tend to have strong a priori
notions of the types of
causes that ought to be linked
to particular kinds of effects.
Specifically, individuals use the
"resemblance criterion" to look for
causes

whose principal features match or
resemble those of the effect.

Thus,

people believe that great events ought
to have great causes, and emotionally relevant events ought to have
emotionally relevant causes.
Causes and effects must resemble
one another in their outward features.
The simple resemblance criterion
might figure heavily in people's

notions about the possible causes of
cancer warning signs.

conception of cancer is one of
able disease (Mcintosh, 1974).

a

The general

horribly painful, and above all, incurPeople often view cancer as

a

necessar-

ily incapacitating illness that entails
long periods of extreme suffer-

ing and radical treatments, including mutilating
surgery and noxious

47

therapies.

Use of the resemblance
criterion might lead people
to assume

that the symptoms of such
be disruptive and severe.

a

debilitating and painful disease
must also
It was previously suggested
that painful,

persisting, and incapacitating
symptoms are more likely to be
evaluated
as serious and as warranting
professional attention than are
nonpainful
and intermittent symptoms that
do not interfere with one's
activity,
other words, symptoms that have
significant effects may be
attributed to
a major illness, while
symptoms that have innocuous effects
may be

m

attributed to

a

minor ailment.

Initial cancer symptoms typically
have

slow and insidious onset, and
are rarely painful or incapacitating.

example, the most common warning
signal of breast cancer

is

a

a

For

small,

painless lump or thickening in the
breast that does not produce

a

dis-

charge or any other alteration in the
outward appearance of the breast
(Kushner, 1975).

If the resemblance criterion is

used in evaluations of

physical symptoms, the apparent triviality
of cancer symptoms would lead

individuals to fail to correctly consider
that these symptoms might be
linked to

a

serious, life threatening disease such
as cancer.

symptoms of cancer may be misattributed to
the symptoms themselves seem to be.

a

Rather,

cause as unnoteworthy as

Several medical sociologists have

recognized that the most common forms of cancer
do not usually appear in
a

painful, alarming, or disruptive fashion, which
mitigates against

early medical consultations (Apple, 1960; Mechanic,
1968; Stoekle,
Zola & Davidson, 1963; Suchman, 1965).

Thus early detection of cancer

may be hindered by the fact that the characteristics
of initial cancer
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sy.pto.s do not .atch the
salient features of people's
conceptions of
cancer and other serious
health conditions.
Kahne^an and Tversky
(1973) have deronstrated that
people's intuitive predictions often
violate nonnative principles
in ways that

can

be attributed to
representativeness biases.

For example, when judging

the probability that an
individual fits into a
particular category,
people tend to examine the
extent to which the individual
displays a few

salient characteristics of
category members, while ignoring
base rates
for the categories.
Weinstein (1980) points out that
for many events,
1-ncluding the negative event
of cancer, people may have

a

stereotyped

conception of the kind of person
to whom the event happens.

If individuals do not see themselves
as fitting the stereotype,
the representa-

tiveness hypothesis suggests they
will conclude that the event
will not
happen to them, and they will
overlook the possibility that
few of the

people who experience the event may
actually fit the stereotype.

Weinstein also noted that stereotypes
of victims of negative
events may stem from both motivational
and cognitive processes.

Pos-

sibly, stereotypes of the victim
serve an ego-defensive function, in
which case people would seldom see
themselves as representing the type

of person who falls prey to misfortune.

It is also possible that people

are struck by superficial differences
between themselves and the stereo-

type (differences such as gender, age.
or appearance) and fail to see

more fundamental similarities between
themselves and the people to whom
the event occurs.

Both lines of reasoning would lead to the
expectation

that people would be apt to conclude that
negative events will not
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happen to them.

As

mentioned previously, Weinstein
found that when

a

stereotype existed in college
students' minds of the kind of
person to
whom a negative event generally
occurred, subjects judged their
own
chances of suffering the negative
event as less than average.

There is

no research that has examined
the prevalence or nature of
people's

stereotypes about the type of individual
who becomes
If people do have an overall

a

cancer victim.

picture of who is likely to get
cancer,

this might bolster perceptions
of personal invulnerability to
the dis-

ease.

Such perceptions might in turn
contribute to misattributions for

cancer symptoms, and thus to delay in
seeking medical assistance for
those symptoms.

Behavioral

Responses

When physical symptoms are perceived,
alternatives for action do
not consist solely of obtaining

a

doctor's care or not obtaining care.

Rather, it appears that people engage in

sponse to

a

a

variety of behaviors in re-

physical deviation, including self-medication,
withdrawal

from activities, and presenting the symptom to
ways.

Furthermore,

a

a

physician in indirect

number of situational variables may discourage the

seeking of professional help, even when the desirability
of such help

acknowledged by the individual experiencing symptoms.

is

It is generally

agreed that people who are in the early stages of an
illness frequently
attempt to restore their health through their own efforts prior
to contacting

a

doctor.

Unfortunately, very little empirical research has

been published concerning the prevalence and nature of behavioral

.
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strategies that are used in
coping with sy.pto™s.
other than the utilization of .edical facilities.
The lack of infonnation
on this topic

probably reflects the
methodological difficulties
involved in gathering
data fron, syw,ptomatic people
who have not consulted a
professional

practitioner about their symptoms.
The evidence that is available
indicates that a common strategy

for dealing with the first
appearance of symptoms is to do
nothing at
all.
People refrain from taking any
action, waiting "to see what
happens" in regard to the symptoms.
The self-prescription of
delay often
takes place in hopes that the
symptoms will just disappear
(Freidson.
1961; McKinlay, 1975).

In

the case of cancer symptoms,
Gold (1964) and

Lynch and Krush (1968) found
that some patients who delayed
getting
treatment had done so because they
hoped the tumor or lesion would
heal
and clear up without intervention.
In a study of seeking care
for

general medical symptoms, Zola
(1973) found that there was often
"temporal i zing of symptomatology" on
the part of patients.

subjects set external time criteria
for the diagnosis of

a

a

That is,

symptom,

saying, "If it isn't better in three
days, or one week, or seven hours,
or six months, then I'll take care
of it."

involved the setting of

a

recurrence of the symptom.
to disregard a physical
ti

A variant of this strategy

different kind of temporal standard- the
Some subjects reported that they had
decided

disorder until it recurred

a

certain number of

mes

When delay is prescribed and the symptoms
persist, reoccur, or

worsen, it becomes apparent that waiting

is

not an effective strategy

,
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for getting rid of the
symptoms, and more direct
action may be necessary.
It is at this point that
home remedies or self-medications
are
tried, if a doctor is not contacted.
In addition, the individual
may
decide to rest or stay in bed for
a day or so, in order
to restore his

or her health (Davis, 1963;
Freidson, 1961; McKinlay, 1975).

been relatively few studies of
self-medication.

In fact,

There have

self-

medication represents one of the least
understood health-relevant
behaviors, even though it
1972).

On a general

is

also one of the most prevalent
(Zola,

level, self-medication reflects the
treatment of

conditions that the individual believes will
not get better by themselves; or, the individual may consider the
symptoms being treated as
too minor to warrant

a

medical consultation.

Research that has been

carried out on self-medication shows that
people who frequently self-

medicate also frequently utilize medical
facilities (e.g., Jef ferys
Brotherson

&

Cartwright, 1960).

of people who had seldom seen

a

Kessel and Shepard (1965), in

study

a

doctor, found that the lowest rate of

self-medication occurred among those subjects who had
not sought
doctor's care for ten years.

The decision to "take it easy" as

of alleviating symptoms may involve

a

a

a

means

temporary withdrawal from everyday

activities, including work, school, social, and
leisure-time pursuits.
An individual who tries a home remedy or interrupts his
or her normal

routine to rest is likely to attract the attention of household
members.
Once other people become aware of the individual's symptoms,
lay consul-

tations will probably take place.
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If symptoms continue or
recur despite the
self-prescription of

medication and/or idleness, it
appears that most people will
consider
seeking professional help (Freidson,
1961; Suchman, 1965).
However,
situational factors substantially
influence whether or not the
physician
is actually called.
Mechanic (1968) noted that other
needs of an individual compete with health needs,
and may be viewed as more
crucial to
fulfill.
McKinlay (1975) similarly stated that
"the need to cope with

symptoms, even though recognized, may
be overridden by more pressing
issues."

In his

question of when

study of illness behavior, Koos
(1954) found that the
a

symptom became noteworthy was tied to
how important

matters of health and illness were to
the family when compared with
its
other needs and desires.
It seemed that the choice of
behavioral reactions to symptoms was dictated by the
place of health in the value

system of the family.

Aside from exigencies that may interfere
with

help seeking for symptoms, another
situational factor determining action

concerns the availability of treatment
resources (Koos, 1954; Mechanic,
1968; McKinlay, 1975).

The extent to which treatment is viewed
as

accessible is related to the cost, payment
arrangements, physical proximity, and schedule of particular medical
facilities.

Studies concerning

responses to cancer symptoms support the proposal
that delay often
occurs because certain life problems take precedence
over

need for treating the symptoms.

a

recognized

Domestic problems were given as

a

reason for delaying care by patients in several studies
(Aitken-Swan &

Paterson, 1955; Cameron & Hinton, 1968; Greer, 1974).

Henderson,

Wittkower, and Lougheed (1958) reported that some subjects put off
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seeking treatment because
they couldn't spare
any

t,-.e f.o. their
Jobs
breast cancer patients who
delayed diagnosis in
Lynch and Krush's'
(1969) study stated that another
family .ember's illness
had prevented
them from getting help
sooner.

see

Individuals experiencing
symptoms frequently seek
professional
advice through telephone
consultations, or through
indirectly presenting
the symptoms to a doctor.
Telephone consultations are
regarded as a
routine component of medical
practice, but the prevalence
of their use
1s unknown (Zola.
1972).
Zola (1972) suggested that
the perception of a
physical disorder may prompt
an Individual to obtain a
"regular checkup" as opposed to care for
the

swtom

specifically.

The check-up is a

«ay Of handling and presenting
complaints that puts the burden
on the
physician.
According to Zola, individuals
may fail to verbalize even
pressing complaints during the
course of a physical exam. If
the doctor
indicates that "the appropriate
body system is in good working
order."
The check-up is also a means
for an individual to bring up
a symptom in
a casual, offhand manner;
the patient may say, "Oh yes, by
the way,

while I'm here

I

wonder if you think this

Is serious

..."

Thus

patients use general check-ups to
Indirectly seek help for particular
symptoms.
cal

Another indirect method people use
to secure care for physi-

problems is to consult about symptoms
while accompanying another

person to the doctor's office (Zola,
1972).
is

In this case,

the physician

actually treating someone else, but the
individual asks for

a diagno-

sis of symptoms since the opportunity
to do so is readily available.
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Abrams and Finesinger
(1953) found that one reason
for either
prompt action or the termination
of delay among cancer
patients, was
that the patients sought advice
about their symptoms while
escorting a
friend or relative to the doctor.
More frequently, however,
studies of
delay in diagnosing cancer
report that a common situation
prompting patients to initiate care for
cancer symptoms was requiring
contact with a
doctor for some other abnormality
or illness.
Aitken-Swan and Paterson
(1955), Greer (1974), Henderson. Wittkower
and Lougheed (1958), and King
and Leach (1950), all found that
a significantly greater
proportion of
delayers than nondelayers presented
themselves to the doctor with physical

disorders that were totally unrelated
to cancer.

King and Leach

stated that delayers were aware of
having cancer symptoms, and yet
the
seeking of care depended greatly on
whether or not there was some other

disturbance to see the physician about.

Henderson, Wittkower and

Lougheed regarded the indirect presentation
of cancer symptoms

as

a

compromise between the patient's wish to
seek medical help and his or
her denial of the existence of

a

threat to life.

Several medical sociologists have suggested
that people's decisions to obtain or not obtain professional
care for physical symptoms
are based on beliefs concerning the
consequences of the behavioral options.

Barker (1953), for example, focused on how the
relative strength

of perceived costs and benefits of seeking medical
attention for symptoms of illness determines whether or not such
attention is actually

sought.

He proposed that medical attention is likely to be
viewed as

unattractive because of the time, expense, and pain it may involve,
and

55

because it .ay confix the
presence of

a

sen'ous illness.

Simultaneous-

ly, however, medical

n

may produce

a

care is likely to be viewed
as attractive,
because
quick remission of symptoms
and return to good health.

Therefore, according to Barker,
an individual experiencing
signs of illness is inevitably in a
state of psychological
conflict, the resolution
Of which depends upon whether
the consequences of seeing
the doctor are
more attractive than unattractive
or
vice versa.

More specifically. Barker
posited that two sets of
"psychological
forces" operate concurrently
in the situation of the
individual suffering illness symptoms.
One set of forces induces
the individual to "move
toward" the diagnosis and
trea^ent of symptoms, and includes
two components:
the pain or discomfort caused
by the symptoms, and the
individual's expectation of returning
to health if the illness is
treated.
The

other set of forces induces "movement
away from" medical help, and
consists of three components:
fear of diagnostic and treatment
procedures,
fear of discovery of serious
illness, and
healthy.

a

concept of self as always

The primary implication of Barker's
theory is that the

symptom-experiencer will decide to see

a

professional only if the

forces inducing movement toward diagnosis
and treatment are greater than
the forces inducing movement away
from medical

attention (Shontz, 1975).

Robinson (1971) stated that there are two
major outcomes people

consider when making decisions about how
to respond to bodily disorders.
These are "the danger of going sick," i.e.,
seeking and accepting

treatment from

a

medical practitioner, and "the danger of non-
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treatment." I.e.. falling
to see. professional
advice.
In Robinson's
model, a person experiencing
physical symptoms evaluates
what s/he
believes to be the short- and
long-te™ physiological and
social

gains

and costs of each outcome.

The perceived consequences
of nontreatment

are presumed to be the
reverse of those of treatment.

The Individual

with symptoms will obtain
medical care only If the
gains of care are
believed to exceed its costs.
According to Robinson's analysis,
beliefs
regarding the costs and benefits
of going and not going to
the doctor
must be independently assessed
for each individual on each
occasion
symptoms are noticed.
In his

theory of decision making about
responses to symptoms,

Fabrega (1974) hypothesized that
everyone has available

a

set of "treat-

ment plans" that may be implemented
in order to alleviate the
particular
symptoms under consideration.
A person suffering symptoms
computes the
potential benefits and costs entailed
by each treatment plan, and
then
subtracts the costs from the benefits.
In this way, each treatment
plan

becomes associated with

quantity that represents the amount
of overall

a

utility that can be derived from
its use.

treatment plan following

a

The individual selects one

particular principle of choice; one may,
for

instance, choose the treatment plan
having the highest benefits, the

lowest costs, or the highest overall
utility.

The entire process of

decision making is likely to be repeated
some time after the selected

treatment plan has been implemented.

Fabrega suggested that empirical

applications of his model would allow researchers
to specify the types
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of actions that are likely
ly to oe
be taken
tsken h,,
by Hi«
different populations in
response to symptoms of
various types.
A comparison of these
three theories of decision
making about behavioral responses to symptoms
of illness yields basic
similarities and
differences among the models.
Most simply, all the
theories imply that

person suffering symptoms
will seek medical care
if the positive consequences of care are perceived
to outweigh the negative
consequences,
or if the results of obtaining
diagnosis and treatment are
viewed more
positively than those of
abstaining from treatment.
The models differ
however, in their assumptions
about the beliefs upon which
action decisions are based.
Barker's model puts forth a
set of belieefs that are
expected to influence help seeking
by any individual for
any sign of
illness.
Robinson's model assumes that
beliefs about the consequences
of treatment and non-treatment
are not generalized within
populations
experiencing similar symptoms.
In contrast, Fabrega
proposes that it
a

would be desirable to empirically
assess beliefs about illnesses
and
treatments among different populations,
on the assumption that such
beliefs detennine what behaviors
are engaged in to remedy symptoms.
Fabrega's proposal resembles a
methodology developed by Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980; Fishbein t. Ajzen,
1975) to measure attitudes in order
to

predict and understand behavior.

Ajzen and Fishbein call their model
of

the attitude-behavior relation "the
theory of reasoned action."

The

theory of reasoned action begins with
the assumption that behavioral

decisions are made in light of more or
less careful deliberations, taking into account consequences and
other factors that are believed to be
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associated with the available
options.
detennlnant of action

Is

In the theory,

mediate

the Individual's Intention
to perfon. (o. not

perform) the behavior under
consideration.

although

the

The theory holds that

number of factors Influence
the strength of the
intentionbehavior relation, barring
unforeseen events, people are
expected to act
in accordance with their
intentions.
a

There are two immediate
detenninants of intentions.

One is a

personal

factor, attitude toward the
behavior, which consists of
the
individual's positive or negative
evaluation of performing the behavior.
The other determinant of
intentions is a social factor,
subjectiv^^.
This is the individual's
perception of social pressures

not perform the behavior.

^^^^^^^^^^^^

Generally, individuals will intend
to perform

behavior when they evaluate it positively
and when they believe that
important others think they should
perfom it. According to Ajzen and
a

Fishbein, the relative importance
of the attitudinal and normative
factors in determining intentions
depends partially on the intention

under investigation, as well as on the
population of interest.

In

addition, the relative weights of the
factors may vary from one person
to another.

The theory of reasoned action, as
presented thus far, can

be summarized symbolically as follows:
B

^ X

ct

[w^Ag + w^SN].

Here, B is the behavior,

I

is

the intention to perform (or not perform)

the behavior, Ag is the attitude toward the
behavior, and SN

subjective norm concerning the behavior.

is

Further, w^ and w^ are

the
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empirically dete™i„ed weighting
parameters that reflect
the relative
importance of Ag and SN.
The

i^ediate determinants of an
Individual's attitude toward

the

behavior are his or her salient
beliefs about the consequences
of perfonning the behavior, labeled

behavioralMiefi.

vidual «ho believes that
perfo™ing

positive outcomes will hold

a

a

In general, an indi-

given behavior will lead
to mostly

favorable attitude toward
performing the

behavior, whereas an individual
who believes that perfo^ing
the behavior will result in largely
negative consequences will hold
an unfavorable attitude.
Furthermore, the greater the
confidence with which a
behavioral belief is held, and
the more positive or negative
the conse-

quence is perceived to be, the
greater will be the beliefs
impact on
the attitude.
This part of the theory
of reasoned action is depicted
symbolically by:
n

In this equation, b.

ity)

is

the behavioral belief (or subjective
probabil-

that performing B will

outcome

i,

lead to outcome i, e.

and the sum is over the

n

is

the evaluation of

salient behavioral beliefs.

The subjective norm is determined by
the individual's normative

beliefs, that is, by the beliefs that
specific people or groups think
one should or should not perform the
behavior.

Generally speaking, as

the number of referents (e.g., one's
spouse, friends, doctors) who are

believed to approve of perfonning the behavior
increases, so does the
perceived social pressure to engage in the
behavior.

However, the

.
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effect of any given negative
belief on the subjective

no™

is

moderated

by the individual's
motivation to comply „ith the
referent in question

Symbolically, the subjective

no™

and its dete™inants are
represented

n

SN a

where b. is

a

I b.m.,

nomative belief concerning referent

tion to comply with referent
j, and the sum is over

is

j,
n

the motiva-

salient normative

bel iefs
In

order to apply the theory of
reasoned action to

a specific behavioral domain, it is necessary
to first elicit salient
behavioral and
normative beliefs in a pilot study
from individuals who are
representative of the population of interest.
These beliefs are then used
to con-

struct

standard questionnaire containing
measures of intention, attitude toward the behavior, subjective
norm, behavioral beliefs and
their
a

evaluations, and normative beliefs and
motivations to comply.

Because

the theory of reasoned action
maintains strict correspondence between

behavior and explanatory constructs, all
measures must correspond to one
another in their action, target, context,
and time elements.

Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) have demonstrated
that application of
the theory of reasoned action permits
highly accurate prediction of be-

havior in

a

wide variety of behavioral domains, including
weight loss,

use of birth control, voting, and consumer
behavior.

They have shown

that these varied types of behaviors
can be predicted with

a

gree of accuracy from intentions to perform those
behaviors.

great deAjzen and
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F.shbem point out, however,
that their theory can

be applied to situa-

tions in Which the
prediction and explanation
of Intentions, rather
than
behaviors per se, are at Issue.
In such cases, a
sa.ple of respondents
can be divided Into those
who Intend to perfo™ a
given behavior and
those Who do not.
Differences 1n Intentions can
be explained by
examining patterns of differences
In behavioral beliefs,
outcome evaluations
no^ative beliefs, and motivations
to comply.
Thus, by examining
closely the underlying belief
structures, the researcher
can gain a good
understanding of the factors
that ultimately dete™ine
a person's

decision to perform or not
perform

a

given behavior.

According to the theory of
reasoned action, external
variables,
including attitudes towards targets
(people and institutions),
personality traits, and demographic
characteristics, will be related
to behavior
only If they are related to
one or more of the variables
specified by
the theory.
Kore precisely, the relation
between external variables
and

behavior may be mediated by the
dete™lnants of attitude toward the behavior, the determinants of
subjective norm, and/or by the relative
weights of the attitudinal and
normative factors.

In the case of atti-

tude toward the behavior, differences
among individuals on demographic

characteristics, for example, may produce
differences in salient beliefs
about the consequences of perforaing
the behavior.
Alternatively, the
same salient beliefs may be held by
individuals possessing different

background characteristics, but the
strength with which the beliefs are
held may vary systematically.

Finally, external variables may affect

individuals' evaluations of behavioral
outcomes.

The determinants of
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the normative component
may be Influenced by
external variables in
similar ways. That is.
individuals' salient referents,
the normative
beliefs they attribute to
given referents, and their
motivation to
comply with those referents,
may each be affected by
individual difference variables.
The impact that external
variables may have on the

determinants of the attitudlnal
and negative components
may in turn
influence the attitude toward
the behavior and subjective
non™. both of
Which may then have an impact
on intention and behavior.
However, even

when external factors affect
the dete^inants of any
particular variable
In the Ajzen and Fishbein
model, it does
not follow that they will

necessarily also affect the variable
itself.
external variable

is

For instance, even if an

shown to be related to the
subjective norm, the

variable will not be related to
intention should Intention be
primarily
dependent on attitudlnal considerations.
In spite of the fact that
there is no necessary relation
between any external variable and
intentions or behavior, Ajzen and Fishbein
do suggest that when external
variables are related to beliefs
underlying

a

given behavior, demonstra-

tion of these relationships can
add to understanding that behavior.

When cancer delay research is viewed
from within the framework of
the theory of reasoned action,

it Is not surprising that the
research

has accomplished little by way
of explaining delay behavior.

As previ-.

ously discussed, the types of variables
that have been examined in
studies of delay in seeking

a

diagnosis of cancer symptoms include demo-

graphic and personality characteristics, attitudes
towards doctors and
the health care system, habits of medical

care seeking, and previous
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expen-ence. knowledge, and
affective reactions In
.elation to cance.
symptoms and cancer Itself,
f™. the perspective of
the theory of reasoned action. It IS because
these types of variables
can have an effect
on help seeking behavior
only through their l.pact
on mediating variables, that delay research
has failed to provide
an adequate
explanation
Of the process whereby
people reach a decision
to present or not
present
the,r cancer sy.pto.s to
a doctor.
However, since these types
of variables have been found in
so.e studies to be related
to medical help
seeking for cancer symptoms,
this does suggest that
they might Indeed
contribute to an understanding
of prompt and delay behavior,
if their
indirect effects on behavior
via mediating variables
can be demonStrated.
The research reported in
the present dissertation
sought to understand and explain women's decisions
to delay or obtain immediate
professional medical care for a
breast cancer symptom, in
accordance with this
line of reasoning.
Middle-aged women were asked to
imagine that they
had just discovered a specific
change in one of their breasts,
and

completed

a

questionnaire that assessed what they
believed their emo-

tional, cognitive, and behavioral

responses would be to this situation.

The methodology of asking
people to predict their responses
to an imaginary situation has the potential
problem that the individuals may be

unable to make accurate predictions.

actually discovering

a

It is

possible that responses to

breast symptom are quite different from
the

responses women believe they would have
to this situation when it

hypothetical.

is

Ideally, studies of delay in seeking
care for breast
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cancer symptoms would collect
data from symptomatic
women in the time
intervening between their
discovery of the breast
abnormality and their
contacting a doctor.
Unfortunately,
this ideal

sibility.

is

not a practical pos-

An alternative methodology
would be to follow the
example of

cancer delay studies and obtain
retrospective data from women
who had
breast cancer symptoms and
sought a doctor's advice.
This methodology
has the potential

problem of biased retrospective
accounts, particularly

if the doctor's diagnosis
of the symptom is known to
the respondent.
In
addition, this methodology
necessarily excludes subjects
who are symptomatic but choose not to contact
a doctor.
the present study, attempts
were made to enable respondents
to
easily and realistically imagine
themselves in the situation of
finding
In

a

breast cancer symptom.

discovered

a

Respondents read

a

scenario about

a

woman who

breast symptom, in which the
circumstances of the discov-

ery, especially the nature of
the symptom, were described in
detail.
Thus the respondents were provided
with concrete mental images of the

situation.

Furthermore, respondents were required
to be between the

ages of 35 and 65 years old.

The rationale for the age requirement
was

that women over age 35 are considered
to be at high risk of getting

breast cancer, and the risk of getting
the disease increases with age
(American Cancer Society, Note 1).

Therefore, the sample consisted of

women who, according to one key indicator,
were relatively likely to
develop symptoms of breast cancer.

It was expected that a substantial

proportion of respondents would have actually
discovered

a

breast lump

at some time prior to participating in the
study, and that these women,
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past experience, would
be able to both
.ead1l,
-ag,ne themselves 1n the
hypothetical situation and
accurately

predict

their responses to It.

As expected,

there was a sizeable
number of

respondents In the sample who
did have

comparisons of respondents who
had such

history of breast lumps

a

a

history to those who
did not

provided an Indication of the
extent to which responses
to the questionnaire items were affected by
actual experience with
breast cancer
symptoms.
The questionnaire respondents
completed assessed two general
sets
Of variables.
First, the variables
specified by Ajzen and Fishbeln's
theory of reasoned action were
measured, so that the cognitive
structures that dete™ined
respondents' Intentions to
engage In prompt or delay behavior in seeking
medical care could be examined.
A second set of
variables was also measured,
and the variables were tested
for whether
or not they indirectly Influenced
Intentions, through their Impact
on
the other components of the
Ajzen and Fishbein model.
These variables
fell Into ten categories:
respondents' emotional reactions
to finding
the breast change, and their
perceptions of what their emotional
reac-

tions would be if the change
turned out to be breast cancer;
respondents'

personal diagnoses of the change
(i.e., causal attributions);

respondents' actual medical history
of breast symptoms and cancer;
respondents' beliefs about the
incidences of breast lumps, breast
cancer, and deaths from breast cancer
(I.e., variables invoking use of
the availability heuristic); respondents'
perceived vulnerability to

breast cancer; respondents' beliefs about
the symptoms and nature of
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breast cancer (I.e..
variables Invoking use
of the representativeness
heunstic); respondents'
attitudes toward their
relationships with
doctors; respondents'
general habits of seeking
.edical care; personality factors; and respondents'
demographic characteristics.
TWO personality factors
were assessed In the
study,
one of which

was health locus of
control expectancies.

An Increasing number
of

health researchers have
measured locus of control
beliefs and have
attempted to relate these
expectancies to a wide variety
of healthrelevant behaviors (for
reviews of this research,
see Strickland. 1978Wallston , wallston. 1982).
Si.ply stated, the
generalized expectancy'
that one's outcomes are
the direct result of one's
behavior or relatively enduring characteristics
is tended an internal
locus of control
orientation.
This is opposed to believing
that one's outcomes are
under
the control of powerful
other people or are randomly
detemined by such
forces as fate, luck, or chance;
these beliefs are indicative
of an
external locus of control
orientation (cf. Rotter. 1966).
her review
of research on the locus of
control construct and its relation
to health
behavior, Strickland (1978) wrote.
"Results of research conducted
with
various instruments suggest
that beliefs about internal
versus external
control are related in significant
and even dramatic ways to healthrelated behaviors" (p. 1192).
However, in a more recent review,
Wallston and Wallston (1982) stated
that some of the apparently strong

m

relationships discussed by Strickland
have not been supported by the
findings of additional research in
this area.
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Although locus Of control
beliefs have been
studied in .elation
to
a host Of health-relevant
behaviors, they have not
been examined for
the,r possible influence
on promptness and delay
in seeking .edical
care
for physical symptoms.
People differing in health
locus
of control ex-

pectancies have been found
to utilize health systems
differently.
For
example. Krantz, Baum and
Wideman (1980) found that
internal college

students reported fewer clinic
visits, and that

a

second sample of

Internals was .ore likely to
self-diagnose symptoms than
were externals.
Among the many health-specific
measures of the locus of
control
construct that have been developed,
the one that is currently
used most
widely, and was used in the
present study, is Hallston.
Mallston, and
DeVellis' (1978) Multidimensional
Health Locus of Control (MHLC)
Scales.
In addition to measuring
internality,

the MHLC Scales split
externality

into two distinct components
and measure each separately.

These components of externality involve the
belief that powerful other people
control one's health, and the belief
that chance, fate, or luck determines whether one Is healthy or
111.
The three dimensions that
are

tapped by the MHLC Scales (I.e.,
one of internality and two of
externality) are statistically
independent.

The second personality factor that
was assessed in the present

study was self-esteem.

Specifically, Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem

Scale was included in the questionnaire.

This measure was included on

the basis of cancer delay researchers'
suggestion that general emotional

health contributes to prompt action in
responding to cancer symptoms,

rather than to the maladaptive response
of denying or avoiding the
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symptoms (cf. Cameron
& Hinton, 1968; Henderson,
1966; Henderson.
Wittkower & Lougheed, 1958;
Worden & Weisman, 1975).

CHAPTER

II

METHOD

Pilot Study
The pilot study was administered
to

sample of women that was

a

recruited in an informal manner;
friends and colleagues of the
author
distributed the pilot questionnaire
to their friends and
colleagues.
The only selection criteria for
respondents were that the women be
at
least 35 years old, and had not heard
of the study prior to receiving
the questionnaire.

Fifty women were asked to complete
the questionnaire

and mail it back anonymously in an
accompanying stamped, addressed
envelope.

A total

of 34 completed questionnaires was
returned (64.0%);

however, one was returned too late for
inclusion.
tionnaires were used in the pilot study.
from 36 to 77 years old, with

a

Therefore, 33 ques-

The respondents ranged in age

mean age of 53.19 years.

The questionnaire was self-contained, and
was described as part of
a

study of decisions people make about seeking
medical help, particular-

ly the different decisions women make
when they discover a lump in their

breast (the pilot questionnaire
dents read two brief scenarios.

is

contained in Appendix A).

One described

ately sought medical care after discovering

a

a

Respon-

woman, Ann, who immedi-

lump in her breast; the

second scenario described Susan, who delayed seeking medical
care for
the identical symptom.

Both scenarios began by describing that the

woman (Ann or Susan) woke up one morning, took
showering felt

"a hard,

a

shower, and while

tiny lump on the edge of her left nipple.
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The

'™p

was so

U

sure

s.an. s.alle. than the sUe
of

was anything unusual.

Aside

f™.

a pea,

the

that Ann/Susan wasn't

,™p. Ann/Susan hadn't

noticed anything about her
physical condition that was
different from
nonnal.
Ann/Susan thought about how
s^all the lu.p was

and that she was

feeling as well as she
usually did."
At this point, the first
scenario read, "She thought
that, even
though the l«p was tiny and
she felt fine, she should
find out if the
lu.p was something serious.
Ann got out of the shower
and decided she

would immediately call her
doctor.
examination."

She made an appointment
to have an

In contrast, at the same
point,

stated, "She thought that,
because the

the second scenario

l™p

„as tiny and she felt fine.
She should watch the lump
to find out if it would
change or go away.
Susan got out of the shower
and decided she would watch
the lump for a

while.

She could always make an
appointment to have an examination
at
later time."

Following the scenarios, the
questionnaire instructed respondents
to imagine that what happened
to Ann and Susan had just
happened to
them.

Respondents were told to imagine that
they had just found

a lump
in their breast while taking
a morning shower, and the
details of the

size and nature of the lump were
repeated.

The instructions asked the

respondent to answer the questionnaire
items as if she had actually

experienced the situation described.
The questionnaire followed the
methodology of Ajzen and Fishbein
to elicit salient outcomes.

In separate questions,

respondents were

asked to list what they saw as the advantages
and disadvantages of

a
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list anything else they
associated with immediately
calling the doctor
To elicit salient referents,
respondents were asked to
list any people
or groups who would approve
of them immediately calling
the doctor, and
any people or groups who
would disapprove of this
behavior.
The same
set of questions was repeated
with regard to "watching
the lump for a
while, as Susan did," in order
to elicit salient outcomes
and referents
for this behavioral decision.
The pilot questionnaire
was also used to
elicit salient emotions women
would experience in reaction
to discovering a breast lump.
Specifically, respondents were asked
to list the

emotions they felt when they found
the lump in their breast.

Additional

items on the pilot questionnaire
concerned respondents' behavioral
intentions and demographic characteristics.

The advantages and disadvantages
that were listed by respondents

for the behaviors of immediately
calling the doctor and watching
the
lump for a while were used to
obtain the modal salient outcomes
that

appeared on the final questionnaire.

For each of the two behaviors,

responses that referred to similar
outcomes were grouped together into

outcome categories.

All

outcome categories that were listed by
at least

10% of the sample were chosen for inclusion in
the final questionnaire.

This procedure resulted in the nineteen
outcomes that are listed in

Table

1.

Although the outcomes chosen were elicited in
response to the

behaviors of immediately seeking care and delaying
medical care, the
table shows that in the final questionnaire,
all outcomes were worded to
be appropriate to the behavior of delaying
medical care (i.e..
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Table

1

Modal Salient Outcomes,
Referents, and Emotions

Mo dal Salient Outcomes

'°

"ing
'

t^^t the change In

h.ast

"°?irn?;^?h"e^:-S?e:\r?^:rne^^?se^^^^'^^°- °"

is noth-

of

"^'^""'^

or get worse
wn!!?^"'™^"?"'''
woj;,d^avo,d
be,ng inconvenienced by
taking ti^e'Lay fro.
™y daily
This would give me time
to find a doctor I trust
''''''
'
'°
surgery™L'/or other disabling
""treVt^er
T
I

I

would avoid wasting the doctor's
time

a:«"i:^ut^h:r?[:^rgro:^::^rr^aJ°°""

'lnf*\lon^\^brurth?i2:rL'h:t^1ot:L*:„^™^^-^%-S"3^
nim/ner to make an accurate

would save money
would be decreasing my chances
for a complete
^umpiete cure
The lump would go away
I would avoid
upsetting my family
treatment and I might die
J^wnMiH^^
I
would not know ^'J'
what the change in my breast
means
I

diagnosis

I

Modal Salient Referents
My co-workers

m,,

u„^l,^.

American Cancer Society

My doctor

Modal Salient Emotions
'""^

FP.^^^nf
^PP':'\hensive
In.ir^l
5
^'""'^y
TnoT and annoyed
Angry
Surprised and curious

Disbelieving and shocked
Pessimistic and hopeless
Concerned and worried
Sad and depressed
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™on1ton-ng the b.ast change
for

a

whne

rathe, than 1™ed1ately
caning

the doctor).

Respondents'

lists of the people or
groups who would approve
and

disapprove of both behaviors
were used to obtain .odal
salient referents. All referents that
were listed by at least
of the sample were
chosen for inclusion In the
final questionnaire, which
resulted in the
11 referents that are listed
in Table 1.
Lastly, respondents'
lists of
emotions they felt after finding
the breast s^to. were
categorized, to
yield the nine emotional
reactions that are shown at
the bottom of the
same table.

m

The Study

Recruitmen of Respondents

Respondents were recruited for the
study in the following manner.

Street lists were obtained for
two neighboring towns in
western Massachusetts.
The street lists provided the
name, address, and year of
birth of every person who was
at least seventeen years of
age, and was
considered

a

town resident, as of January

1,

1983.

Every fifth woman

who was recorded on the street
lists as having been born between
1918
and 1948 (i.e., was between 35
and 65 years old) was sent a letter
that
briefly described the study and
requested her participation.

(The let-

ter is contained in Appendix B.)
The letter introduced the author
as

a

doctoral student in social

psychology who needed help with her dissertation
research on how women

make decisions about seeking medical care.

It asked potential
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respondents 1f they would be
willing to fill out

a

questionnaire In

Change in her body, and
then answer questions
concerning what they
would
think, feel, and do If they
were In the sa.e situation
as the wo.an In
the story.
The confidentiality of
all responses was
assured, and an
Offer was „,ade to send
participants results of the
study after Its
completion.
A stamped, addressed
postcard was enclosed with
each letter.

The

women were asked to return the
postcard after marking the
appropriate
response option as to whether
or not they would cooperate
with the study
(the postcard is contained in
Appendix B).

If they did choose to
parti-

cipate, the women provided
their name, telephone number,
and best time
to be called about the research.
Each woman who returned the
postcard
Indicating that she would be willing
to complete the questionnaire
was
telephoned, so that she could ask
any questions she -ay have
had about
her participation. All women
who agreed on the telephone
to participate
i-n

the study were sent a
questionnaire, along with

envelope for its return.

a

stamped, addressed

The questionnaire Included
the author's tele-

phone number, so that respondents
were able to ask about any questions

or problems they had in filling out
the fom.

Table 2 presents the re-

sponse rates for all stages of the
recruitment process.
Table

2 is

that, of the 164 women who were sent

a

Not shown in

questionnaire, 134

respondents (81.7%) returned completed
questionnaires.
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The Questionnaire

Introduction
The entire questionnaire
packet respondents
received is in Appendix C.
Respondents first read and
signed an informed
consent fo™. and
then read instructions
on ho« to use the rating
scales that were contained in the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was
described as part of
a study of the different
decisions people .ake about
seeking .edical
help, particularly the
decisions wo.en make about
what to do when they
notice a change in their
breast.
After these introductory
co-ents, the
following scenario was presented
for respondents
to read:

dressed

Tt".^' i™

bump was quite small

cT;.^

^^-^er before gettina

^

/

smallpr th^n thf

l^^

""^"^^ ^^^1

::s^%?sTinlf ?a???ng

l^l

^^^^ mpple.

The

the doctor if the thickeninq oer-

ZHT'''

^^^^

At this point, respondents were
instructed to imagine that what

happened to Ann had just happened to
them.

They were told to imagine

that they had "just felt

a

hard, tiny thickening on the edge
of your

left nipple while taking

a

morning shower.

smaller than the size of

a

pea, that you aren't sure there is
really

The bump is so small,
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not,ced anything out o.
the oH1na.. about
you. physical condition
Respondents were then asked
to answer the
questionnaire items
Hue:stionnaire
i.«
as if they
had actually experienced
this situation.
The Ajzen and Fishbein MnHoi
In the first half of
the questionnaire,

the components of
AJzen
and Fishbein's theory
of reasoned action
were assessed.
,„ p,.t1cular
the f,rst two items
on the questionnaire
measured respondents^
behavioral intentions.
Respondents answered. "„«
likely is lt that
you would

to do, rather than
Immediately call

that you would decide
to

mediately

the doctor?" and, "How
likely Is it
call

the doctor?" on
seven-point

scales, with "unlikely"
(scored as -3) and "likely"
(scored as .3) at
the endpoints.
The next three questions
that appeared on the
questionnaire are not a part of the
Ajzen and Fishbein model.
Respondents were
asked how long they would
wait to call the doctor if
the l^p disap-

peared, if the

l™p

did not change in any way,
and if the lump did grow

or change.

There were 13 labeled response
options for these questions.
Which ranged from "less than
one day" to "would never
call the doctor."
Attitudes towards the behaviors
of monitoring the breast change
and immediately calling the
doctor were obtained in two separate
measures.
Specifically, the concept "For you
to decide to monitor the
change in your breast for a while,
rather than immediately call the
doctor" was rated on 20 seven-point
scales, most of which were taken
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fro. the evaluation,
potency, and activity
factors of the semantic
differential (Osgood. Suci S
Tannenbau™,. 1957).
The concept "For
you to
decide to Immediately call
the doctor" was rated
on the sa.e 20 scales
(see Appendix C for a complete
listing of the scales).
All ratings were
scored fron, -3 to .3.
Responses to each set of scales
were submitted to
a principal components
factor analysis, followed by
orthogonal factor
rotation.
For both analyses, the
same 11 scales had the highest
loadings (all exceeding
.65) on the first, evaluative
factor.

were:

These scales

foolish-wise, weak-strong,
aimless-motivated, useless-useful,

passive-active, sick-healthy, bad-good,
ha™ful-benef1cial

impractical.
practical, objectionable-acceptable,
and impossible-manageable.
Scores

representing attitude toward monitoring
the breast change were computed
by summing ratings of this
concept on the 11 scales, so that
higher
scores indicated more favorable
attitudes.
Scores representing attitude
toward immediately calling the
doctor were also computed by summing
responses to the appropriate

11

scales, and again, favorable attitudes

were indicated by higher scores.
Inserted after the attitude measures was
an open-ended question
that is not

a

variable in the theory of reasoned action.

The respondent

was told to "Suppose you did decide
to immediately call the doctor for

advice about the change in your breast,"
and was asked to write in what
advice she thought the doctor would give
her.
The next two questionnaire items were
measures of subjective

norms.

Respondents answered, "How likely

is

it that most people who are

important to you would think you ought to monitor
the change in your
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breast for

a

while, rather than

mediately

call

the doctor?" and

"How
that .ost people who are
Important to you would
thin, you
ought to l™ed1ately call
the doctor?" on seven-point
scales, with the
endpolnts labeled "unlUely"
(scored as -3) and "likely"
(scored as .3)
Although not a part of the
Ajzen and Fishbein .odel
the question "How
likely 1s It that you would
talk to people who are
important to you to
find out what they think
you ought to do about the
change in your
breast?" was asked at this
point.
Responses were n,ade on a
seven-point
scale labeled "unlikely"
(scored as 1) and "likely"
(scored as 7) at the
endpoints.

likely 1s

U

,

The next section of the
questionnaire assessed outcome
evaluations
for nine of the 19 outcomes
that were constructed from
the pilot study.
Each of the following nine
statements was rated on a
seven-point scale,'
with the endpoints labeled
"bad" (scored as -3) and
"good" (scored as
+3).

Z

^''^ ^^^^^^
feel confidence in myself isIZ me ^°
For
to avoid unpleasant medical
procedures is"^^^^^^ ^^at a change in my breast
is

no^hin'g sIr?oil
For meto handle my problems and
decisions on my own, instead
insiead of
ot
turning them over to someone else
is-

by taking time away from my
'°d'aily'°rou^?ne is:"'
For me to take time to find a
doctor I trust is^'

^^^^^/Pf^'^ing.as

silly and foolish alamist is:
information about a lump in my
breasffnr
oreast
for Jhp'n^rt^'^r
the doctor to make an accurate
diagnosis isFor me to not know what a change
in my breast means is:

FarZ

In

a

Because six of the 19 consequences were
obviously undesirable, it seemed
that asking respondents to evaluate
these outcomes might cause the women
to no longer give serious consideration
to the questionnaire.

Therefore,
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these six consequences
were assigned an
unfavorable outcome
evaluation
Of -3.
I

would feel anxious, fearful,
and worried

^0™

\':rr]?.^?rt^
^ '°

treatments

I'woulVhe'i^''"

r

*° a--"

It-Soi^dtto-?:^^-

-

^et wo.se
^"1/or other disabling

^"•'S^'-y
°'-

^P'-^^d

?rL"?-„t%^n^

S^dfe"-

Four consequences were
assigned a favorable outcome
evaluation of +3

The lump would go away
I would avoid
upsetting my family

Again, values for these
evaluations were assigned rather
than assessed
to preclude the possibility
that respondents would
doubt the seriousness
of the study if they were
asked to rate the favorableness
of clearly
desirable outcomes.
The outcome evaluations were
directly followed by Items
measuring
behavioral beliefs.
Behavioral beliefs were assessed
with regard to all
of the 19 outcomes.
Respondents rated the likelihood
that each outcome
would result from monitoring the
breast change rather than immediately

calling the doctor.

These ratings were made on
seven-point scales that

had unlikely" (scored as -3)
and
points.

e.g.,

If

likely

(scored as +3) at the end-

The behavioral belief items
were worded in the first person,
I

monitored the change In my breast
for

called the doctor immediately,

I

a

while rather than

would feel anxious, fearful, and

worried. '
The next set of items on the
questionnaire assessed normative

beliefs.

On seven-point scales

labeled "unlikely" (scored as -3)
and
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l^^eiy. (scored as
.3) at the endpoints.
respondents .ted the,>
subjective p.o.a.„U1es
that U referents
(obtained .ro. the
p1,ot stud.)
would reco^end monitoring
the breast change
Instead of calling
the
doctor.
The non„at1ve belief
Items were also worded
In the first per

-

breast for

a

while rather than call
the doctor l^edlately

After the negative
beliefs, respondents rated
their motivation to
comply with each referent
by responding to
the statement. "Generally
speaking, I want to do
what my [referent] thlnk(s)
"
I ought to
do
These ratings were made
on seven-point scales,
where the "unlikely"
endpoint was scored as
1, and the "likely" endpoint
was scored as 7
In
another set of Items, each
referent was rated In te™s
of how Hkely the
respondent would be to talk
to that referent about
the decision to seek
medical care or not.
Specifically, the statement,
"I would talk to
my
[referent] to find out what
they (s/he) thlnk(s)
I

ought to do about the

change In my breast" was
rated on the same response
scales used for
motivations to comply.
This latter set of Items
is not a component
of
the Ajzen and Fishbein
model.

Variables External to the A^ypn
~
and nsnbein Model
Emotional reactions

.

Respondents provided their emotional
reac-

tions to finding the breast
change.

The phrase,

"Discovering the change

in my breast made me feel"
was followed by nine scales;
each scale

corresponded to one of the nine
emotions that was obtained from the
pilot study. Subjects rated the
extent to which discovering the
change
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-de
not

the™ .ee, each of the
nine emotions, on
seven-polnt scales
Uheled
at all" (scored as
1) and extremely" (scored
as

7)

at the end-

Pomts.

Respondents also Indicated
what their emotional
reactions would
be ,f the breast change
proved to be breast
cancer.

Change turned out to be
breast cancer.

I

They rated. "If the

would feel" on the sa^e
nine

scales that measured emotional
reactions to finding the
breast change.
Personal diag noses,
between the ^o sets of
emotional response
™easures were three questions
that concerned respondents'
personal diagnoses of the breast sy.pton,.
In an open-ended question,
respondents
were asked to provide their
own diagnosis of the change
in their breast.
A scaled question asked
the women to Indicate the
extent to which their
personal diagnosis represented
a life-threatening
condition.
Responses

m

to this question were
made on a seven-point scale,
where one endpoint.

not

life- threatening." was scored
as 1, and the other
endpoint. "life-

threatening." was scored as

7.

On the third item respondents
provided

their subjective probability
that the change in their breast
was a symptom of breast cancer; ratings
were made on a seven-point
scale with

unlikely" (scored

as

1)

and "likely" (scored as
7) at the endpoints.

At this stage in the questionnaire,
respondents were given further

instructions.

The Instructions stated that the
remainder of the ques-

tionnaire contained items that did
not require the women to respond
as
if they had discovered

a

change in their breast.

The respondents were

asked to stop Imagining that they
had found the change, and to answer
the rest of the questions as they
normally would.
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^^iHLhlstoi^,.
dents'

several questions were
asked concerning respon-

actual history of breast
sy.pto.s and cancer.

asked the wo^en if they had
ever discovered

a

l™p

The first question

in their breast

If
the respondent answered
yes. she was asked to
report how ™any ti.es she

had discovered a breast lu.p,
and whether or not she had
had the lu.p(s)
examined by a doctor.
If the respondent reported
that a doctor had
examined the lump, she was asked
to indicate how much time
went by
between her discovery of the
lump and contacting the
doctor (responses
were coded as number of days);
she was also asked to
provide the doctor's diagnosis of the lump.
All respondents were asked
if they had
ever had any breast symptoms
other than a lump, and if so,
to briefly
describe the symptoms.
Each woman marked whether or
not she had ever
had breast cancer, whether or
not she had ever had any type
of cancer
other than breast cancer, and whether
or not her mother or sister(s)
had
ever had breast cancer.
Those respondents whose mother
or sister had

ever had breast cancer were asked
to rate, "On the whole, how
successful
was her outcome from breast cancer?"
on a seven-point scale labeled
"unsuccessful" (scored as

1)

and "successful" (scored as
7) at the end-

points.

Availability

.

Five questions assessed respondents'
beliefs about

the incidences of breast lumps, breast
cancer, and deaths from breast

cancer.

Respondents were asked to provide their
opinions as to the per-

centage of:

women that discovers

a

breast lump at some time in their

lives, breast lumps that is diagnosed as
breast cancer, and women that
gets breast cancer.

Respondents were further asked, "What percentage of
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Of

U?"

Similarly, an additional

Ue.

asked for what percentage
of

wo.en Who have breast
cancer, and are treated
for the disease, die
of
n. TWO separate questions asked
respondents to write in the
number of
wo.en they knew who had
discovered a breast ,u.p
that was not

diagnosed
breast cancer, and how .any
women they knew who had
discovered a lump
that was diagnosed as
cancerous.
as

Mnerabilltj,.

Perceived vulnerability to
getting breast cancer
was assessed by one item
that asked. "How likely is
it that you will one
day get breast cancer?" on
a seven-point scale,
labeled "unlikely"
(scored as 1) and "likely"
(scored as 7) at the endpoints.
Subjects
rated the extent to which they
had personal control over
not getting
breast cancer, and the extent
to which they believed
there was a particular type of woman who had a high
chance of getting breast cancer.
These ratings were made on
seven-point scales, where the
endpoints "not
at all" and "completely" were
scored as 1 and 7, respectively.
An openended question asked respondents
to provide a description of
the type of
woman who has a high chance of
getting breast cancer.
In a scaled

response, subjects rated the extent
to which they matched their
description.
This was also a seven-point
scale that had "not at all"
(scored
as

1)

and "completely" (scored as

Representativeness.

7)

at the endpoints.

The next section of the questionnaire
as-

sessed respondents' beliefs about the
symptoms of breast cancer.
Respondents were presented with

a

list of 30 physical symptoms that
was

drawn from the Pennebaker Inventory
of Limbic Languidness (Pennebaker.
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1982), and the «.e.1can Cancer
Societys

cancer symptoms.

They were asked to
rate each symptom as
to how fre-

early. Initial stages.

2 =

(Note ,) description
of breast

Ratings were n,ade on the
following scale.

Produces this symptom

laHv' Ininf! k'^"'!

early' nU a Ctll
ea"]^: Inl
e"
cine";
5 = early. Initial hreas?
3 =
4 =

P^°^"^« this

Sfl

P;;oduces

sw?l

thl^ s'y'Sptom

ll^lir^^/^tclT t^l\lZToT

Of the 30 symptoms presented,
five are described by the
American Cancer
society (Note 1) as symptoms
of breast cancer: pain
or tenderness
in

breast, nipple; lump or thickening
in breast; change in
retraction or
scaliness of nipple; bleeding
or discharge from nipple;
and, change in
size, shape, or skin of
breast.
The other 25 symptoms are
not symptoms
of breast cancer, but some are
symptoms of other types of
cancer:
convulsions; sore or stiff muscles,
back; hot flashes; shortness
of breath,
coughing; weight loss; hair loss;
change in appearance of wart
or mole;
fever; numbness, tingling in
any part of body; headaches;
blurred
vision; weight gain; a sore that
doesn't heal; upset stomach,
stomachache; faintness. dizziness;
heartburn, indigestion; ringing in
ears;

constant thirst; abnormal Pap smear;
chills; chest pains; running,
congested, or bleeding nose; weakness,
tiredness; abnormal vaginal

bleeding; and sore throat, hoarseness,
difficulty swallowing.
The next set of items assessed
respondents' beliefs about the dis-

ease of breast cancer.

Specifically, respondents rated, "Breast
cancer

1s" on 23 seven-point, bipolar
scales.

The scales were drawn from

studies that have examined what dimensions lay
persons use to classify
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illnesses, and where
specific illnesses are
judged to fall on
these
dimensions (D'And.ade,
Pulnn. Ne.love « Ro.ney,
,972; Fab.ega, 1974'
Fabrega . Manning.
1972; He.zlich, 1973;
dentins . ZyansM
,968.
Oones. Wiese. Moore
, Haley, ,981; Linz. Penrod.
Siverhus s Leventha,
The 23 sca,es were
1982).
scored fro. -3 to .3. and
were labeled by the
following endpolnts:
pe™anent-te.porary; incurable-curable;
dlsabl,

ing-e.powering; dangerous-safe;
painful-painless; serlous-.lld11fe-threaten1ng-not life-threatening;
recurrlng-not recurring;

unpre-

dictable-predictable; contaglous-not
contagious; inheritable-not
inheritable; unpreventab,e-preventable;

uncontrol,ab,e-controllable;

dirty-clean; mysterious-well-understood;
unfair-fair; bad-good;
punishing-rewarding; unpleasant-pleasant;

undeserved-deserved; a
disease that results in
permanent bodily changes-a
disease that 'results
in no bodily changes;
a disease that results
in pemanent personality
changes-a disease that results in
no personality changes;
and. a disease that requires long
treatment-a disease that requires
short treatmerit.

Relati onships with doctors.

Respondents rated the concept,
"In

general, my relationships with
doctors have been" on five bipolar,

seven-point scales:

bad-good; hannful-beneficial

;

unsatisfactory-

satisfactory; uncomfortable-comfortable;
and unfriendly- friendly
scales were scored from
found to have

a

1

to 7.

.

Responses to these five scales were

high internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha

Therefore, responses to the scales
were summed, to yield

a

=

.97).

general

The

~
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Of respondents, attitudes
toward the,> past
relationships with
doctors.
Higher scores represented
.ore favorable
attitudes.

a^^^^^^^^^^^^^l^Sre^eekina.

Two ite.s that were
drawn from

studies Of delay by Goldsen.
Gerhardt, and Handy (,957)
and King and
Leach (1950) tapped
respondents' general habits
of seeking medical
care
The first item asked,
"In general, when you
notice a physical symptom,
do you usually go to the
doctor right away or do
you wait?" Responses
were made on a seven-point
scale; the endpoint "usually
wait" was scored
as 1, and the endpoint
"usually go right away" was
scored as 7.
The

second item asked, "In general,
do you consult doctors on
a regular
basis or only in emergencies?"
Again, responses were made
on a sevenpoint scale, but in this case
the endpoints were labeled
"only in emergencies" (scored as 1) and "on
a regular basis" (scored
as 7).

Personality factors

.

The Multidimensional Health
Locus of Control

(MHLC) Scales (Wallston, Wallston
8 DeVellis. 1978) were
described on
the questionnaire as a measure
of opinions about general health
and illness issues.
The MHLC Scales are comprised
of three scales:
the Internal Health Locus of Control
(IHLC) Scale, the Powerful Others
Health

Locus of Control
(CHLC) Scale.

of 18 items.

(PHLC) Scale, and the Chance Health
Locus of Control

Each of the scales consists of six
items, making
All

a

total

of the items utilize a six-point
scale, ranging from

"strongly disagree" (scored as

1)

to

"strongly agree" (scored as 6).

Responses to the six items within each
scale were summed, as each scale

proved to be internally consistent.

Cronbach's alpha was .73 for the

IHLC Scale, and higher scores indicated
a belief that internal factors
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are responsible for one's
health.

Po. the PHLC Scale,
Conhach's alpha

was .70, and higher scores
were indicative of a
belief that one's health
IS detennined by
powerful other people.
Lastly, Cronbach's
alpha for
the CHLC Scale was
.68, and higher scores
represented the belief
that
one's health is a matter
of fate, luck, or chance.

Rosenberg's (1965) Self-esteem
Scale was presented on the
questionnaire as asking respondents
for their general feelings
about themselves.
Ten items comprise the
Self-esteem Scale. The items
utilize a
four-point scale, in which the
score of 1 is labeled
"strongly disagree," 2 is labeled "disagree,"
3 is labeled "agree,"
and 4 1s labeled
strongly agree." Appropriate items
were reverse scored, and
responses
to all of the Items were
summed (Cronbach's alpha =
.83).

Higher scores

indicated higher self-esteem.
.Demographics

.

In the last section of the
questionnaire, respon-

dents provided background
information.

following data:

Specifically, they provided the

their marital status, the year
they were born, their

ethnic background, their religion,
whether or not they were employed,
their occupation (if employed),
the last year of school they
completed,
the number of people they were
living with, their household's
annual

income, and the number of people
who were being supported by that
income.

Respondents who were married were asked
to report the last year

of school their husband completed,
whether or not the husband was
employed, and what their husband's
occupation was, if he was employed.

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS

Description of Respondpnt^

-an

The 134 respondents
ranged 1n age from 35
to 65 years old.
with a
age of 45.55 years.
Almost three-guarters of
the wo.en were .ar-

"•ed (73.,., n=98).
32 respondents (16.4%) were
separated or divorced
10 (7.5%) had never been earned,
and three (2.2%) were
widowed.
Marital status was missing
for one respondent.
The number of people
respondents were living with
ranged from zero to seven,
with a mean of
2.32.
The great majority of the
women were white (96.3%,
n=129)- two
respondents (1.5%) were blac.,
one (.7%) was Hispanic,
and one (.'7%) was
Asian.
One respondent did not
report her ethnic background.
Of the
sample, 68 respondents
(50.7%) indicated their religion
was Protestant,
32 (23.9%) were Catholic, and nine
(6.7%) were Jewish.
Nine women
(6.7%) marked their religion as
"other," and 14 (10.4%)
.^ported they
had no religious preference.
Two respondents did not
provide their
religious affiliation.

Most of the respondents
(73.1%, n=98) were employed.

Of the employed respondents, five
(5.1%) perfomed janitorial duties;
three
(3.1%) were saleswomen; six (6.1%) were
aides or clerks; 19 (19.4%)
were
secretaries; ,7 (17.3%) were in
health-related occupations (e.g..
nurse,

occupational therapist. X-ray technician);
eight (8.2%) were selfemployed; nine (9.2%) were teachers;
20 (20.4%) were administrators;
and

11

(11.2%) were professionals

89

(e.g., professor, social worker.

90

Psycholo,,st,.

AS a w.o,e t.e sample
was unusuall,

respondents (30.6.) had

a

educated.

4,

graduate deg.ee. 39
(29.,« ,ad

a college
degree. 27 (20.1%) had
completed so.e college, and
15 (11. 2« had
attended a trade school.
Only 12 respondents
(8.9.) did not have any
formal education beyond
high school.

Of the 127 women who
reported their household's
annual income 10
(7.9« reported it as $10,000 or less;
15 (11.8%) as
$10.001-$20 . 000 29
(22.8%) as $20,001-$30,000;
36 (8.3%) as $30.001-$40.000;
17 (13 4%) as
-

$40.001-$50.000; and 20 (15.7%) as
S50.001 or .ore.

provide this infonmation.

Seven women did not

The nunber of people
supported by the house-

hold's annual income ranged
from one to eight, with
a mean of 3.24.
An
additional measure of economic
status was computed in the
following way:
Each income category listed
above was assigned the value
of the category's midpoint, e.g., the
category $10,001-$20,000 was
assigned the
value of $15,000.
Then, the assigned income
was divided by the number
of people supported by the
income, to yield the average
income available
for each person supported.
The average income per
person supported
ranged from $1,250 to $35,000.
and had a mean of $11,468.83.
A total of 100 respondents
reported their husband's education.

Sixty men had

a

graduate degree, 17 had

pleted some college, nine had

graduated from high school.

a

a

college degree, nine had com-

high school diploma, and five
had not

Most of the husbands (91%) were
working.

Of the husbands who were employed,
almost one-half (46.2%, n=42) were

professionals (e.g., professor, physician,
psychologist).

Two men

(2.2%) were custodians; two (2.2%) were salesmen;
10 (11.0%) were
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Skilled laborers (e.g.
.

mechanic, .ason, toolnaker);
seven (7.7fl had

miscellaneous jobs such as
computer progra-er, textbook
editor, and
research assistant; six
(6.6%) were self-employed; 10
(11.0%) were
business executives, and
12 (13.2%) were teachers
or administrators.
Fully 41.8% of the respondents
(n=56) reported that they
had actually discovered a lump in
their breast. Of these.
48 women indicated
the number of times they had
discovered a breast lump.
(The other eight
women gave such responses as
"several" or "many" times.)
The number of
previous breast lumps ranged
from one to six. with a mean
of 1.67.
The
large majority of the 56
respondents did have the lump(s)
examined by a
doctor (85.7%. n=48)
Six women (10.7%) reported
that a doctor had
found the lump, and only two women
(3.6%) never had the lump examined.
The 48 women who did ask a
doctor to examine their l™p
indicated how
.

much time went by between their
discovery of the lump and their
contacting the doctor.
Responses ranged from less than 24
hours to one year;
the mean number of days was
23.70. and the median number of days
was
four.

One-fifth of the respondents (20.1%, n=27)
had experienced breast
symptoms other than

a

lump.

Two women (1.5%) had previously
had breast

cancer, and five women (3.7%) had
previously had
than breast cancer.

a

Twenty respondents (14.9%) had

cancer in their immediate family.

type of cancer other
a

history of breast
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The A.izen and Fishbpin
Model

Predictors of Intentions
Two intentions were
assessed:

change for

intention to monitor the
breast

while rather than
i^ediately call the doctor
(^-.45,
S0=2.41), and intention
to immediately call
the doctor (ji=.88.
SD-2 27)
As Shown in Table
3. which displays correlations
among intention,
a

atti-'
tude. and subjective
norm measures, these two
intentions were highly

negatively correlated (r=-.825.
£<.005).

For each respondent,
a differ-

Mlilintention

score was obtained by
subtracting her intention
to call
the doctor from her
intention to monitor the
breast change.
Differential intention scores
ranged from -6 to .6. with
negative scores indicating an intentional
preference for immediately calling
the doctor, and
positive scores indicating an
intentional preference for
monitoring the
breast change (i.e.. delaying
.edical care).
The mean differential intention score was -1.33 (SD=4.46),
indicating that the sample
as a whole
had a slight intentional
preference for seeking medical
care immediately.

Two separate measures assessed
attitude toward the behavior of

monitoring the breast change
(possible range

=

-33 to +33, X=-6.71.

SD=16.44) and attitude toward the
behavior of immediately calling
the
doctor (possible range = -33 to
+33, M8.26. SD=12.41).
The correlation of intention to monitor with
attitude toward monitoring was .733
(£<.005), and the correlation of intention
to call the doctor with atti-

tude toward calling the doctor was
.618 (£<.005).

A differential

tude score was obtained by subtracting
attitude toward calling the

atti-
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doctor fro. attitude toward
.onitoHng the breast change.
attuude scores had a possible
range of -66 to .66, with

Differentia,

negative scores
favorable attitude toward
i™ediate,y calling the
doctor
and positive scores
indicating a favorable
attitude toward monitoring
the breast change instead
of calling the doctor.
The .ean differential
attuude score was -24.97 (SD=26.95),
indicating that the sa.ple
as a
"hole had a favorable attitude
toward i™ed1ately seeking
.edical care
The correlation between
differential intention and
differential attitude
was high and positive (r=.736,
£<.005).

indicating

a

Subjective norm was also measured
with respect to monitoring
the
breast change (X=-1.77, SD=1.87)
and immediately calling
the doctor
(^=2.11, SD=1.46).

The correlation of intention
to monitor with the

corresponding subjective norm was
.595 (£<.005), while the
correlation
of intention to call the doctor
with its corresponding
subjective nonn
was somewhat lower, although
significant {r=.385, ^<.005).

A differen-

tial subjective norm score was
obtained by subtracting the
subjective

nom

for calling the doctor from
the subjective

breast change.

Differential subjective

+6, with negative scores indicating

a

nom

nom

for monitoring the

scores ranged from -6 to

perceived likelihood that impor-

tant referents would think the
respondent ought to immediately call
the
doctor, and positive scores indicating
perceived referential pressure to

monitor the breast change.

The mean differential subjective
norm score

was -3.88 (SD=3.01), indicating
that, on the average, respondents be-

lieved that most people who were
important to them would think they

ought to immediately call the doctor for
advice about the change in
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the,> breast.

The correlation between
differentia, intention
and differential subjective norm
was .557
(£^<.005).

Three separate regression
equations were constructed
in order to
test the prediction of
intention to monitor the
breast change, intenti
to in^ediately call

the doctor, and differential

on

intention, from thei r

corresponding attitude and
subjective nor. measures.

The regression of
intention to monitor on attitude
toward monitoring and
subjective norm
for monitoring found that
both predictors were
significant, together
accounting for 60% of the
variance in intention (R=.775,
^<.001).
The
regression coefficients were
.580 (£<.001) and .294
(£<.001) for the

attitudinal and normative components,
respectively.

The regression of

intention to call the doctor on
attitude and subjective norm
scores for
calling the doctor revealed that
only attitude was a significant
predictor (b=.560, £<.001), accounting
for 39% of the variance in
intention
{R=.628, ^<.001).
The regression of differential
intention on differential

attitude and differential subjective
norm showed that both predictors were significant, together
accounting for 57% of the variance in

intention (R=.753, £<.001).

The regression coefficients were
.623

(p<.001) for the attitudinal component,
and .194 (£<.05) for the normative component.

Prediction of each of the three intention
scores was

found to be highly accurate.

However, it is apparent that attitudes

toward the behaviors of delaying medical
care and immediately seeking
medical care were more important
determinants of choice intentions than

were subjective norms.
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Predictors of Attitudes and
Subjective Norms
In the theory of
reasoned action,
the

Mediate dete™i„ants

of

attuude are behavioral beliefs
and outcome evaluations.

,„ the present
study, behavioral beliefs
and outcome evaluations
were obtained (or
assigned) for 19 consequences
of deciding to monitor
the breast change
for a while rather than
call the doctor immediately
(see Table 1)
These behavioral beliefs
and outcome evaluations
were used to compute an
estimate of attitude toward
monitoring the breast change.
For each of
the 19 consequences, the
behavioral belief was multiplied
by the corresponding outcome evaluation,
and then the products were
suened.
This
estimate of attitude (possible
range = -171 to .171, i(=-26.79,
SDM2.42)

was found to predict the
direct measure of attitude
toward monitoring
with a high degree of accuracy
(r=.630, £<.005).
In

the Ajzen and Fishbein model,
the determinants of an individ-

ual's subjective norm are
normative beliefs and motivations
to comply.
In the present study,
respondents were asked to provide
their normative
beliefs and motivations to comply
with respect to 11 referents.
How-

ever, In the section of the
questionnaire that obtained normative

beliefs and motivations to comply,
respondents were also asked to "leave
blank any questions that do not
apply to you (for example, if you
do not
have any children, leave blank
all the questions that ask about
'my

children')."
dents.

This procedure resulted in missing
data for some respon-

For all

referents except "in-laws." missing data
for normative

beliefs were replaced with the respondent's
own mean normative belief
score, and missing data for motivations
to comply were replaced with the
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respondent's own ™ean motivation
to comply score.

The referent "Inlaws" was dropped fro.
analyses completely, because
there was an especially large number of missing
responses for this referent
(38.8% of the
sample had missing data).

Respondents' normative beliefs
and motivations to comply
were used
to compute an estimate of
their subjective norm for
monitoring the
breast change.
For each referent, the
normative belief was multiplied
by the motivation to comply,
and then the products were
suited.
This

estimate of subjective norm
(possible range

=

-210 to +210, )(=89.18,

SD=63.14) significantly predicted
the direct measure of
subjective norm
for monitoring (r=.491,
£<.005).

Cognitive Foundations of Intentions
to Monitor
This section begins

a

more detailed analysis of the
beliefs that

were found to constitute the underlying
cognitive foundations of respondents'

intentions to monitor the breast change
for

immediately call the doctor, or not to
do so.

a

while rather than

In order to examine the

effects of beliefs on intentions to
monitor, the sample was divided into
two groups on the basis of responses
to the item that assessed this in-

tention.

The first group,

"non-delayers," consisted of 74 women
(55.2%)

whose responses to the intention scale
fell below the midpoint (i.e.,
the "unlikely" side of the scale).

The second group,

"delayers," was

made up of 60 women (44.8%) whose responses
to the intention scale fell
above the midpoint (i.e., the "likely" side
of the scale).
dent checked the midpoint of the intention
scale.

No respon-

The utility of this

Classification of respondents

1s

evident 1n Table 4 which
presents, for

both non-delayers and
delayers, the mean attitude,
subjective no™, and
intention scores.

Results for non-delayers show
that this group had clear
preferences against n,on1tor1ng
the breast change, and
for calling the doctor
immediately.
The results concerning
delayers are less
straightfon,ard
Although delayers had a
positive differential Intention
score, a negative score for Intention
to call the doctor, and a
positive attitude
toward monitoring, they were
also positive in their
attitude and subjective norm regarding calling
the doctor.
In addition, delayers
had a
slightly negative attitude estimate
and differential attitude,
as well
as

negative subjective norm scores
for monitoring (as assessed
by both
the direct and estimated
measures) and a negative differential
subjective norm.

Those respondents who intended
to monitor the breast change

rather than Immediately call the
doctor, and had
toward doing so, also had

a

a

favorable attitude

favorable attitude and perceived
social

pressure toward immediately calling
the doctor.

ambivalence of the delayers. It

is

Despite the apparent

clear that their responses differed

from those of the non-delayers, in
the expected directions.

On measures

concerning monitoring, delayers were
significantly more positive in
their attitude, and less negative in
their estimated attitude, subjective norm, and estimated subjective
norm.

calling the doctor, delayers had

a

On measures concerning

negative intention score while non-

delayers had

a

positive intention, and delayers had

attitude and

a

less positive subjective norm.

a

less favorable

On the differential
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Table 4

Intentions Attitudes, and
Subjective Norms
of Delayers and
Non-delayers

^^^^^^^^

Dela^
X

Attitude*
Estimate of Attitude*
Subjective Norm*
Estimate of Subjective
Norm*
Call

Non^^ela^

SD

55

~..

g

-ifiy

Igg

in'f;
^^'^^

-''^-''^

"47.00
"^-^^

'

,Q
-57.28

^
11.92
32.41

l.H

t-7

65.98

-I15.05

47.24

A
1-04

2.46
25.75
2.62

6.81
1.06

3.2O

2.12

.5.00

1.44

-2.79

19.64

.42.94

16.71

3.30

-5.28

,.82

Doctor

Intention*
Attitude*
Subjective Norm*
Differential

Intention*

Differential Attitude*

.i

i

go!
]'
aq

-7c

\

l.io

Differential Subjective
-2-15

Difference between means of delayers and
non-delayers

is

significant at
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scores, delayers Intended
to .onito. «h1,e
„on-de,ayers Intended
to can
the doctor, and delayers
were less negative on
their attitude and
subjective no™ scores. Thus,
in comparison to
non-delayers, the delayers
had stronger preferences
for monitoring the
breast change, and
against
immediately calling the
doctor.
Behavioral Beliefs Underlying
Attitudes Toward Monitoring
Table 5 presents the mean
behavioral beliefs and outcome
evaluations for delayers and
non-delayers.
In addition. Table 5
presents correlations for the measure of
intention to engage in delay
behavior with
the behavioral beliefs
and with the outcome
evaluations.
The discussion
Of the results contained in
Table 5 focuses on the means
rather than on
the correlations, in order
to highlight as clearly as
possible the differences between delayers and
non-delayers on the underlying
determinants of attitudes and
intentions.
On Table 5, for the behavioral
beliefs, a positive score indicates
that the outcome was Judged as

Hkely

to result from monitoring the
breast change, while

negative
score indicates that the outcome
was judged as an unlikely result.
For
the outcome evaluations, a
positive score indicates that the
outcome was
rated as "good," while a negative
score indicates that the outcome
was

rated as "bad."

Table

5

a

shows that delayers and non-delayers
differed

significantly on their evaluations of
four out of nine consequences for
which evaluations were made.
In comparison to non-delayers,
delayers
gave

a

more favorable evaluation of the
consequence "control my own

health and feel confidence in myself," and
less negative evaluations of

—
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avoid unpleasant .edical
procedures" and
that the change is nothing
serious."

evaluation for "avoid appearing
as
delayers gave this consequence

a

On the behavioral beliefs,

"be able to convince
.yself

While delayers gave a
neutral
silly and foolisb
alannist," non-

a

negative evaluation.
delayers and non-delayers
differed sig-

nificantly on the perceived
likelihood of every consequence,
with the
exception of "this would give
me time to find a doctor
I
trust." Seven
of the consequences were
judged as neither likely or
unlikely by delayers, but as unlikely by
non-delayers:

I

would be controlling my
own

health and would feel confidence
in myself;

would be handling my
problems and decisions on my
own instead of turning them
over to someone
else; I would avoid being
inconvenienced by taking time away
from my
daily routine;

appearing as

a

I

I

would avoid wasting the doctor's
time;

silly and foolish alan^ist;

I

I

would avoid

would be able to provide

enough information about the lump
for the doctor to make an
accurate
diagnosis; and, I would avoid
upsetting my family.
Two consequences

were perceived by delayers as neither
likely nor unlikely to result
from
monitoring the breast change, whereas
non-delayers perceived them to be
likely:

My condition would become more
serious or get worse; and,

would be decreasing my chances for

a

complete cure.

While both delayers

and non-delayers rated as unlikely the
consequences of

unpleasant medical procedures,"

"I

I

"I

would avoid

would be able to convince myself that

the change in my breast is nothing
serious,"

"I

would save money," and

"the lump would go away," delayers rated
them as less unlikely than did

non-delayers.

Both delayers and non-delayers perceived

"I

would feel

104

anxious, fearful, and worried,"
"cancer would have time
to grow or
spread," and "I would not know
what the change in
.y breast neans" as
likely consequences of
monitoring, but delayers less
so than
non-

delayers.

Finally, the consequences of

"I

would be more likely to
need

-ajor surgery" and "it would
be too late for treatment
and
were judged as unlikely by
delayers,

I

might die-

whereas non-delayers judged
the

former as likely and the latter
as neutral.
Normative Beliefs Underlyin g Subjective Nnrm.
^^-^
with Respect to MonitoriTiq
Table

6

presents the mean nonnative beliefs
and motivations to

comply for delayers and non-delayers,
as well as the correlations
for
intention to delay with normative
beliefs and motivations to comply.
For the normative beliefs,

a

positive score would indicate
respondents'

perceptions that the referent in question
would be likely to prescribe

monitoring the breast change, while

a

negative score indicates that the

referent would be unlikely to prescribe
monitoring.
to comply,

For the motivations

the higher the score, the more
respondents reported generally

wanting to behave in accordance with the
referent's prescriptions.
On the normative beliefs, delayers
and non-delayers differed sig-

nificantly on the perceived likelihood
that every referent would think
the breast change ought to be monitored.

Each referent was believed by

both groups to be unlikely to recommend monitoring.

However, for every

referent, delayers judged prescriptions for monitoring
as less unlikely
than did non-delayers.

On the motivations

to comply,

delayers and non-

delayers differed significantly in their
ratings for only three
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Both delayers and
non-deU.ers had high average
scores on motivations
to
ccply with these three referents.
However. 1n comparison
to delayers
non-de,ayers gave significantly
higher ratings for generally
wanting t^
act as doctors, their
doctor, and the American
Cancer Society recommend.

Summary
Respondents'

Intentions to delay seeking
.nedlcal care or immedi-

ately seek care for the breast
symptom were highly correlated
with their
attitudes toward delayed and
prompt help-seeking behavior,
and with
their perceptions of which
behavior other people would be
likely to
recommend.
However, respondents' personal
evaluations of the two
behavioral options were more
strongly related to Intentions
than were
their perceived social pressures
to choose one behavior over
the other.
When respondents were classified
into the "delayer" and
"non-delayergroups it was clear that, in
comparison to the delayers, the non-

delayers were more extreme in
their unfavorable evaluations
of delay and
their favorable evaluations of
prompt help-seeking.
The delayers mani-

fested ambivalence in their attitudes,
in that they were somewhat
favorable toward engaging in both
delayed and prompt behavior.

The less

extreme attitudes of delayers relative
to non-delayers were reflected in
the finding that delayers tended
to believe that delaying medical
care

wuld

be neither likely nor unlikely
to result in various consequences.
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es

Relationships of External
Variables
to Differential
Intentions

Pearson correlation
coefficients were computed
between differentia, intention scores
and scores for the
variables that were
assessed in
the questionnaire, but
are externa, to the
AJzen and Fishbein ™ode, 3
The f,rst set of
correlations computed was
between differential
intentions and respondents'
ratings of the likelihood
that they would tal.
to
"people who are important"
to the™, as well as
each of the ten referents, to find out what
the referents would think
they ought to do about
the breast change.
Table 7 presents the
.eans and standard
deviations
for these ratings, and
the results of the
correlations.
The column of
means shows that the sample
as a whole would be
neither likely nor unlikely to talk to important
others.
On the average, respondents
believed they would be likely
to seek out their doctor,
doctors, and their
husband for advice about the
change in their breast, but
would be unlikely to consult with any
other referent.
The third column in the
table shows that differential
intention scores were negatively
correlated with the likelihood
of talking to three referents:
doctors, one's
own doctor, and the terican
Cancer Society.
Respondents who intended
to monitor the breast change
for a while rather than call
the doctor
Imnediately believed it was unlikely
that they would consult with the

cancer society, or with their own
or other doctors.

These findings

provide support for the reliability
of the choice intention measures.
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Table

7

Likelihoods of Consulting
with Referents- Means
Correlations
w^t'h
with Differential
''^'T'/"^
Intentions

would talk to:
people who are
important to me

I

differential intmvMnn

4.22

2.57

-.076

DO

1.78

.120

5.55

1.88

-.351*

3.40

2.18

my children

.014

3.15

2.08

-.083

my parents

3.02

1.82

my doctor

-.047

6.48

1.08

-.460*

my husband

5.18

2.04

-.019

my siblings

3.04

1.98

-.094

my relatives

2.30

1

.64

-.023

3.17

2.24

my co-workers
doctors

my friends

C

,

the American Cancer

Society
to find out what they (s/he)
think(s) I ought to do about
the change in my breast.

*£<.05

-.181*
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correlation coefficients
«ere also computed
between differential
intentions and responses
to eac. of the three
variables that measured
how long respondents
would wait to call the
doctor

if the lu.p in
their

breast manifested specific
characteristics.
tion coefficients was
significant.

Each of the three
correla-

Intentional preference for
monitor-

the sy.pto. instead of
calling the doctor i^ediatel,
was positively
associated with waiting a
longer period of time to
call the doctor if
the l^p disappeared (r=.527,
£<.005), if the lu.p did not
change in
any way (r=.673. £<.0O5),
and if the lump grew or
changed (r=.43g,

-9

£<.005).

These findings provide further
support for the reliability
of
responses to the intention
measures.

Table 8 presents the correlations
between differential intentions
and respondents' ratings
of their emotional reactions
to finding the
breast change, as well as their
ratings of what their emotional
reactions would be if the change
turned out to be breast cancer.
The table
shows that four emotional
reactions to finding the breast
change were
significantly negatively correlated
with differential intention.
The

stronger respondents' intentional
preferences were for monitoring the
change instead of calling the
doctor, the less they felt fearful
and

apprehensive, anxious and panicky,
concerned and worried, and sad and
depressed upon discovering the breast
symptom.
Three emotional reactions to the possibility of the
change turning out to be breast
cancer

were significantly related to
differential intention scores.

Intention

to monitor the symptom was
negatively correlated with feeling fearful

no
Table 8

Correlations Between Differential
Intentions
and Emotional Reactions

Emotions

Embarrassed and ashamed
Fearful and apprehensive

Anxious and panicky

Anqry and annoyed

Surprised and curious

FinHinn the change
u
Finding
,081

-.280*

-.372*
054

Change turned out to
__be_breast_cancer
.097

-.215*
-.158*
.150*

"128

.101

Disbelieving and shocked

-.ns

.013

Pessimistic and hopeless

-.]^S

-.049

Concerned and worried

-.213*

-.048

Sad and depressed

-.206*

-.107

*£<.05

m
and apprehensive, and
anxious and panicky, but
this Intention was
positively correlated with
feeling angry and annoyed.
In an

open-ended question, respondents
were asked to provide
their
own diagnosis of the
change In their breast.
A total of 108 women
answered this question, and
responses fell into three
categories- a
diagnosis that the change was
a sy.pto. of cancer
(n=30). a diagnosis
that the change was not

a

cancer symptom (n=59), and
an uncertain diag-

nosis that the change was
either cancerous or
non-cancerous (n=20).
Respondents were also asked to
rate the extent to which
their personal
diagnosis represented a lifethreatening condition (!i-3.59.
SD=1.98).
and the likelihood that the
change in their breast was a
symptom of
breast cancer (X=4.27, SD=1.70).
Responses to both of these items
were
significantly negatively correlated
with differential intention
scores.
The stronger respondents'
Intentional preferences were for
monitoring
the change Instead of calling
the doctor, the less respondents
judged
their personal diagnosis as
representing a life-threatening
condition
'

(r=-.353, £<,005).

Stronger intentional preferences for
monitoring were

also associated with lower subjective
probabilities of the change being
a

symptom of breast cancer {r=-.384, £<.005).''
Pearson correlations were computed between
differential Intention

scores and respondents' ratings of
breast cancer.

Table 9 presents the

results of the correlations, and the
means and standard deviations of
the ratings.

There were no significant findings among
the correlations,

suggesting that respondents' conceptions
of breast cancer did not
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Table 9

Standard Deviations
^°"''^'andVn.^
and Correlations with
Differential Intentions

'

r wi th

differential
intention

Breast cancer is:

permanent vs. temporary

4.57

1.73

incurable vs. curable

.039

2.52

1.40

disabling vs. empowering

-.034

4.66

1.07

dangerous vs. safe

.126

6.45

.90

.112

5.03

1.74

-.108

6.74

.57

-.017

painful vs. painless

serious vs. mild

life-threatening vs. not
life- threatening

6.29

1.19

-.045

recurring vs. not recurring

5.37

1.08

.017

unpredictable vs. predictable

5-41

1.70

-.025

contagious vs. not contagious

1.22

.85

.009

inheritable vs. not inheritable

5.46

1.41

-.053

unpreventable vs. preventable

4.87

1.81

-.027

uncontrollable vs. controllable
dirty vs. clean

3.01

1.67

-.119

3-68

1.11

..053

mysterious vs. well -understood

3.40

1.55

.067

unfair vs. fair

5.08

1.34

-.011

bad vs.

good

5.74

1.35

-.056

punishing vs. rewarding

4.57

1.08

.034

unpleasant vs. pleasant

6.61

.92

.009

undeserved vs. deserved

5.59

1.48

.011

disease that results in permanent
bodily changes vs. no bodily changes

5.82

1.09

.005

disease that results in permanent
personality changes vs. no personality changes

4.50

1.29

-.051

disease that requires long
treatment vs. short treatment

5.34

1.32

-.124

a

a

a

113

influence the,> Intentions
to delay seeking
„edica, ca.e or
i^ediatel,
seek care for the breast
symptom.

The general measure of
respondents' attitudes toward
their past
relationships with doctors
(possible range = 5 to
35, 5(=29.73, SD=5.97)
also was not significantly
correlated with differential
intention
scores.
In contrast, the two
items that addressed
respondents" general
habits Of seeking medical
care were found to be
significantly related to
differential intention.
Specifically, the first item
asked. "In general, when you notice a
physical symptom, do you usually
go to the doctor
right away or do you waif
(M.37, SD=2.06), and the second Item
asked,
"In general, do you consult
doctors on a regular basis or
only in emergencies" {^=5.09, SD=1.93).
Intentional preference for monitoring
the

breast change instead of calling
the doctor was negatively
related to
self-reports of usually going to the
doctor right away when noticing
a
symptom (r=-.553, £<.005) and consulting
doctors on a regular basis
(r=-.313, £<.005).
Of the three scales that comprise
the Multidimensional Health

Locus of Control Scale-the Internal
HLC Scale (possible range=6-36,

X=24.06, SD=4.53). the Powerful
Others HLC Scale (possible range=6-36,
55=16.02, SD=5.11), and the Chance HLC
Scale (possible range=6-36,
5(=16.14,

SD=5.09)-only the PHLC Scale was significantly
correlated with

differential intention scores (r=-.254,
£<.005).

Intentional preference

for monitoring rather than immediately
contacting the doctor was in-

versely related to respondents' beliefs that
their health
by powerful other people.

is

determined

Responses to the Self-Esteem Scale (possible
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-nge=,0-40. ^33.88. SD=4.21)
.ailed

to

cc.elate significantly with

differential intention.
Finally, relationships between
differential intention and
respondents" demographic characteristics
were examined.
Pearson correlati on
coefficients were computed between
differential intention scores
and respondents- age and education, the
number of people respondents
reported
they were living with, their
household's annual income, the
average
income per person in their
household, and their husband's
education.
The only significant correlation
involved respondents' education;
the

higher the level of formal education
respondents had completed, the
stronger their intentional preference
was for monitoring the breast
change rather than immediately calling
the doctor (r=.210, £<.05).
Chisquare tests were used to examine the
relationships between differential
intention and respondents' marital status,
ethnic background, religion,

employment status (i.e., whether they were
or were not employed), and
husbands' employment status.

For the chi-square tests, the sample
was

divided into two groups on the basis of
differential intention scores,
and the groups were compared across the
response categories for each

demographic variable.

The group of "non-delayers" was made
up of 67

respondents (50.0%) who scored below the median
on differential intention, indicating an intentional preference for
immediately calling the

doctor.

The group of "delayers" consisted of the other
half of the

respondents, who scored above the median on this measure,
indicating an
intentional preference for monitoring the breast
change.

The chi-square

tests revealed that there were no significant
associations between
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differential Intention and
the demographic variables
of marital status
ethnic background, religion,
employment status, and
husbands' employment
Status

Relationships of External Variables
to Differential
Attitude and Differential
Subjective
The following variables
were found to be significantly
correlated

with differential intention:

ratings of emotional reactions
of fear,

anxiety, concern, and sadness
in response to finding
the breast change;
ratings of emotional reactions
of fear, anxiety, and anger
if the change

turned out to be breast cancer;
the extent to which personal
diagnoses
of the change were judged as
representing a life- threatening
condition;
the perceived likelihood
that the change was a symptom of
breast cancer;
two measures of general habits
of seeking medical care; the
Powerful
Others Health Locus of Control
Scale; and respondents' education.

Ajzen
and Fishbein state that because
intentions are determined by attitude

and subjective norm, any effects
of external variables on intentions

must be due to their impact on one or
both of these factors.

Therefore,

Pearson correlation coefficients were
computed between each of the
external variables listed above, and
differential attitude and subjec-

tive norm scores.

The results are presented in Table 10.

The table shows that favorable attitudes
toward monitoring the

breast change, and perceived referential
pressure to monitor, were both

associated with the absence of fear and apprehension,
anxiety and panic,
and sadness and depression, upon discovering
the symptom.

In addition,

the more favorable respondents' attitudes
were toward monitoring, and
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Correlations Between External
Variables and Differential
''^'^^"^^^^
Attitude and Subjective
Norm

Emotional reactions to
findinq
the breast change:
Fearful and apprehensive
Anxious and panicky
Concerned and worried
Sad and depressed

_Attitude__

o-^n*

"'900*
""fnc
"

onL
-•^08*

•''81*
-.292*
"-063
-.245*

Emotional reactions if the
change
turned out to be breast
cancer:
Fearful and apprehensive
Anxious and panicky
Angry and annoyed

Personal diagnosis represents
life- threatening condition

Likelihood that change is
symptom of breast cancer

"
"

loo

"-084

no^

-•"'01

•^37

^026

-.351*

-.201*

-.338*

-.305*

-.563*

-.368*

-.316*

-.139

-.268*

-.185*

.094

.088

a

General habits of seeking
medical
care:

Usually goes to the doctor
right
away when physical symptom
is
'''''''
Consults doctors on

a

regular basis

Powerful Others Health Locus
of
Control

Education

*2.<.05
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the more respondents believed
other people would prescribe
monitoring,
the less they believed the
change in their breast was a
symptom of a
life- threatening condition or
breast cancer.
Favorable attitudes and
normative pressure toward monitoring
were inversely related to respondents' self-reports of having a
general habit of going to the
doctor
right away when they notice a
physical symptom.
Similarly, favorable

attitudes toward monitoring were inversely
related to self-reports of
consulting doctors on a regular basis as
opposed to only in emergencies.
The more respondents had

a

favorable attitude toward monitoring,
and

believed that important other people would
prescribe monitoring the
breast change instead of calling the doctor,
the less they believed that
powerful other people control their health.

Prediction of Intention from External Variables
Eight regression equations were constructed in
order to determine

whether the consideration of variables external
to the Ajzen and Fishbein model, in addition to the attitudinal and
normative components,

improved the prediction of choice intentions to delay
seeking medical
care or immediately seek care.

Specifically, differential intention

scores were predicted from differential attitude scores,
differential

subjective norm scores, and scores for each external variable
that was

significantly correlated with one or both of the attitudinal and
normative factors.

These predictions were made by means of hierarchical

multiple regression analyses,

in

which differential attitude and subjec-

tive norm were entered as predictors of intention on the first step
of
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the analysis, and the
external variable under
consideration was entered
as a predictor on the
second step.

Table

11

presents the results of these
regression analyses.

Only

three of the eight variables
tested were found to contribute
significantly to the prediction of
differential intention, above
and beyond the

contributions of differential
attitude and subjective norm.
These variables were:
the extent to which respondents
reported feeling anxious
and panicky upon discovering
the change in their breast,
respondents'
perceptions of the likelihood that
the change was
cancer, and the extent to which
respondents had

a

symptom of breast

general habit of going

a

to the doctor right away when
they notice a physical

symptom.

Inten-

tional preferences for monitoring
the breast change instead of
immedi-

ately calling the doctor were
predicted by the absence of anxiety,

subjective probabilities that the change
was not

a

breast cancer symp-

tom, and having a general habit
of waiting to go to the doctor when

noticing

a

symptom.

However, each of the three external
variables

accounted for only 3% or less of the
variance in intentions to engage in
prompt or delayed help-seeking behavior.^

Behavioral and Normative Beliefs
Underlying External Variables

Ajzen and Fishbein state that if external
variables are found to

influence the attitudinal and/or normative factors,
this influence must
be accounted for by the variables' effects
on one or more of the deter-

minants of the factors, i.e., behavioral beliefs,
outcome evaluations,
normative beliefs, and motivations to comply.

In order to examine the

—
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-pact

on the deten^inants of
the three external
variables that were

significant predictors of
differential intention,
correlations were
computed Of each external
variable with the behavioral
beliefs and with
the outcome evaluations
(see Table 12), and with
the normative beliefs
and motivations to comply
(see Table 13).

Table 12 shows that the
relationships of the behavioral
beliefs to
the external variables-anxiety
in reaction to finding
the breast
change, perceived likelihood
that the change was a breast
cancer symptom, and having a habit of
seeking care promptly for
physical problemswere quite similar across the
three variables, although not
identical.
All three external variables
were significantly correlated
with 11 of
the 19 behavioral beliefs,
and the direction of the
correlations was

consistent among the external variables
for each of these beliefs.

The

correlations of the outcome evaluations
with the external variables
did
not yield similar, significant
results across the three variables.
Therefore, the discussion of the
results in Table 12 focuses on the

correlations involving the behavioral
beliefs.
Respondents who had little anxiety about
the breast change, gave

a

low likelihood that the change was
breast cancer, or had habitually put

off medical care, believed that monitoring
the breast change would enable them to control their own health
with confidence, and handle their

decisions by themselves.

These same respondents also believed that

delaying treatment for the breast change would
allow them to avoid

wasting

a

doctor's time and to save money.

Further, these women thought
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Table 13

Correlations of External Variables
with Normative
Beliefs and Motivations to
Comply
Motivations to Comply
r.

Referent
Co-workers

with

Anxi ety

r with
Li kel

i

hnoH

r

with

Normative Belipf«;
r wi th

naui z

Anxiety

r wi th

Likelihood

r with
Habit

-.070

.022

-.100

-.262*

-.255*

-.356*

Fri ends

.027

.077

-.092

-.315*

-.321*

Doctors

-.464*

.113

.068

-.181*

-.297*

-.360*

Children

.107

.084

-.025

-.191*

-.141

-.256*

Parents

.103

.137

-.046

.044

-.097

-.116

My doctor

.028

.085

-.235*

-.312*

-.383*

Husband

.063

-.001

-.081

-.149*

-.247*

-.265*

Siblings

.136

.077

-.027

-.207*

-.275*

-.345*

Relatives

.153*

.174*

.027

-.156*

-.258*

-.361*

179*

.151

-.229*

-.317*

-.342*

American
Cancer Society

"'£<.05.

,084

.269*

.253*
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that the breast lu^p would
probably disappear if they
.onltored 1t on
their own for a while.
The respondents who were
anxious after noticing the
breast change
did attribute the change
to breast cancer, or were
apt to quickly seek
I
doctor's advice for bodily
sy.pto.s, believed that
negative consequences
would be likely to follow from
delaying treatment for the
change.
They
were certain that they would
feel anxious, fearful,
and worried if they
did not i^ediately obtain
professional care.
These groups of women
thought that delay would result
in their condition becoming
more serious
and requiring major surgery.
Additionally, high anxiety, cancer
attributions, and habits of prompt
behavior were positively
associated with

perceptions that delaying care would
give cancer time to spread, decrease the chances for a complete
cure, and increase the chances
of
death from disease.

Turning to Table 13, it can be seen
that the correlations of the
normative beliefs with the external
variables produced results that were
very much the same across the three
variables.
All three external variables were significantly inversely
related to ratings that eight out of

the ten referents would recommend
monitoring the breast change rather
than immediately calling the doctor.

The greater respondents' anxiety,

the higher their judged likelihood of
breast cancer, and the more they

tended to promptly seek

a

physician's care, the less the women believed

that their co-workers, friends, husbands,
relatives, and medical profes-

sionals would agree with deciding to delay
care for the breast change.
Also notable in Table 13 is that motivations
to comply with the
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suggestions of doctors, one^s
own doctor, and the
African Cancer
society, were positive,,
related to having a habit
of seeking treatment
right away for physical
abnormalities.

Summary
Intentions to engage in delayed
rather than prompt help-seeking
behavior were associated with
the absence of anxiety
and panic in response to discovering the breast
change, low subjective
probabilities
that the change was caused by
breast cancer, and having
established a
habit of waiting to go to the
doctor after noticing a physical
symptom.
These three variables significantly
contributed to the prediction
of
intentions, above and beyond
attitudinal and normative
considerations.

However, the contribution of the
three variables to explaining
the variance in intentions to immediately
seek care or delay care, was
quite
small

in each case.

Low anxiety, non-cancer attributions,
and having a

general habit of delaying medical
treatment, were linked to perceptions

that delaying care for the breast
change would be unlikely to result
in

undesirable outcomes.

Determinants of Perceived Likelihood that
Change is Breast Cancer

Of special interest in the present study
was investigating the

determinants of respondents' interpretations of
the breast change.
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed
between respondents' ratings of the likelihood that the change in
their breast was

breast cancer, and three sets of variables:

a

symptom of

variables invoking use of
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the representativeness
heuristic, variables invoking
use of the availability heuristic, and
perceived vulnerability to
breast cancer.
The
first set of correlations
computed was between the
likelihood ratings
and respondents' ratings of
how frequently breast
cancer produces each
of 30 symptoms, when breast
cancer is in its early, initial
stages.

Table 14 presents the means
and standard deviations of
the frequency
ratings, and the results of the
correlations.
The first column on the
table shows that the five
symptoms that actually are symptoms
of breast
cancer (the first five symptoms
listed on the table), received
the high-

est mean ratings as to how frequently
they are produced by early
breast
cancer.
It can be seen in the third
column that only two correlation

coefficients were significant out of the
30 obtained.

Higher subjective

probabilities of the change being breast
cancer were associated with

higher assigned frequencies of breast
cancer producing convulsions and

a

lump or thickening in the breast.

The second set of correlations was
between the likelihood ratings
and responses to the seven questions
concerning the incidences of breast
lumps, breast cancer, and deaths from
breast cancer.

The means and

standard deviations of these items, as well
as their correlations with
the likelihood ratings, are presented
in Table 15.

The third column of

the table shows that two of the correlation
coefficients were significant.

Higher probabilities of the change being breast
cancer were

associated with

a

higher assigned percentage of breast lumps that

diagnosed as breast cancer, and
that gets breast cancer.

a

is

higher assigned percentage of women

The final correlation computed was between the
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Table 14

Frequencies of Breast Cancer
Symptoms:
Means
StandarH^
Deviations and Correlations
with Likelihood
that Change is Breast
Cancer

How frequently is each of
the following
symptom of breast cancer, when
breast
cancer is in its early, initial
stages?
a

SD

lump or thickening in breast

3.96

.76

.187*

.77

.050

3.27

.82

.115

3.07

.82

.134

3.01

.95

.094

change in size, shape or skin of
breast 3.29
change in retraction or scaliness
of nipple

bleeding or discharge from nipple
pain or tenderness in breast,
nipple

r with perceived
likelihood that
change is breast
cancer

change in appearance of wart or
mole
a sore that doesn't heal

2.87

1.13

.065

2.71

1.09

.125

weakness, tiredness

2.01

.96

.126

1.98

.92

.125

1.94

1.01

-.064

weight loss
abnormal Pap smear

sore or stiff muscles, back

'

1.76

.88

-.026

abnormal vaginal bleeding

1.60

.79

.029

numbness, tingling in any part of body
chest pains

1.58

.73

.060

1.57

.76

-.014

shortness of breath, coughing

1.49

.71

.048

faintness, dizziness

1.47

.70

.038

fever

1.43

.

69

.

046

weight gain

1.42

.66

-.035

upset stomach, stomachache

1.40

.62

.028

hot flashes

1.39

.63

.067

headaches

1.39

.62

.036

sore throat, hoarseness, difficulty
swal lowing

1.37

.66

-.039

hair loss

1.35

.62

.033

.29

.55

-.010

heartburn, indigestion

1
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Table 14
(continued)

How frequently is each of
the following
symptom of breast cancer, when
breast
cancer is in its early, initial
stages?

r wi th percei ved

a

blurred vision
chills

constant thirst
ringing in ears
running, congested, or bleeding nose
convulsions

*£<.05

SD

likelihood that
change is breast
cancer

1.25

.49

.048

1.24

.51

.010

1.20

.49

.047

1.18

.46

-.015

1.18

.43

.076

1.10

.33

.174*

—
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likelihood ratings and responses
to the single item
assessing respondents' perceived likelihood
that they will get breast
cancer -one day"
(5^=3.58, SD=1.59).

Higher probabilities of the
change being breast

cancer were associated with higher
subjective probabilities of
one day
getting breast cancer (r=.183,
£<.05).
Chi-square tests were used to examine
the relationships between
the perceived likelihood of the
change being breast cancer
and responses
to three questions concerning
respondents'

actual medical history:

whether or not the women had ever
discovered

a

lump in their breast;

whether or not they had ever had any
breast symptoms other than

a

lump;

and whether or not their mother
or sister(s) had ever had breast
cancer.
For the chi-square tests, the sample
was divided into two groups, the

"cancer" and "non-cancer" groups, in the
same way that was described

previously.

The chi-square tests revealed that whether
or not respon-

dents had ever discovered

a

lump in their breast was the only variable

significantly associated with the perceived
probability that the change
was

a

symptom of breast cancer (x2(l)=io.73,
£<.005).

who reported never having had

a

Of the 78 women

breast lump, 32 (41.0%) judged the

change as unlikely to be breast cancer, and 46
(59.0%) judged the change
as

likely to be cancerous.

Of 54 women who reported having

a

history of

one or more lumps, 39 (72.2%) rated breast cancer
as unlikely, and 15
(27.8%) rated breast cancer as likely.

Therefore, respondents who had

previously discovered at least one lump

in

their breasts were less like-

ly to believe that the change was a symptom of
breast cancer, than

respondents who had never discovered

a

lump.
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For the subsa.ple of
respondents who did have

a history of
breast
lumps, Pearson correlation
coefficients were computed
between ratings of
the likelihood that the
change was a sy.pto. of
breast cancer, and
the number of ti.es the
women reported having
discovered a lump, as well
as the number of days
they reported having waited
to contact a doctor
after discovering the lump(s).
The latter variable
produced a significant correlation; respondents
who rated the chances of
the change being

breast cancer as relatively
high took

a

fewer number of days to
contact

doctor about breast lumps they
had actually discovered in
the past
(r=-.311, £<.05).
For the subsample of
respondents whose mother or
sister(s) did have a history of
breast cancer, a correlation
was coma

puted between ratings of the
likelihood that the change was

a

symptom

of breast cancer, and respondents'
ratings of how successful their
mother/sister's outcome was from breast
cancer ()(=3.80, SD=2.80).
This
correlation was not significant.

Predictors of Perceived Likelihood
that Change is Breast Cancer
The following variables were found
to be significantly related
to

respondents' ratings of the likelihood
that the change in their breast
was

a

symptom of breast cancer:

ratings of how frequently breast cancer

produces the symptoms of convulsions, and

a

lump or thickening in the

breast, when breast cancer is in early
stages; opinions as to the per-

centage of breast lumps that is diagnosed
as breast cancer, and the

percentage of women that gets breast cancer;
respondents' ratings of the
likelihood that they will get breast cancer one
day; and respondents'

actual expenence with
b.east ,„.ps.

. stepwise multiple
regression
analysis was pe.fonned in
which each of these
variables was entered
as a
predictor of the perceived
livelihood of the change
being breast cancer
The results of this
analysis revealed that only
two predictors- the
per-

ceived likelihood of one day
getting breast cancer (b=.218.
£<.05) and
whether or not respondents
had ever found a lump in
their breasts
(b=-.194. E<.05)-were
significant.
One predictor-the
percentage of
lumps that is diagnosed as
breast cancer-was marginally
significant
(b=.175. £<.10).
Together, these predictors
accounted for
of the
variance in the subjective
probability that the change was
a symptom of
breast cancer (R=.327, £<.05).

m

Because women who had

a

history of breast lumps gave
smaller

chances that the breast change
was cancerous than women
who did not have
such a history, the same regression
analysis was conducted on each
of
these two groups separately,
for exploratory purposes.

who had never discovered

a

For the women

breast lump, the regression of
the likelihood

ratings on the five variables
that were significantly correlated
with
these ratings revealed that two
predictors- the percentage of lumps that
is

diagnosed as breast cancer (b=.331,
£<.05), and the perceived likelihood of one day getting breast
cancer (b=.306, p<.05)-were significant,
together accounting for 18% of the
variance (R=.424, p<.005).

For the

women who had found at least one lump
in their breasts, the same
regression analysis revealed that no
predictors were significant.

However,

for this group of women it was found
that the number of days they re-

ported having waited to contact the doctor
after finding the lump{s) was
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significantly negatively correlated
with the perceived
likelihood that
the change was breast
cancer.
Therefore, this variable
was entered as
predictor in the regression
equation along with the
other five vari-

a

ables.

The results showed that the
ti.e taken to contact
a doctor after
discovery of a breast lump was
a significant
predictor (b=-.435,
p.<.05)
accounting for 19% of the variance
in perceived likelihood
that the
change was a symptom of breast
cancer.

Determinants of P erceived Vulnerahi lity
to Breast Cancer
A secondary purpose of the
present study was to examine the
deter-

minants of women's perceived
vulnerability to breast cancer.

Pearson

correlation coefficients were computed
between ratings of the likelihood
of one day getting breast cancer
and each variable that was
hypothesized
to influence this perceived
likelihood.

The first set of correlations

computed was between the liklihood ratings
and responses to the seven
questions that concerned the incidences
of breast lumps, breast cancer,
and deaths from breast cancer.

The presentation of these correlations

in Table 15 shows that one
correlation coefficient was significant.

Higher subjective probabilities of getting
breast cancer were associated
with

a

higher assigned percentage of breast cancer
victims who are

treated for the disease but die of it.

The second set of correlations

computed was between the likelihood ratings and
respondents' ratings of
the extent to which they have personal control
over not getting breast

cancer (X=2.56, SD=1.65), the extent to which they
believe there

is

a
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{X=4.32. SD=1.69), and
the extent to which they
match their own description of this particular type
of woman (X=2.95, SD=1.98).
Results showed
that perceived personal
control over getting breast
cancer was not

significantly correlated with
perceived vulnerability to
the disease.
Results also showed that
respondents who indicated that
they are likely
to get breast cancer one day
tended not to believe that
there is a

particular type of woman who has
(r=-.158, £<.05).

a

high chance of getting
breast cancer

However, respondents who felt
vulnerable to breast

cancer also viewed themselves as
matching the characteristics of
women
who have a high chance of getting
the disease (r=.577, £<.005).
Respondents' descriptions of the type
of woman who has

a

high

chance of getting breast cancer were
classified into 16 categories.

Twenty-five respondents (18.7%) did not
answer this open-ended question.
The 109 women who did provide a
response listed from one to eight
characteristics of

a

likely breast cancer victim.

Table 16 displays the 16

categories and the number of respondents
who gave each description.
Over one-half of the respondents stated
that having

a

family history of

breast cancer puts women at high risk of
getting the disease; this was
by far the most frequently cited
category.

The second most frequent

description of the woman likely to get breast
cancer involved her personality traits.

The likely victim was described as being
anxious,

depressed, and perfectionistic; "she represses her
emotions" and "buries
her own needs— she worries about others first."

More than 10% of the

sample stated that nulliparous women, women who consume
alcohol.
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Table 16

Descriptions of the Likely
Breast Cancer Victim

has a high chance of
getting breast cancer?

Woman has

family history of breast
cancer
Woman has certain personality
traits, e.g., she
is anxious, depressed,
type A, and unable io
express her emotions and needs

„

H

°^
sample

a

chnSren'""

sO

59

23

17.2

19

14.2

18

13.4

15

n

14

10.4

12

9.0

10

7.5

8

6.0

7

5.2

7

5.2

5

3.7

4

3.0

4

3^0

3

22

5

3 7

^^'^"'^ breastfeed

Woman uses caffeine and/or
alcohol and/or tobacco
Woman eats poor diet, e.g., diet
high in fats and
additives, and low in vitamins and
minerals

Woman lives and works in stressful
environment
Woman is older

9

Woman has been exposed to carcinogens
in the
environment

Woman is large-breasted
Woman has a history of breast symptoms,
e.q
fibrocystic disease

Woman is in generally poor physical
condition
Woman takes hormones, e.g., birth control

pills

Woman doesn't exercise

Woman has certain ethnic background, e.g
she
IS Southern European, Jewish,
or non-Asian
,

Woman is overweight
Other:

Woman's body had a physiological change
Woman has had children
Woman has breastfed children
Woman is of upper SES
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tobacco, and caffeine, and
wo.en who maintain an
inadequate diet, have
a
high chance of getting
breast cancer.

Chi-square tests were used
to examine the
relationships between
the perceived melihood
of one day getting breast
cancer and responses
to the three questions
that concerned respondents'
actual .edical
his-

tory:

whether or not the women had
ever discovered

a

lump in their

breast; whether or not they
had ever had any breast
symptoms other than
a lump; and whether or
not their mother or sister(s)
had ever had breast
cancer.
For the chi-square tests,
the sample was divided
into two
groups on the basis of ratings
of the likelihood of one
day getting
breast cancer.
The "invulnerable" group
consisted of 61 women (45.9«)
who scored below the median,
indicating that they are relativly
unlikely
to get breast cancer, and
the "vulnerable" group was
made up of 73 women
(54.ir.) who scored above the
median, indicating that they
are relatively
likely to get breast cancer
one day.
The chi-square tests revealed
that
whether or not respondents' mother
or sister(s) had ever had breast
cancer was the only variable that
was significantly associated
with the
perceived probability of one day
getting breast cancer (x2(l)=7.44,

Of the 114 women whose relatives
had not had breast cancer, 58

E<.05).

(50.9%) judged themselves as unlikely
to get breast cancer, and 56
(49. IX) judged themselves as likely
to get the disease.

who had

a

Of the 20 women

mother or sister with breast cancer,
three (15.0%) felt invul-

nerable, and 17 (85.0%) felt vulnerable
to getting breast cancer.

Therefore, respondents who had

a

family history of breast cancer per-

ceived themselves as more likely to get
breast cancer one day than
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respondents who did not have
a history of breast
cancer within their
immediate family.
For the subsample of
respondents who had a history
of breast
1U.PS. Pearson correlation
coefficients were computed
between ratings of
the likelihood Of one day
getting breast cancer, and
the number of ti^es
the wo.en reported having
discovered a lunp, as well as
the number of
days they reported having
waited to contact a doctor
after discovering
the lu.p(s).
Neither correlation was
significant.
For the subsample of
respondents whose mother or
sister(s) had a history of
breast cancer, a

correlation was computed between
ratings of the likelihood
of one day
getting breast cancer and respondents'
ratings of how successful
their

mother's/sister's outcome was from
breast cancer.

This correlation was

not significant.

Predictors of Perceived Vulnerability
to Breast Cancer
Four variables were found to be
significantly associated with re-

spondents'

ratings of the likelihood of one
day getting breast cancer:

opinions as to the percentage of breast
cancer patients who are treated
for the disease but die of it,
the extent to which respondents
believed
there is

a

particular type of woman who has

a

high chance of getting

breast cancer, the extent to which
respondents believed they match their
own description of this particular
type of woman, and respondents'

family history of breast cancer.

A stepwise multiple regression analy-

sis was performed in which each of
these variables was entered as

a

predictor of the perceived likelihood of one day
getting breast cancer.

The results of this
analysis revealed that
only one pred1ctor-the
extent to which respondents
judged themselves as matching
their own
stereotype of a likely breast
cancer victim (b=.504.
£<,001)-was

sig-

nificant.

Whether or not respondents'
mother and/or sisters had
ever
had breast cancer was of
marginal significance
(b=.158. t<.,o).

two predictors together
accounted for

m

These

of the variance (R=.587,

E<.001).

Because of the chi-square result
that women who had a family
history of breast cancer differed
from women who did not have
such a
history on their perceptions
of the likelihood of one day
getting
breast cancer, the same regression
analysis was conducted for
each of
these two groups separately.
For the women who did not
have a mother or
sister with breast cancer, the
regression of the likelihood
ratings on
the three variables that were
significantly correlated with these

ratings revealed that the same
variable-the extent to which respondents
Judged themselves as matching their
own stereotype of a likely
breast
cancer victim {b=.508,
E.<.001)-was significant, accounting for 26%
of
the variance.

For the women who did have a
mother or sister with breast

cancer, the Identical regression
analysis revealed that

a

different

variable-the percentage of breast cancer
victims who die of the disease
In spite of being treated for it
(b=.549, e.<.05)-was significant,

accounting for 30? of the variance in
perceived vulnerability to breast
cancer.

CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION

The Theory of Reasongd Artinn

Prediction of Intentions
The present study found
that women's Intentions
to engage in
prompt or delay behavior in
seeking medical care for
a breast cancer
symptom correlated highly with
corresponding attitudinal and
normative
measures.
Because a woman's intention
to engage in prompt or
delay
behavior reflects a choice
between these two alternatives,
differential
intentions, attitudes, and
subjective no™s were assessed.
Differential
intentions were significantly
predicted by differential attitudes
and
differential subjective norms.
Respondents who had intentional
preferences for monitoring the change
in their breast for a
while rather than

Imedlately calling the doctor, were
more favorable

in their evaluations

of monitoring than of Immediately
seeking help, and believed that
important others would be more likely
to prescribe monitoring than
immedi-

ately seeking

a

doctor's advice.

Although differential attitude and

differential subjective norm were both
significant predictors of choice
intentions, the attitudinal component
proved to be

a

more important

determinant of help-seeking decisions
than the normative component.
Similarly, although both attitude toward
monitoring the breast change
and subjective norm with respect
to monitoring contributed significantly
to the prediction of Intentions
to monitor,

the attitudinal factor was

found to have a greater influence than
the normative factor.
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In the
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prediction of intentions to
immediately call the doctor,
the only significant predictor was attitude
toward in^ediately seeking
help, for
subjective norm failed to make a
significant contribution.
The choice
respondents made between delaying
medical care and seeking
medical care
promptly was primarily determined
by personal, attitudinal
considerations as opposed to social,
normative considerations.

Delayers Versus Non-delayers
In the

present study, promptness and delay
in seeking medical care

for a breast cancer symptom were
defined empirically, on the
basis of
the sample's responses to the
measure of intention to monitor
the breast

change rather than immediately call
the doctor.

The group of delayers

intended to monitor the change rather
than call the doctor right away,
whereas the group of non-delayers did
not intend to monitor the change.
This classification of respondents
was found to be useful for under-

standing the women's intentions to delay
or not delay care,

in that

delayers and non-delayers differed
significantly on their mean responses
to the two additional

intention measures and every measure of
attitudes

and subjective norms that underlie
intentions.

The most clearcut differences between the
two groups were on the

assessment of differential intention, the measure
of intention to immediately call the doctor, and the direct measure
of attitude toward monitoring the breast change.

The mean differential intention scores showed

that delayers intended to monitor the change, while
non-delayers in-

tended to call the doctor immediately.

Quite similarly, mean scores for
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intention to call the doctor
revealed that delayers did
not intend to
immediately contact a doctor,
while non-delayers did intend
to do so.
Delayers had a mean positive
evaluation of deciding to
monitor, and nondelayers had an unfavorable
evaluation of this decision.
Results of the
remaining measures of attitudes
and subjective norms showed
that, relative to the non-delaying group,
the delayers were less
negative in their
attitudes toward monitoring, and
less positive in their attitudes
toward

calling the doctor.

In addition,

delayers perceived prescriptions
for

monitoring by other people to be less
unlikely, and they perceived
prescriptions for calling immediately
to be less likely.

Thus, in compari-

son to non-delayers, the group
of delayers had stronger intentional

preferences for delaying medical care
and against seeking care promptly.
Underlying this intentional choice were
more favorable evaluations of
the decision to delay and less
favorable evaluations of the decision
to
immediately seek care.

Intentions to delay were further determined
by

perceptions that important others would exert
relatively less pressure
to either delay or not delay.

Because delayers and non-delayers differed
on each component on
the theory of reasoned action,

a

detailed examination

is

warranted of

the cognitive structures that were found
to underlie the intentions of

each group.

The responses of the non-delayers to the
intention, atti-

tude, and subjective norm measures were quite
consistent, which provided
a

clear picture of the cognitive foundation of the intention
to seek

medical care promptly.
call

That is, the non-delayers clearly did intend to

the doctor immediately and did not intend to
monitor the breast
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change.

Accordingly, they had

a

favorable attitude toward
seeking care

mediately,
care.

and an unfavorable evaluation
of putting off professional
Further, the non-delayers
believed that people who
were Important

to the. would reco^end
seeking .edical attention
1-edlately. but would
not recommend delaying
action.
In contrast to the
non-delayers,

the delayers were
inconsistent in

their assessments of the
components that determined their
intention to
delay, so that the cognitive
foundation of this intention is
more difficult to clearly identify.
The delayers displayed
ambivalence in their
attitudes toward delay and prompt
behavior, and their responses
to the
intention, attitudinal. and normative
measures had generally greater
variance compared to the responses
of non-delayers. As stated
above, it
was clear that delayers did
intend to monitor the breast
change and did
not intend to immediately call
the doctor.

Additionally, delayers were

favorable in their attitude toward
monitoring on the direct measure
of
this attitude.

However, on the indirect measures
of attitude toward

monitoring, delayers were slightly
negative in their evaluations of
this
behavior.
Furthermore, delayers were favorable
in their evaluations of
the decision to immediately call
the doctor.

The delayers believed that

other people would recommend prompt
help-seeking behavior, and would
tend not to recommend delaying medical
treatment.
It is apparent that delayers'

intentions to delay medical care

were not rooted in unfavorable attitudes
toward immediately seeking
care, or in perceived social pressure to
delay care.

In

fact, the in-

tentions of delayers did not even appear to
originate in the possession
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of highly favorable
attitudes toward delaying,
and the intentions
were
held despite perceived
normative pressure for prompt
medical attention.
It seemed that intentional
preferences for delay were
detennined by the
absence of polarized attitudes
with respect to both
intentional

choices-the lack of strongly favorable
attitudes toward immediate
care,
and the lack of strongly
favorable or unfavorable attitudes
toward
delay.
The decision to delay seeking
medical care for a breast
cancer
symptom may be a decision made by
default, the result of moderate

evaluations of each of the two behavioral
options.
that because going to the doctor
right away

able option, and monitoring the
symptom
she might as well put off seeking

a

is

is

A delayer may reason

not an especially desir-

not particularly good or bad,

professional diagnosis.

The absence of polarized attitudes
on the part of delayers in com-

parison to non-delayers was also seen
in the results concerning
the determinants of attitudes, behavioral beliefs.
Delayers and non-delayers

differed significantly on the perceived
likelihood that 18 out of 19
consequences would result from monitoring
the breast change rather than
calling the doctor immediately.

However, delayers judged nine of these

consequences as neither likely nor unlikely
to occur, and on eight other

consequences, the mean likelihood ratings of the
delayers were closer to
the neutral point than the ratings of
non-delayers.

Relative to the delayers, the non-delayers were more
convinced
that several types of consequences would be unlikely
to follow from

monitoring the breast change.

Non-delayers believed that the decision

to delay would not allow them to confidently
handle their health and
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other problems on their own,
or to gather enough
infon^ation about the
breast sy.pto. to enable a
doctor to diagnose
it accurately.

They also

believed that they would not
avoid inconveniencing
themselves, their
family, or their doctor, by
monitoring the change, and that
monitoring
would not save them from
spending money or undergoing
medical procedures.

Furthermore, non-delayers believed
it would be unlikely that
they would be able to avoid
appearing as alannists, or
convince themselves that the symptom was
not serious and that it would
go away.
Non-

delayers were more certain than
delayers that if they did not
i^ediately call the doctor, their
condition would worsen and cancer
would have
time to grow, so that their
chances for a cure would be
decreased and

more extensive treatment would be
necessary.

Non-delayers were also

more sure that they would feel
anxious about the change in their
breast
and would not know what the
symptom meant.
Only one consequence of
delaying, "it would be too late for
treatment and I might die," was
rated as neither likely nor unlikely
by non-delayers; delayers rated
this consequence as unlikely to
result from the decision to monitor
the

breast change rather than seek immediate
care.

External Variables

Prediction of Intentions
Three variables that are external to the theory
of reasoned action

were found to contribute significantly to the
prediction of choice intentions, above and beyond the contributions of
differential attitude
and differential subjective norm.

Intentional preferences for monitoring

the breast change rathe,
than 1™ediately calling
the doctor, were
predicted by the absence of
anxiety and panic In
reaction to discovering
the sy^pto..
AS noted In the
Introduction, studies of
delay In seeking
a

diagnosis of cancer sy„,ptoms
have considered affective
reactions to
the discovery of the
symptoms to be Important
variables In explalining
delay behavior, although
findings concerning the
Influence of these
reactions on delay have been
inconsistent.
The findings of the
present
study concur with those of
Cameron and Hinton (1968)
and Sugar and
Watkins (1961), who suggested
that the experience of
anxiety in response
to finding a symptom of
breast cancer may be associated
with early helpseeking.
Intentions to delay calling
a doctor about the
breast change
«ere also predicted by low
subjective probabilities of the
change being
a breast cancer symptom.
This finding supports Rodin's
(1978) notion
that when people assign causes
to symptoms on the basis of
limited

information, this can inhibit help
seeking behavior.

It is also in line

with cancer delay researchers'
conclusions that the Interpretation
of
breast cancer symptoms as due to
a cause other than cancer
promotes
delay in obtaining

a

diagnosis (Cameron

J,

Hinton.

Gold, 1964; Greer, 1974; Sugar
S Watkins, 1961).

1968; Eardley, 1974;
The third variable

found to be predictive of Intentions
to delay was the self-report
of

having

a

general habit of waiting to go to the
doctor after noticing

physical symptom Instead of going to
the doctor right away.

a

One of the

least equivocal findings of cancer delay
studies is that cancer patients' behavioral reactions to the
symptoms of their disease are

similar to their behavioral responses to
the symptoms of previous,
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other illnesses (Clements
, Wakefield. 1972; Goldsen.
Gerhardt . Handy,
1957; Hackett. Cassem S Raker,
1973; Henderson, Wittkower
S Lougheed.
1958; King & Leach, 1950).

Unlike prior cancer delay studies,
the present study
provided
empirical evidence as to how the
absence of anxiety in response
to finding a cancer symptom,
misattributions for the symptom, and
general

habits of putting off medical
treatment, might indirectly
influence
delay in seeking care for the
symptom, as well as directly
contribute to
delay.
Specifically, the indirect impact of
these external variables on

intentions to delay was explained

in

terms of their impact on mediating

variables, the determinants of intentions.

First, the relationships of

these three variables to the direct
determinants of differential inten-

tions-differential attitude and differential
subjective norm-were
examined.

It was

found that the absence of anxiety upon
discovering the

breast change, low subjective probabilities
of the change being

cancer symptom, and having

a

general practice of waiting to seek

breast

a

a

doc-

tor's advice for physical symptoms, were
all associated with favorable

attitudes toward monitoring the breast change
rather than immediately

calling the doctor, and the perception of social
pressure to delay
medical care.

Next, the relationships of the external variables
to

indirect determinants of intentions were investigated,

in that

correla-

tions were computed between the external variables
and the behavioral

belief measures.
These correlations revealed that respondents who had

a

low level

of anxiety, made non-cancer attributions, and generally
delayed medical
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care, were convinced
that .onitoring the breast
change would enable the™
to control their own
health and other problems
with confidence
These
wo^n were also certain that by
delaying care, they would
avoid wasting
a doctor's ti™e and
would save money, since the
lu.p would probably
just
go away,
contrast, the anxious,
cancer-attribution, and general
nondelayer respondents were more
sure than their counterparts
that they not
only would feel anxious about
the breast symptom if they
did not call
the doctor, but they also
believed that their condition
would become
™ore serious and that cancer
would spread, thereby increasing
the need
for disabling treatments and
decreasing the chances for a
complete cure.
Finally, the anxious,
cancer-attribution, and general non-delayer
groups
perceived the possibility of dying
as a result of delayed
treatment to
be more likely than did the
other groups of respondents.
In summary, it

m

1s

apparent that the absence of anxiety
in response to finding

cancer symptom, the attribution
of the symptom to
breast cancer, and having

a

a

a

breast

cause other than

general tendency to wait before seeking
care

for physical symptoms, all contribute
to intentional preferences for

delay partly because they impact on
specific and general beliefs that

determine intentions to delay.

However, each of these variables was

shown to also have a direct, non-mediated
link to the decision to post-

pone medical care for the breast change.

Causal Attributions

One focus of the present study was determining
the basis on which

respondents assigned causes for the breast change they
were asked to
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imagine they had discovered.

More specifically, the
predictors of the

perceived likelihood that the
change was
examined.

It was

breast cancer sy.pto.
were

a

found that respondents' actual
history of having or

not having lumps in their
breasts was related to the
women's interpretations of the hypothetical breast
change.
Respondents who had never
found a breast lump believed
the chances were greater that
the change
was a cancer symptom than
respondents who had found at least
one breast
lump.
The reason that the respondents
with a history of breast lumps

tended to make non-cancer attributions
probably lies in the fact that,
for most of the women, their lumps
were diagnosed as caused by a non-

cancerous condition.

In

particular, of the 56 respondents
(41.8% of the

sample) who reported having
had breast cancer.

found

a

a

history of breast lumps, only two
had ever

Since the great majority of the women
who had ever

breast lump had benign tumors, it

is

not surprising that they

would interpret the hypothetical breast
change as also being nonmalignant.

Greer (1974), in his study of delay in
seeking medical care

for breast cancer symptoms, found that
women who had

breast tumors often assumed that

a

a

history of benign

subsequent lump was benign, and so

the women were apt to delay obtaining

a

diagnosis of that lump.

Other

studies of cancer delay report that delay occurs
because patients fre-

quently attribute their cancer symptoms to

a

recurrence of

a

previous

illness that was not cancer (Cameron & Hinton,
1968; Gold, 1964; Henderson, 1966; Henderson, Wittkower & Lougheed,

Since respondents who had

a

1958; King & Leach, 1950).

history of breast lumps were found to differ

from respondents who did not have such

a

history on their interpretations
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Of the imaginary breast
change, these two groups
were treated separately
examining the predictors of
causal attributions for
the change.

m

For the subsample of
respondents who had never
discovered
in their breasts,

a lump
it was determined that
two variables significantly

predicted subjective probabilities
that the breast change
represented
breast cancer.
Greater likelihoods of breast
cancer were associated
with higher assigned percentages
as to how many breast
lumps are diagnosed as cancerous, and with
greater perceived likelihoods
of one day
getting breast cancer.
It is probable that both
of the predictor variables invoked utilization of
the availability heuristic
(Tversky &

Kahneman, 1974).

That is, when estimating the
percentage of all breast

lumps that are diagnosed as breast
cancer, the respondents may have
made

their estimates according to how
easily they could recall cases of
cancerous breast tumors they had heard
about through other people or the
media.
When the women were unable to recall
such cases, they made a

judgment that few breast lumps are indeed
caused by cancer, and thus
assumed that their own imaginary lump
was not attributable to breast
cancer.

In a

similar way, respondents' appraisals of the
likelihood of

one day getting breast cancer depended
partly on the extent to which the

women had personal experience with breast
cancer that made vivid images
of the disease available to them; this
point
below.

In terms of the present discussion,

more fully discussed

is

the point is that women who

perceived themselves as invulnerable to breast cancer
were likely to
interpret the change in their breast as due to
cancer.

a

condition other than

150

These results suggest that,
among women who have never
found a
breast lump before, decisions
regarding the cause of a lump
are rooted
at least partly in cognitive
processes.
Traditionally, cancer delay
researchers have emphasized
motivational factors that influence
the in-

terpretation of cancer symptoms.

For example, researchers
have indi-

cated that people deny the
possibility that their symptoms
are caused by
cancer, because they are so fearful
of having the disease (Bard
&

Sutherland. 1955; Cameron & Hinton.
1968; Greer, 1974; Shands et al..
1951).

The findings of the present study
do not negate the role that

motivational factors play in assigning
causes to cancer symptoms.

How-

ever, they do point out that cognitive
factors, such as availability

biases, also play

a

role in cancer symptom attributions.

For the subsample of respondents
who had found at least one lump
in their breasts, only one variable
was significantly related to subjec-

tive probabilities that the breast change
was
cer.

a

symptom of breast can-

This variable was the number of days
that passed between the

respondents' discovery of the lumps and their
contacting

advice about the lumps.

a

doctor.

a

fewer number of days to con-

This result is interesting when it is contrasted
with

the results for the respondents who did not have
lumps.

doctor for

A greater likelihood of the change being
breast

cancer was associated with having taken
tact

a

a

history of breast

The contrast suggests that, among women who have

breast tumors (or more specifically,
causal attributions for

a

a

a

history of

history of benign breast tumors),

new lump do not depend upon the availability

of information about other women's experiences with breast
tumors.
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Rather, once women have
experienced the situation of
finding a lu.p in
their breast, they .ay
automatically interpret and
respond to the discovery Of another lump in
much the same way as they
did previously,
it
Should be recalled that one
predictor of respondents'
intentions to seek
help or not for the breast
change was their interpretation
of the
change.
If it is true that women
tend to give the same
attribution for
a newly discovered lump
as for previous lumps,
then it is not surprising
that their behavioral response
to previous lumps is
predictive of their
interpretation of a new lump.

Vulnerabil ity

Another focus of the present study
was on investigating factors
that influenced the extent to which
respondents perceived themselves as
vulnerable to breast cancer. The study
examined the predictors of re-

spondents'

one day.

ratings of the likelihood that they
will get breast cancer

Whether or not respondents' immediate
family members had ever

had breast cancer was found to be
significantly associated with the

respondents' perceptions of vulnerability.

Respondents who had

mother

a

or sister with breast cancer were
more likely to perceive themselves as

vulnerable to the disease than respondents who
did not have such
tory in their family.

Having

a

a

his-

female blood relative with breast

cancer does, in fact, increase one's chances of
getting the disease
(American Cancer Society, Note 1).

Nonetheless, as mentioned briefly

above, respondents' judgments of the likelihood
of one day getting

breast cancer were probably affected by the cognitive
bias of

152

availability.

experience with

The availability hypothesis
Implies that because having
a

disease .akes the disease
.ore vivid and salient

memory, this experience leads
to
getting the disease.

a

in

greater subjective probability
of

This further implies that
the occurrence of breast

cancer in one's family would
lead to an exaggerated
perception of vulnerability to breast cancer, in
comparison to the perceptions
of women
whose mother and sisters were not
victims of breast cancer.
Because
perceived vulnerability to breast
cancer was found to differ between
respondents with and without

a

family history of the disease,
these two

groups were considered separately
in examining the predictors
of vulnerabil ity.
For the subsample of women whose
mother and/or sisters had never
had breast cancer, one variable
significantly predicted the extent to

which they believed they will be likely
to get breast cancer.

This

variable was the extent to which the
respondents viewed themselves as

matching their own descriptions of the
type of woman who has
chance of getting breast cancer.

a

high

The less respondents judged themselves

as matching their stereotype of a
breast cancer victim,

the less they

perceived themselves as vulnerable to breast
cancer.
Weinstein (1980) has suggested that the possession
of stereotypes

of victims of negative events stems partly from
motivational processes.
In

this view, stereotypes serve an ego-defensive
function, and so people

rarely see themselves as similar to the type of person who
suffers misfortune.

However, Weinstein has also noted that stereotypes of victims

may be rooted in cognitive processes, such as representativeness
biases
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(Tversky & Kahne.an, 1974).

According to the representativeness
hypo-

thesis, when people decide
whether or not they fit

a

stereotype, they

examine the extent to which they
match the salient characteristics
of
those who do fit the stereotype.
If people find differences
between the

characteristics of their stereotypes
of victims and their own
qualities
or attributes, they are likely
to conclude that they will
avoid victimization.

The present study showed that this
cognitive bias operates in

judgments as to the likelihood of being
victimized by breast cancer.
Respondents who found discrepancies between
their own characteristics
and their description of

a

typical breast cancer victim believed
that

they are relatively unlikely to ever
get breast cancer.
It is noteworthy that,

of the type of woman who has

to some degree,
a

respondents' descriptions

high chance of getting breast cancer
were

accurate representations of some of the factors
that are considered to
put women at high risk of getting the disease.

Society (Note

1)

The American Cancer

states that risk factors for breast cancer
include

a

family history of breast cancer, never having
had children, and being

middle-aged or older.

These factors were listed in respondents' ac-

counts of who is likely to get breast cancer (see
Table 16).

Therefore,

it might appear that rather than giving biased
estimates of the likeli-

hood of getting breast cancer, respondents simply used their
knowledge

of the risk factors in breast cancer to realistically estimate
their own
risk of getting the disease.

It may seem that the possession of correct

information about the characteristics of women who are at high risk of

getting breast cancer would lead to greater accuracy in assessing one's
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own risk.

However,

a

further examination of the
implications of the

representativeness hypothesis indicates
that relying on stereotypes
of
victims in estimating one's own
chances of victitnization does

bias these

estimates, even when the stereotypes
accurately incorporate known
risk
factors.
In using the representativeness
heuristic to judge the proba-

bility of getting

a

disease, for example, people tend
to ignore base

rates for the disease, which biases
their subjective probabilities.
the present study, respondents'

In

opinions as to the percentage of
all

women who get breast cancer were
unrelated to their assessments of
their
own chances of getting breast cancer.
Furthermore, reliance on one's

stereotype of disease victims in making
judgments as to the likelihood

of getting the disease results in the
failure to consider that victims
of the disease do not always match the
stereotype; this failure biases
the likelihood judgments.

Women who are quite knowledgeable about
the

risk factors in breast cancer may overlook
the fact that many breast

cancer victims do not have
and do have children.

a

history of breast cancer in their family,

This gives rise to the conclusion that the
pos-

session of information as to the risk factors of
breast cancer, whether

correct or incorrect, will lead women to make biased
estimates of their
chances of getting the disease, if they do not believe
that they display
the risk factors.

Women who do not see themselves as having the charac-

teristics that cause women to have breast cancer will underestimate

their vulnerability to breast cancer.

The present study demonstrates

that this underestimation may indirectly contribute to delayed help-

seeking for

a

breast cancer symptom.
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For the respondents who
had a .other or sister
with breast cancer

one variable significantly
predicted their ratings of
the likelihood of
getting breast cancer one day.
Respondents who perceived
themselves as
more vulnerable believed that
a higher percentage
of breast cancer victims die of the disease
despite being treated for it.
This finding is
inconsistent with some researchers'
suggestions that motivational
processes cause people to defensively
deny the possibility of
becoming ill,
especially seriously ill (e.g.,
Kirscht, Haefner, Kegeles &
Rosenstock,
1966).

If motivational

processes determined this subsample's
estimates

of getting breast cancer, the
respondents would be expected to
give
themselves a smaller chance of getting
breast cancer when they believed
that breast cancer is often fatal.
In contrast, this finding is
not in-

consistent with the notion that cognitive
processes, including availability biases, figure heavily in
people's judgments of the likelihood
of suffering an illness.

The availability hypothesis states
that emo-

tionally salient events exert

a

disproportionate impact on inferences as

to the frequency with which those
events occur.

In support of this

statement, the present study found that respondents
who considered their

mother and/or sister to have had an unsuccessful
outcome from breast
cancer (perhaps meaning that the relative died),
believed that

a

larger

percentage of breast cancer victims die despite
receiving treatment
(r=-.415, £<.05).

Given that

a

family member's poor outcome from breast

cancer can be an emotionally powerful event, the
experience of this
event apparently inflates estimates of how many women
die from the

disease, which in turn inflates the perceived likelihood
of getting the
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disease.

This cognltively based
explanation for the finding
that respondents «ho had a family history
of breast cancer perceived
themselves
as more vulnerable to the
disease if they also believed
that breast

cancer

1s

incurable. Is only a speculation.

However, it does point to

the possibility that cognitive
biases, as opposed to only
motivational
ones, determine people's
perceptions of their vulnerability
to cancer.
The Decision to Delay

In the present study,

Ann, who discovered

a

respondents read

a

scenario about

a

woman,

breast cancer symptom and decided to
delay seeking

medical care for the symptom.

The results of the study suggest
that

a

different scenario would more realistically
represent the process by

which women decide to delay professional
treatment for
breast cancer.

a

symptom of

This scenario is presented below.

One morning, Ann woke up and took

shower before qettinq
showering, she happened to
fppf.
feel a h.^H
hard tiny ^^H-^r'^thickening on the edge of her left nipple
The
bump was quite small, smaller than the
size of a pea.
Ann wasn'?
sure there was anything unusual about the
spot.
Aside from this
change, she hadn't noticed anything about
her physical condition
that was different from normal.
a

shovjer and thought about what she should
°^
do.
bnould she call the doctor for an appointment or
should she watch
the symptom on her own? Ann thought it would
be somewhat advantageous to call her doctor right away, but she also
thought it would be
of some benefit to monitor the change by herself for
a while.
She
didn't really have any strong opinions one way or the
other.
While
Ann believed that other people, including her family,
her friends,
and most physicians, would probably recommend having an
exam immediately instead of waiting, she didn't imagine that they would
feel
very strongly about what to do either.
Ann didn't think that anything particularly good or bad would happen to her if she
put off
calling the doctor.
She didn't feel anxious about having found the
change in her breast and she didn't believe it could be caused
by
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before, and
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J*^"
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^^ncIudTIh^ '/"'" are rarely diagnosed ^^d
breast cancer
as
Ann didn'? Jhini
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Methodology

The methods that were used in the
present study raise several
issues that need to be addressed.

One issue concerns the fact that

intentions to seek medical care or not
for

a

breast cancer symptom were

assessed with respect to the hypothetical
discovery of such

a

symptom.

Respondents formed their intentions on the
basis of imagining that they
had discovered

a

change in their breast, so that the intentions
under

investigation were not formed in the context of
actually experiencing
this situation.

This raises the potential problem that
the intention

measures did not provide valid indications of what
respondents' intentional

preferences for help-seeking would be, if the women
actually

discovered the breast change described.

The respondents might make

different decisions about obtaining medical treatment, if
and when they
find

a

symptom of breast cancer, from the decisions they believed
they

would .ake when they were
asked to picture themselves
making such
choices,
certain procedures were
followed In the study to
minimize this
potential problem.
The respondents were not
simply instructed to
imagine that they had discovered
a breast cancer symptom,
or a lump in
their breast.
Rather, respondents read a
scenario about a woman who
discovered a change in her breast,
and the circumstances in
which she
made the discovery as well as
the characteristics of the
change, were
described in detail. Thus respondents
were given specific pieces
of
information they could use to readily
imagine themselves in the
situation of finding a breast symptom.
Furthermore, the requirement was
made
that the respondents be 35 years
of age or older. The sample
thereby

consisted of women whose age put them
at high risk of getting breast
cancer.
It is possible that respondents'
cal

supposed intentions to seek medi-

care or not differed from what their
actual intentions would be, be-

cause the women perceived themselves as
likely to respond in

desirable way to finding

a

breast symptom.

In the

a

socially

situation of deciding

whether to seek medical attention promptly
or to delay care for

a

breast

abnormality, the socially desirable decision is
to immediately seek professional care.

It did not appear that respondents'

hypothetical inten-

tions were invalid because of social desirability
biases, since

a

large

proportion of the sample was self-identified as having
intentional
preferences for delay.

Fully 44.8% of the respondents judged that they

would be likely to monitor the change in their breast
for
rather than call the doctor immediately.

a

while,

Two additional measures of
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intentions also showed that
these delayers believed
they would be likely
to monitor the breast
change, but would be unlikely
to call a doctor
1.-

niediately for advice about
the sy.ptom.

Furthermore, intentional
pref-

erences for delay or pronipt
behavior among all respondents,
as assessed
by differential intention
scores, were found to be
reliable.
The finding that a substantial
portion of the respondents
reported having intentions to delay medical care
argues against the possibility
that choice
intentions, even though
hypothetical, were forced purely
on the basis of
social desirability biases rather
than on respondents' realistic
appraisals of what their intentional
choices would be.
However, it is

clear that additional research

is

needed that will examine the
intention

to delay seeking care for a
breast cancer symptom when the
intention is

formed in response to

a

real, as opposed to an imaginary,
symptom.

Another methodological issue involves
the study's focus on the
prediction of intentions instead of behavior.

As just discussed,

the

study assessed respondents' intentions
to engage in prompt or delayed

help-seeking behavior with regard to the
hypothetical occurrence of

a

breast cancer symptom.

Because intentions were measured in relation
to

an imagined experience,

it was not possible to obtain a measure
of

actual behavior and then test the extent
to which intentions predicted

behavior.

This brings up the potential problem that,
had the study

measured help-seeking intentions and behaviors
among symptomatic women,
intentions might be found to be unrelated to the
behavioral observations.

Little understanding of delay behavior would be
gained by

predicting intentions to delay, if intentions were not
predictive of

this behavior.

However, theoretical and
empirical work by Ajzen
and
Fishbeln (1980) suggests
that Intentions would have
accurately predicted
behavior In the situation of
responding to a breast
cancer sy.pto™. if
had been possible to test
the prediction.
Ajzen and Fishbein state
that Intentions predict
behavior, if certain
prerequisites are .et.
They have demonstrated that
Intentions significantly
predict behavior in
a wide variety of behavioral
realms, including losing weight,
using

n

contraception, and consumer and voting
choices, when these prerequisites
are fulfilled.
For intention to predict
behavior, the behavior observed
must be

under volitional control.
is

under

a

According to Ajzen and Fishbein,

a

behavior

person's volitional control if the
individual can decide at

will to perform it or not perform
it.
to the topic of the present study,

for advice about

a

cancer symptom

When this definition is applied

it is apparent that calling
a doctor
is

largely under volitional control,

although this action may be inhibited by
lack of financial resources.
The second requirement that needs to
be met for intention to predict be-

havior, is that intention and behavior
must be assessed at corresponding
levels of generality.

Thirdly, the intention must not have changed
in

the interval between the time at which
it was assessed and the time at

which the behavior was observed.

To ensure a strong intention-behavior

relationship, it is therefore desirable to assess
intention in close
temporal proximity to the behavior, since the longer
the intervening

time interval, the more likely is the occurrence
of unforeseen events

that may change the intention.

In the case of investigating delay in
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seeking care for

breast cancer sympto.. 1t
would certainly be
possible
to design a study in which
these latter two prerequisites
were ^et, if a
sample of symptomatic women
could be obtained.
The ideal study would
be
a prospective one, in
which a sample of sympto^tic
women would be
followed over time.
The women who developed breast
cancer symptoms
would complete measures of their
intentions for prompt or delayed
helpseeking behavior before they
contacted a doctor, and then their
helpa

seeking behavior or lack of it
would be assessed.

If such

a

study were

carried out, there would be no
theoretical reason to suspect that
intentions would not accurately predict
behavior.

Hopefully, prospective

studies of this type will be performed
in the future, not only to
provide a better understanding of delay
in seeking medical care for
breast

cancer symptoms, but to also provide

a basis

on which effective inter-

ventions can be designed to deter delay
behavior.

FOOTNOTES

and

..non-

irA'^'<-'^^^^^^^^^^^^
differential

'^""P'^ at the median of
intention scores and
Ihl^
immediately call the doctor
^"t^"*^'"" to
'The resuUs Ztlt\''.°''
6, that compare delayers to
"> =• and
non-delayeJs do no? rhJ"
tive way according to
""^ substanwhich intent on me^.n^^ ?,
"^^l^^
groups.
-^^^ *° "^^'"^ the two
The findings that were
ba ed on rlL=
f
9lassifying
ing to intention to
respondents accordengage in del^v

tation. because beha
o'ral
nd
respect to delay behavior,
and
was of interest.

nol

Presenel^rr
""^^ "^t^i
th^ mwct of
°^ thL!T,"l""''
'^^^^ beliefs on
e

intentions

Delayers and non-delayers were r-nmr,a..=w
^^*''^"' '"'"^'"^ to the
open-ended question that asked
resDonden^
thought their doctor would
'^^^
g1velher i? thev d^d^H^'r*'"
'decide to call the
doctor immediately. Of the 27 r^n^ndl r'^^J^''
P'-°^''«led an answer, 107
(84.3%) stated that the dnrtnr
ih
''^'"'"^^ examinat o
and/or test, and 20 (15
7%) stated Pit'h'°T.'"^ \"
mend monitoring the change
fo \'l
e o, t^*
"^'"^ uncertain of
what advice the doctor would nivo thl!'
?•
,
'^'^'-^''"are test that compared
delayers and non-delayers
on ?he«
association; X^dnfeS p<
' ^^^n^ficant
oSl
flmnnn ?£°"ln'
''''''''
doctor would recommend monf
or? g Sn? 'th ee 1^'?
were
(15.0%)
and 17 85.0%) were delaver^ TnV^^^
non-delayers,
?
lieved the doctor woul ^ec
l'^^ie d a exam 'fiHS S?
and 38 (35.5%) were in
non-delayers,
'^^^
'
the"™ayer groS

r

J

terna/vaHaMerin^d^f'""
?n\"nJio^r;o'Jl^^

'^^""-1
inten?,"'

intentions

coefficients were also computed
between ex-

e^Ttor'°^hfr:sius'ofXs*r' ^V^"^^^
to those" pre'slntld^^

i

u'

zed°'d7 ^e^^enliri"

^"corporate all the data available
concerning

concerning personal diagnoses we!e'useS'?o ^hP^?%H^'""f"^!^?^"^*^'°"
reliability of respondents' ratings
of the
l^LmnnH^h ! .u^^t
'^'"^e was a breast cancer symptom.
The sample was
5
H
Oroups at the median of the likelihood
^
ratings
The

r.n'"^?
^^^'^"^^
^^^^^d be ow the
"'"'l'''' °'
med la'n and the
median,
thT"'cancer"
group was made up of 62 women (46
3%) who
scored above the median.
(Two women did not respond Eo this
tern
A
chi-square test was used to compare the
two qroups across the response
'
categories for personal diagnosis, and the
result was si gnifi can
X (2)=45.70, £<.001.
All of the 30 women who, in the
open-enSeS
^^nnn

)

162

163

question, made a cancer diagnosis wprp in ^-h^ ^,
"^^^ "^^J^^"
ity (75.9%, n=44) of the
^''^'P'
59 resoondent. 1^
S'"'^''
' non-cancer diagnosis
were in the non-cancer qrouD
ThP ?n
''u^^
personal diagnoses were^?most
°^ their
as 1
k^°-^'L'
(n=9) as in the cancer grou^
'''''
n' 1
''|^is°r suU Z^^'^'r.''
livelihood ratings of th^e cKaige bii
,

Lrtn

ng^^l,.Tto:^;"g;^:sTc:^^ce^^^e

test

-^^^

whe?heMhe'ih?:e eTternal^var^ablpr^H^r^-^^"!'^^^^^^

o7

to

to the prediction
iffere
a
on 'VtJfrllSr'^'-'^
contribution to prediction when he
e t'm a
es of at'tJJndl^^H'
subjective norm with respect to delay
were subst tufed
Jh!

^

silbje^liJe'nomt reTin'' he^^Tres""'^l^'^^'
'V^''^'^
intention scores were predicted
from ?utt
L.- r^'.^'^^^"^^"^'^^

the estimate of attitude toward
monitoring the breast rh^noplnw
with regard to m ito
g'.^'l
re s'ion
T^lZTl'l
showed
that l^'r^'^^
both predictors were significant,
together accLting for
41/o of the variance in
differential intentions (R= 642 d< nni
tZ
regression coefficients were .483
(p<.001
and §35 (i^lSB^f r the
attitude and subjective norm estimates,
respectively

intention scores were predicted from
the
attitnHf and
^nH^c'K^'^!^''^"*''^
attitude
subjective norm estimates, and each of the
three external
Predictions were made by means of hierarch?ca
mu tiple lT'
regression analyses, where the estimates
were entered as pred cthe externarvar able under
^'"'^ '''P 'I
'''^^'''^
Tnllfl
investigation was entered
on the second step.
The following
rouowing taoie
table
presents the results of these analyses.

liX

External variable

2

b

R

R_

change

Significance
change

of R

Anxious and panicky upon
finding breast change

-.141

.654

.428

.016

.056

Likelihood change is a
symptom of breast cancer

-.130

647

.418

.014

.087

698

.487

.075

.000

Usually goes to the
doctor right away when
physical symptom is
noticed

-.315

Respondents' feelings of anxiety and panic after discovering the
breast
change, and their ratings of the likelihood that the change
was a breast
cancer symptom, marginally contributed to the prediction of
differential
intentions, above and beyond the attitude and subjective norm estimates
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his questionnaire is part of

a study that
explores the different
decisions
people .a.e about seeking .edical
help.
We are particularly
inter
different decisions wo.en .a.e
about what to do when thly
fi.d .
their breast.
Some women decide to call
their doctor immediately
an
some women decide to watch the
lump for a while to see
what happens
Please
read the scenarios below.
The scenarios describe
the experiences of two
women. Ann and Susan.
You will see that, although
the women had the same
experience, they had different
reactions to that experience

-

'

--outofthesho.^
leave V^S:^^^' Slus'^^^^as^hte^?^^
1°
^h^f^l tlt^d^^J^^^
edge of ner left nipple.
The lump'^ario sl^ll
m
r^'^ha?
h^s?ze"o?:
pea. that Susan wasn't sure it was
anything unusual.
Aside from the lumo
1

^^'-"^

from"n:?JSK
Susan thought about how small

condi

tio^^haTwa?d1T??;ent

the

lump was and that she was feelinq as
"^'^^^ht that, because the lump was
ny and
Tnl\tl'.'
sne felt f ne, she should watch the lump
to find out if it would chaLe or
'''''''
watch thTlum
or a ihile'^Sh^'n °1H °(
appointment to have an exa;i,ination
^
at a iSer time

^'^^

We would

like to know what your reactions would
be if you had the same

experience as Ann and Susan.

First, try to imagine that what happened
to

Ann and Susan has just happened to you.
a

lump in your breast while taking

edge of your left nipple;
the

it

is

a

Imagine that you have just found

morning shower.

The lump is on the

hard and smaller than a pea.

Other than
lump, you haven't noticed anything out of the
ordinary about your

physical condition.

Next, please respond to the following questions as

if you have just experienced the same situation
as Ann and Susan.

realize that responding as if you are actually

difficult.

in

Please take your time and do your best.

or wrong answers to any of the questions.

We

this situation may be

There are no right

?Jun"%^^S:riJ'yo:?V?:Is?.^^"'^^°"^

2)

3)

^^-^

-^^^

1^ you ^ad Just

What do you see as the disadvantages of
immediately call ing the doctor?

Is

there anything else you associate with immediately
calling the doctor?

Are there any people or groups who would disapprove
of you irmediately
calling the doctor?

TutlVaT

"

advantages of watching the lump for

a

What do you see as the disadvantages of
watching the lump for

Is

while, as

a

there anything else you associate with watching the lump for

while?

a

while

9)

10)

11)

Are there any people or
groups who
for a while?

Are there any people or groups who
lump for a while?

approve of you watching the
lump

disaoprove of you watching the

What emotions did you feel when you found the
lumo?

(Please list.)

12)

a)

On each of the fol lowi
ng scales, please out sn
^
to your response.
'

I

intend to immediately call

likely

:

:

:

in fh=

y

'^^^

^

the doctor, as Ann did
•

:

.

.

.-

b)

I

intend to watch the lump for

likely

:

;

:

:

a
•

14)

unlikely

while, as Susan did
•

.

:

13)

space that corresponds

Suppose you decided to watch the lump
for

Suppose you decided to watch the lump for
away.

a

a

while

unlikely
(i

e

von Hid nn.

while and it did not ao
="

a)

Would you eventually call

b)

If yes, how long would you wait to call
the doctor froni the time
you found the lump?
(Please give number of days, weeks months
or years

the doctor?

yes

no

'

.

)

Background Information
1)

What is your marital status?

Never married
^Married

_Separated or divorced
Widowed
2)

What year were you born?

3)

Ethnic Background:

_White

Jlack
_Hispanic
_Asian
Other:
4)

Religion:
Cathol ic
^Protestant

_Jewish
Other:

None

5)

What is the last year of school
you completed?
8th grade or below
Some high school
^Graduated

from high school

_Some business or trade school

_Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graaudted from college
_Sonie

graduate work

_Graduate degree
6)

Are you employed?

yes

If yes, what is your occupation
7)

How many people do you live with?

people.

8)

What is your household's
annual income?
510,000 or less
SlO.OOl

-

$20,000

320,001

-

530,000

530,001

-

540,000

540,001

-

550,000

550,001 or more
9)

How many people does this
income support?

If you are
1)

present!.

...hm

people.

please answer the following
questions.
What IS the last year of
school your husband
completed?
8th grade or below
,

Some high school

Graduated from high school
Some business or trade

school

Graduated from business or
trade school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work

Graduate degree
2)

Is

your husband employed?

If

yes, wnat

is

yes

nis occupation?

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR
HELP!

no
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Hello,

^studying decisions
people make about seeking
medical hi!r I
"^^^
medical care in the United
"^t of
States ±t r' -nf
important to find out .lit
^°
jo
ToT^Tl?'.
cular I am studying how
women make decisions abo^t
care for health problems
^^''^"^ medical
that apnlv onlv
Your name has been chosen
men.
Ts\ Ztl
I
in Hampshire County
^-Ple of women living
°' "

iTlyVoZ

\

^

study^rfUlli:^;° aTesti^nnalr:"

'^'^
"^^^
5^ S^^^"^
read a brief sto'ry abou^
^"^^
a^ioLTwh^'-,,
\''p:;.\^L^^^^^^
Particular change in her
body, and Chen you would
answer auesrinn=
"^at you would
think, feel, and do if
you we? e in th^
^""^^ion as the woman in
the story.
The questionnaire L^p
to complete.
^"'^
hour
All of
T/u
confidential
and your nan,e would never
be a^;"- J^d
T''^'^''
to not answer any
^^^^
"
questions vou do
'°
Furthermore,
you could fill out th^^,^^!^

^

ZrreLont

Enclosed is a stamped, addressed
postcard that

t

wnniw

This study has been reviewed and
approved by the Department of
"-^"^ '^^^
out
°ect"d"^^':-H

-

S^r

hesS~b

Sincerely,

Clvu/ltli u.
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INFORMED CONSENT FORM
In the questionnaire you are
about to

asked to read

a

fin

out, you are first

story about a woman who notices

a

particular

Change in her body.

You are then asked to imagine
that you
are in the same situation as the
woman in the story,
and to

answer questions concerning what
you believe you would think,
feel, and do if you were in
this situation. You are also
asked to provide your opinions
about some general and specific
health-related issues, as well as some
information about your
actual medical history.
If you have any questions while
you are completing the

questionnaire, do not hesitate to call
me. Christine Timko. at
545-1390 (days) or 586-8142 (evenings).
You are free to not
answer any questions on the questionnaire
that you do not want
to answer, and to discontinue your
participation in this study
at any time.
All of your responses will be completely
confidential
and your name will never be associated
with them; the questionnaire
will be identified by a number, rather
than by your name.

^hisltidy^

"""^^^

statement and

I

agree to participate in

Signature

Date

Instructions

—

In the questionnaire
you are about-

rr.

fn

"^^^
''^^
3pa e ;';o^ e°t;'j:
use
ILIT'''
tha best T^'^'
T^^^^"'^^
describes your opinion.
'""^'^
^^e place
For e^ampSe ^f" "
weather
Massachusetts" on such a
^^l^^*^ t° "te
"The
scaS ^he
rh!' seven
^"l^as follows:
spaces should be

m

interpreted

The weather in
Massachusetts is
good;

extremely

quite

TTi^hnT' -^^IIEh^''

Tll^

:bad
'^"ite

yo„r:.si.' jst.-j^""

extremely
^^^^^

The weather in Massachusetts
is

good:_

x

:

The weather in Massachusetts
is
good:

:

m

The weather
likely:

Massachusetts is cold in January,

.

^^^^^^ ^^li^'iiiih^Tr'-i^iiii^^iii^^
In making your ratings,
(1)

please remember the following
points:

Place vour marks in the middle
of spaces, not on the
boundaries:
this

not
this

(2)

Please try Co answer every item.

(3)

Never put more than one check
mark on

a

single scale.

US

,3

.

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^

..3

^^^^^^^^^
...o..

^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^

^^^^^^ ^^^^

rw.
^

a

^^^^^

change in her breast.
On. corning, »„„

^ouse.

-S.

„p

^ ^

3h„„,rlng, ,he happen., ro
,e.l a a
her i.er nippie. .h.
hn.p ... ,„i,e s^U, .
.

"

"

^„

L

L L

T

.nr... .„,rh.ng ah.r h.r
ph.r.a. .....In rh.::: .'^
Ann got out of the shower
and thought about what
she snouid
should do.
do
immediateiv
ly calling
callinc the
rh« H„.^
doctor for an appointment,
but she

^r''

Sh. considered
She

<:

thought rh.^

^^.^^

best to monitor the change
herself for a

.lle/l^L

u-

^

Z

U.P3 in their breasts that soon
disappear b. themselves.
She was not an alal
nd She would closel, watch
the bump on her own.
Ann decided she would call
octor 1 the thlCenlng persisted,
grew, or changed.
She felt that, for the
time
being, there was no risk
in not calling the doctor.

I

We would like to know what
your reactions would be if you
Had the same experience as
Ann.
First, try to imagine that what
happened to Ann has just happened
to vou.
.

imagine that you have Just felt

nipple while taking
of a pea.

a

a

hard,

tiny thickening on the edge
of your left

morning shower.

The bump is so small, smaller
than the si^e
that you aren't sure there is
really anything different about
the spot.

Other than this change, you haven't
noticed anything out of the ordinary
about your
physical condition.
Next, please answer the following
questions as if you have just

experienced the same situation as Ann.

We realize that responding as
if you are in

this situation may be difficult,
but please take your time to think
seriously about
what your reactions would actually
be.
There are no right or wrong answers to
any
of the questions.

Thank you.

Part A
1)

How likely is it that
you would declrlp ^^
for a while, as Ann
decided to do father

^'^^^^
th^'"
immediately calling

'

likely:

"reast
the doctor?

likely

extremely
3)

sl,,,,,y

llA'llTo.Z?''''^ "

^""'^

'-l^^-^-j^r^--—---^
''"^^

less than one day
^

three months

one week

SIX months

two weeks

one year

three weeks

^more

our weeks

,

If the lump did not change
in any way

less than one day

one week
two weeks

three weeks
four weeks

than one year
,

^would never call the
doctor

sia weeks

two days
^

it would you

two months

two days

^)

^^-r noticing

(i e

^,,„
two

it-

^iA

.

^,
months

three months

SIX months
one year

more than one year
n,

^would never call the doctor

six weeks

less than one day
'^^y^

"^^^
two weeks

two months

three months
six months

one year

three weeks

„ore than one year

four weeks

^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^

six weeks

^^^^

^^^^^^

:::: :::

6)

For you Co decide to monitor the
change in your breast for
a while, rather
than inunediately calling the
doctor, would be:

wise
foolish

_:

strong:
_:weak.

motivated:
aimless

_:

useful:
_:useless

active
_:

passive

_:

healthy

slck::_

pleasant :_

_: unpleasant

easy
_:difficult

comfortable:
_:uncomf ortable
good:

_:bad

emotional:
_:

pessimistic :_
excitable

:_

harmful :_

_:

optimistic

_:

calm

_:benef icial

practical:_
_:

convenient :_

impractical

_:

inconvenient

_:

effortless

_:

peaceful

_:

objectionable

_:

impossible

ef fortful:_

troublesome

acceptable

manageable
7)

unemotional

For you to decide to immediately call the doctor
would be:

wise

_:

strong

foolish

_:weak.

motivated
useful:

active
sick:

_:

aimless

_:

useless

_:

passive

_:healthy

pleasant

:_

_:unpleasant

easy

:_

_:dif ficult

comfortable:
good

:_

emotional :_

pessimistic
excitable

_:

uncomfortable

_:bad

_:unemotional
:

optimistic

:

calm

:

For you to decide to
immediately
'ii-eiy call ^h«
the adoctor would
be
harmful
beneficial

practical

convenient

impractical

effortful

inconvenient
effortless

troublesome

peaceful

acceptable

objectionable

manageable

impossible

Suppose you did decide
to immediately call ^h.

i-iediatel, caUing the
doctor?

a

'

'l""

likely:
:

XJ'^f i::i:di:t:^y"c:^!^c°d^oc^:^°
likely:

.

:

.

^'-^^^^^-^

•

:

.

.

'

'

For

a>e

good

:

to

.

:unlikelv

control my own health and feel
confidence in myself is:
•

.

.

•

:bad

.'•

:

2)

^^^^k you

:unlikelv

•

•

1)

^°

.

'

likely:

unlikely

For me to avoid unpleasant
medical procedures is:

good

:

:
•

TelZsVr

^''^

"

.

.

•

•

:bad

•
:

"-^^^^^

^

^'^-^^

good
:bad

-

breast is nothing

;

For me to handle my
problems and decisions
"^""^"^ °^
chem over Co someone else,
is:

4)

good:

:
•

5)

'•

:bad

:

For me to avoid being
inconvenienced
"'^ bv taking
takino ^•
time away from my
routine is:
daily
good:

:

:bad

•
=

6)

own, instead of
turning

For me to take time to
find a doctor
good:

.

:

.

I

trust is
IS

.

:bad

For me to avoid appearing
as a silly and foolish
alarmist
good:
:

"

good:

:bad

'

•

:

•

"

:bad

•
:

9)

For me to not know what
a change in my breast
means is:
good:

-

•

:

.

.

•

•

:

:bad

:

Part Bi

confidence in ^yZif

conttoiling „y o«n health

.

md

»o„ld feel

likely:
_:unlikely
2)

'^^"^^
""^^"^
^ -hile rather than called
lL\nT'°''-^''
the doctor immediately, I
would avoid unpleasant medical
procedures
likely:

•

:

•

.
•

3)

If

unlikely

monitored the change in my breast
for a while rather than called fhp
doctor immediately, I would feel
anxious, fearful, SSfwor^ie".
I

likelv:
4)

:

:

.

:

.

.

•

•

:unlikely

:

If I monitored the change in
my breast for a while rather than
called
the doctor immediately, I would
be able to convince mvself that
tL
change in my breast is nothing serious.
'

likely:

•

.

.

.

•

•

^^^""^^

dLr^r"''".""^

•

:

™^ ''"^"^

:

unlikely

^ "hil^

"^her than called

'""'^^^"^

oZ instead
own
iLr", of turning them over to someone P""^"'^
else.
likely:

;

;

.

.

•

•

.

.
:

decisions on

, •,
runlikely
,

the

m/

:

6)

If

monitored the change in my
breasr fo.

I

likely:^

•

:
'

:

.

'

'

7)

If

monitored the change in my breast
doctor immediately, I would
avoid
°" h^f
from my daily routine.

•

:

likely:

:

.

~"

.

for-

,

u.i
^"^^

If

I

:

•

:
'

"Hed

the

_

'

monitored the change in my
breast for

likely:

^^^^

inconvenienced by taking
time away

'•

8)

unlikely

I

.

:

.

unlikely

„h,M

.
'

•

:

unlikely

^

other disabling treatments-

surgery and/or

likely
_:unlikely

likely:

•

:

.

.

•

^^eL=-;-r-.^-.r—
likely:

.

•

.

unlikely

^^^^^^^

•
:

:

unlikely

monitored the change in my breast for
a while rather than called
the
doctor xnnnedxately, cancer would have
time to grow or spread
If I

likely:

•

:

•

.

.

•

13)

:

.
•

12)

'

•

If

:

:

unlikely

monitored the change in my breast for
a while rather than called
the
doctor immediately, if and when I did
call the doctor I woulfbe ab!e to
^"^"^'"-^^ ^'^-^
for him/her to make an accurate
I

ZlnoliT^'"'
likely:

;

;

.

.

.

.

:unlikely

:

'"^^

Ynrl
doctor
immediately,
likely:
^

:

;

ILl
doctor
immediately,

=^^"8^
breast for
I would save money.

a

.

.

.

.

•

•

•

:

while rather than called the

•,
i
:unlikely
,

^^ange in my breast for a while rather than
called the
I would be decreasing my chances
for a complete cure

16)

If I monitored the change
in mv breast fnr
doctor unmediately, the'lun^p

"'''^ '''"^'^ ^^an called
the

ZuiTll\tZ

likely:

;

.

;
'

.

,

•_
.: unlikely
monitored the change in mv breast
fnr =
u.i
doctor i:„.ediately. I wLld
'^^^ "^^^^ the
av^id'^u^s^I^.'^^g^^^J^,"^^"
•

17)

If

I

likely;

.

;

'

•

likely:

:

=

^:

;
'

•

likely:

:

•

:
"

.

:unlikely

'

•

.
'•

^^^^^ ^^^""^

"my children")!

likely:

.

:

.

:

.

.

•

•

:

unlikely

^he questions that ask about

'

likely:

unlikely

.

:

unlikely

.

•

'

•

:

unlikely

w'hUe:°r:t;:r"?:an
^^^"^^
uLiier tnan call
calTtL^So^ct^
the doctor"-"""i"^
immediately.

^"

,

likely:

•

.

.

•

'

'° """'^"^ ^'^^
wniie,
while^'SertiL'San
rather than call the doctor
immediately.

l^t'

•

•

.

:unlikely
'^'^^^^^

.
'

•

5)

^

.

•

likely:

''"^^

•

:

^"

""-^

^or a

unlikely

My parents would think I ought
to monitor the change in my
breast for a
while, rather than call the doctor
immediately.

likely:

•

•

.

.

•

•

•

:

'° """^^"^
'
2i?r'°^r"''/''"'
while,
rather than call him/her immediately.

:unlikely
breast for a

7)

My husband would think

likely:

t

;

'

"

„v

°J

^

^
„
My in-laws
would rhnr,^

likely;

'

:unllkely

t

;

'

likely:

.

;

'•

'

g.

.
"

likely:

:unlikely

'

.'

:unllkely

;

-

likely:

•

:unlikely

.

:

'

.:unlikely

Part CI
'>

o.„.„u, .,.^.„,.
likely:

„

,

.

;

"
2)

^^^^^

"

Generally speaking,
supaleinn

t

i

-

likely:

_

-

'

.p....„,.

likely:

.

;

•

„

,

likely:

,

.

•-

'

=.«=„n,

sp,..i„,.

likely:

'.

:unlikely

-

^

^^^^^

.

'

,

..'unlikely

„^

.

:

^^^^

„^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

.

:

^

,

•

=.»..auv sp„.,„,,

:unlikely

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

.
'

5)

ought to do.

I

.

~

» ce„„n,

^^^^^

:unlikely

„an. to do what
.y f.iends think

.

:

^

.

.

^

^^^^^

.

'

•.

•

6)

c.„.„u, .p„k,„,.
likely:

,

„.„

.

:

.

„^
.

'

7)

Generally speaking.
likely:

:

.

•_
I

..'unlikelv

'

:unlikely

want to do what .y husband
thinks
.

1

.

'

•

•

:unlikely

ought to do.

" -

Generally speaking,

8)

ilKely:

want

I

.

:

m
'°

Generally speaking,
likely:

-

-

m

„ant
"^"^
^° ^°

I

.

:

Generally speaking,
likely:

^hinlc I ought

to do

••unlikely

'•.

u

Siblings think

ought to do.

I

.

-'

10)

^"-^-^

.

"

9)

u

'° "'^^ ™^

:unlikely

•_

•

„ant to do What
^•
what my
mv rpl
relatives
think

I

ought to do.

I

:

:unlikely

r."u""tr""^likely:

" -

'

-."cn C„„,

S.c.„. .M„.,

;

-

"'

'

.:unlikely

'

Part C2
i)

I would talk to
my co-worker=; co
about the change
my breL".

L

likely:

a

e->

"'^^ ^^^^

I

ought to do

:
'

likely:

-•

•unlikely

'•

:
'

:unlikely

'

"

^'^i-'^

"rs.^^/'" °"

'b:«'?.rjH^;:,"
likely:

.

:

.

-^^

«

.

.:unlikely

likely:

:

:

.

'

'

" ^^o™'2.riL°."i/:;"'L3".""'' °"
likely:^

:

.

:
'

Jhe"°c;Lg:1n"yTre::t!'^
likely:

.

:

:unlikely

'

•

'"'^

.

•

"

^^^^ ^^^^''^

.

~'

;

.

.

^

.
'

•

:

unlikely

.
•

•

.-

:

««^'

unlikely

:

•

'

likely:

'

unlikely

-^^^

-

about

,

8)

I

would Calk to my
in-law<5

likely:

m f

^

;

'

Qx

•

«rSL^f-;likely:

.0
,

:

^'

10)

would talk to my
relatives
^he Change in
.y Lait^"^^^
I

likely:
ii;

m
"

'

^^ey think

I

ought to do about

'

:unlikelv

-'•

would talk to the Ampri^,„ n
<.".^= .0 .o
I

-

th.,

—

;
'

'

•

:

unlikely

"""--;r"h:^;;:,r:rjriDiscovering the change
in

ai

breast made .e feel:

Embarrassed and ashamed
extremely:
.:not at all

2)

Fearful and apprehensive
extremely:

:

.•not at all
3)

Anxious and panicky
extremely:

:

:not at all
4)

Angry and annoyed
extremely:
:not at all

5)

Surprised and curious
extremely:

:

.•not at all
6)

Disbelieving and shocked
extremely:
:noc at all

7)

Pessimistic and hopeless
extremely:

.

:

.

.

'

8)

^^^^^

:unlikely

'

f ^
^^"^

^

likely:

1)

^^^^^

;

~
,,,

:unlikely

'

^

•

'

:not at all

Concerned and worried
extremely:

~

:

•

.

.

'
'•

'

^:not at

all

.actions

j

Discovering the change in my breast made
me feel
9)

Sad and depressed

:::•.,

extremely:

not at all

Part E-This section of the questionnaire
asks about your personal diagnosis
of the change in your breast.
Please respond to the questions, eve!
ir your answers are guesses.
1)

2)

What is your own diagnosis of the change
in your breast?

To what extent does your personal diagnosis
represent a lif e-threatenine
°

condition?

life-threatening:
3)

:

;

:unlikely

.

;

:

at all

:

:

;

;

.-not

:

:

:

:

;

:not at all

:

:

:

:

:

:not at all

:

:

:

:

:

:not at all

:

:

Anxious and panicky
:

Angry and annoyed
:

::::::

Surprised and curious
extremely:

i

;

Fearful and apprehensive

extremely:
5)

:

Embarrassed and ashamed

extremely:
4)

life-threatening

:

the change in my breast turned out to be breast cancer,

extremely:
3)

:

section of the questionnaire asks about what your emotional reactions
would be if the change in your breast turned out to be breast cancer.

extremely:
2)

:

F— This
If

1)

:

How likely is it that the change in your breast is a symptom
of breast cancer?
^^^e.ly:

Part

:

:not at all

I

would feel:

"
6)

the Change in

,,east turned out .o
.e breas. cancer

Disbelieving and shocked

I
'

'

.
=

extremely:
:not at all
7)

Pessimistic and hopeless
extremely:

:

.:not at all
8)

Concerned and worried
extremely:

:

:not at all
9)

Sad and depressed

extremely:

:

_:not at all

~.
CO .e.p„„.

Section

II— Instructions

,„.„,„„^„ „„,^„,

„

^

PI....

^^^^^^

th..

questions as you

oomaUy

^^^^

,

„„„id.

Have you ever uj.icoverecl
discoverpri
ILjiies:

How many times?

a
a

^^^^

^^^^

i,,m^ in
lump
your breast?

—

'°

vpc=
j'^=>

was the doctor's diagnosis
of the lump(s)?

Have you ever had any breast
symptoms other than a lump?

ILies:

yes

How much time went by
between your discovery of
the
lump(s) and you contacting
a doctor?
Pleas^ ind
the number of days, weeks,
months, or years

IVhat

2)

^no

time(s)

Did you have the lamp(s)
examined by a doctor?

ILZM--

^^^^^^^

H3„^

*"iio«"o:;™cirL3;::rs"^ij:."'' '~
1)

^

^^^^ ^^^^^^

Please briefly describe the
symptom(s).

yes

e

3)

Have you ever had breast
cancer?

^)

Have you ever had any
.,pe of cancer ocher
.Han 5reas. cancer^
Has your .other or
sister(s) ever had breast
cancer^
yes

5)

ves

on the „hoXe. how
successful „as

successful:

the. outcome

2)

3)

HOW .any ti.es in the
past year have you
performed
times

a

„o.„

g,t, b„.,t cancsr?

the disease, die of it?

^unsuccessful

breast
oreast self
e
.
self-examination?

p.rc,„t.g. „f i„.p. 13 ,i,j„„„,
^3 ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
Uh.t p.rcmt.ge of

brelTler.

:

„
6)

fro^

^yes

^
j

7

5)

What percentage of women
who have breast cancer,
and are treated for the
disease, die of it?

6)

HOW many women do ,ou .now
who have discovered a
breast lump that was not
diagnosed as breast cancer?
women

x

7)

HOW many women do you .now
who have discovered
diagnosed as breast cancer?
„omen

answers are guesses

How likely is it that you
will one day get breast cancer?
likely:

•

:

.

.

•

2)

breast lump that was

vulnerability
questions, even if your

'~to'':r:::t":an:e? ^^aiT^Je:"^^^^
'
1)

a

•

:unlikely

:

To what extent do you
have personal control over not
getting breast cancer?

completelv:

:
'

•

.

.
•

'
:

:not at all

4)

5)

How would you descrihp rh^
'^^^
'
breast cancer?

^

"^o has a high chaace
of getting

To what extent do you
oiatch this description?

completely:

:

:

•

.

.:not at all

Part D-Below is a list
of physical symptoms.
We would
symptom as to how frequently
it i« !
Z
breast cancer is in its
°^
earL in^
scale to rate each sJ^ptSr'^^-^^'^
1

'^"^^

'^"^ each
"hen
^^e following

early,

initial breast cancer never
produces this symptom
initial breast cancer rarelv
produces this symptom
= early, initial breast cancer
sometimes produces this
symptom
= early, initial breast cancer
usually produces this symptom
= early, initial breast cancer
always produces this symptom
=

= early,

3

ea^rs^i^toT"'"^

.

_
.

'''' corresponds to your rating
in the space preceding

1)

convulsions

2)

sore or stiff muscles, back

3)

hot flashes

^)

shortness of breath, coughing

5)

weight loss

6)

hair loss

7)

pain or tenderness in breast,
nipple

8)

change in appearance of wart or
mole

_ 9)

fever

_10)

numbness,

tingling in any part of body

: ::

1

=

never

-2

:

11)

-

so^ne^,

, ,

^13)

weight gain

14)

lump or thickening
in breast

^^^^

__

heal

upset stomach,
stomachache

17)

—18)

faintness, dizziness

19)

u

heartburn, indigestion

20)

ringing in ears

21)

constant thirst

_22)

bleeding or discharge
from nipple

_23)

abnormal Pap smear

_24)

chills

_25)

chest pains

_26)

running, congested,
or bleeding nose

_27)

weakness, tiredness

-28)

change in size, shape,
or skin of breast

_29)

abnormal vaginal bleeding

30)

^

Change in retraction
or scaliness
of n,pp,e
a sore that
doesn't

16)

—
—

i.
3

blurred vision

-13)

—

v

headaches

_12)

—

= rare]

sore throat,
hoarseness, difficulty
swallowing

Breast cancer is:

permanent
temporary

incurable
curable

disabling:
'

empowering

dangerous
:

safe

::: :

::

Breast cancer Is:

painful
:

painless

serious
:mild

life-threatening:
recurring:

unpredictable:

__:not life-threatening

—

:not recurring

^predictable

contagious:
inheritable:

unpreventable:

—

:not contagious

— :not

inheritable

preventable

uncontrollable:
:

controllable

dirty:
:

clean

mysterious

_: well-understood
unfair:

_: fair

bad:_
_:good
punishing
rewarding

unpleasant
pleasant

undeserved
deserved
a

disease that
results in permanent bodily
changes

—

disease that
results in permanent personality"
changes

a disease that
.results in no
- bodily
changes

a

:

disease that
requires long
treatment

.:

a disease that
results in no
personality changes

a

<P1.... keep goI„g-,„„

_:

Le .L:. LIj^JLuyftf

a disease that
requires short
treatment

::

1)

In general, my relationships
with doctors have been:

good
bad

beneficial
harmful

satisfactory:
unsatisfactory

comfortable
uncomfortable

friendly :_

unfriendly

usually go_
right away"

'

•

.usually

•

:

:

:

'wait
3)

In general,

do you consult doctors on a re2„l;,r h =
,
regular basis or only
in
.

emergencies?
on a regular

.only in

basis

emergencies
the most recent time you called
the doctor about a Pf^Ysical
physical
symptom you had noticed.
What was the symptom?

questionnaire asks for your opinions about
general
''"tpilrh^''l°",?^
health and illness issues.
Please use the following scale in responding
to each statement below.
6

4

5

3

strongly
agree

2

1

strongly
disagree

Place the number that corresponds to your response in the
space
preceding each statement.
_ 1.

If
I

I get sick, it is my own behavior which determines
how soon
get well again.

No matter what

I

do,

if

I

am going to get sick,

I

will get sick.

.

tor me to

_

Most things that affect my health
happen to me by accident.

A.

-

-''^-Uy

^

trained

am in control of my health.

_

6.

I

_

7.

My fa^nily has a lot to do with
my becoming sick or staying
healthy.

_

8.

'.Jhen

" ^'

I

get sick

I

am to blame.

determining how soon

ITilltlll.^

will recover from

I

_10.

Health professionals control

_11.

My good health is largely a matter of
good fortune.

_12.

The main thing which affects my health
is what

_13.

If

_1A.

When I recover from an illness, it's usually
because other people
(for example, doctors, nurses, family, friends)
have been taking
good care of me.

_15.

No matter what

I

take care of myself,

I

do,

16.

If

it's meant to be,

17.

If

I

I

ray

health.

I

myself do.

can avoid illness.

I'm likely to get sick.
I

will stay healthy.

take the right actions,

Regarding my health,

_18.
t

"-"^^

'

TrT^lllVJr''

I

I

can stay healthy.

can only do what my doctor tells me to do.

H--This section of the questionnaire asks for your general feelings
about
yourself
Please use the following scale in responding to each statement below.
A

2

3

strongly
agree

agree

1

disagree strongly
disagree

Place the number that corresponds to your response in the space
preceding each statement.
1-

I feel that I'm
with others.

2.

I

feel that

I

a

person of worth, at least on an equal basis

have a number of good qualities.

scrongly

agree

disagree rtrongly
disagree

^S'^^^

:

_

3.

All in all,

4.

I

am able to do things as well
as most other people.

5.

I

feel that

6.

I

take a positive attitude toward
myself.

7.

On the whole,

8.

I

wish

9.

I

certainly feel useless at times.

I

At times

10.

I

I

am inclined to feel that

I

am a failure.

do not have much to be
proud of.

I

am satisfied with myself

could have more respect for
myself.

I

think

I

am no good at all.

Background Information
1)

What is your marital status?
^Never

married

Married
Separated or divorced

Widowed
2)

What year were you born?

3)

Ethnic background:

White
Black

_Hispanic

Asian
Other:
4)

Religion:

Catholic
Protestant

Jewish
Other:

None
5)

Are you employed?
If yes,

yes

what is your occupationl

6)

What is the last year of school
you completed?
8th grade or below
Some high school

Graduated from high school
Some business or trade school

_Graduated from business or trade
school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work
_Graduate degree
7)

How many people do you live
with?

8)

What is your household's annual
income?

people

$10,000 or less
510,001 - 520,000

$20,001 - $30,000
$30,001 - 340,000
$40,001 - $50,000

_$50,001 or more
9)

How many people does this income
support?

If you are presently married
1)

,

people

please answer the following questions.

What is the last year of school
your husband completed?
3th grade or below

_Some high school
_Graduated from high school
_Some business or trade school

_Graduated from business or trade school
_Some college
_Graduated from college
_Some graduate work

_Graduate degree
2)

Is your

husband employed?

If yes, what is his occupation?

yes

no

i

i

